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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy credibility has been a key ingredient of many theoretical macro models of 
policymaking in the 1980s. Following the path-breaking paper by Kydland and 
Prescott (1979), the early literature on macroeconomic policy games has stressed the 
time-inconsistency of low inflation. Governments face the temptation to exploit the 
short-term Phillips-curve trade-off between higher inflation and lower unemployment 
(or more economic stimulus). Papers such as Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) predict that 
without the ability of policymakers to make binding policy commitments, low 
inflation will be unsustainable over longer periods of time owing to incentive 
incompatibility: optimising governments will at some point in time choose to renege 
on previous policy commitments and create short-term economic stimulus by surprise 
inflation. This is why low inflation policies are said to be time inconsistent. The 
public knows about this time inconsistency problem and takes it into account when 
forming expectations about the future course of monetary policy. As a result, market 
economies tend to have an inflation bias. Given this set-up, policy announcements 
proclaiming a non-binding commitment to future low inflation typically lack 
credibility. But what precisely is credibility, what are its determinants, and how can it 
be established? Can we measure credibility? These questions are at the heart of the 
discussion in the various chapters of this study. 
Policy game models such as Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) or Backus and 
Driffill (1985a,b) typically assume that credibility can be established over time by 
consistent behaviour. Frequently the term reputation is used in this context. Both 
credibility and reputation are assigned to policymakers by the public. In order to 
avoid confusion, the term reputation will be used throughout this study whenever 
policymakers are evaluated solely on the basis their track record of policy outcomes, 
whilst the term credibility is used in a broader sense. In the present study credibility 
refers to a comparison of policy commitments or policy announcements with policy 
outcomes. Thus, whilst reputation can be established by time-consistent behaviour of 
policymakers, credibility can be established by truthful policy announcements. 
2 Chapter 1 
How exactly may credibility and reputation be attained? What type of 
announcements can central banks use to establish credibility? One possibility is 
mentioned in Rogoff (1985a), who states that the widespread adoption of intermediate 
monetary quantity target announcements during the 1970s may be viewed as an 
institutional reform by central banks aimed at resolving their credibility problem. He 
demonstrates that monetary targeting under a 'conservative', that is, 
counterinflationary, central banker can reduce the time-consistent rate of inflation. 
The role of credibility in this process is modelled in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) 
who show that 'credible' monetary target announcements can speed up the transition 
to a low-inflation equilibrium and hence reduce the welfare costs of disinflation. An 
alternative scenario of gaining credibility is outlined in Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989), 
who state that for a small open economy institutional reform such as entering a fixed 
exchange rate system may help to establish credibility. In this case, announcing an 
exchange rate target relative to a low-inflation centre country reduces the time-
consistent rate of inflation. Finally, targeting nominal interest rates may be adopted by 
countries as a short-run operational procedure for targeting the exchange rate within 
the fluctuation band. On the basis of this scenario announcing an interest rate target 
consistent with a fixed exchange rate and given interest rates in the low-inflation 
country reduces the rate of inflation. All three forms of gaining credibility will be 
studied empirically below. 
Whilst credibility and high reputation are usually unquestioned criteria for a 
good public policy, in the case of disinflation they take on special importance. 
Credibility about a pre-announced deflation policy may reduce or even eliminate the 
output or unemployment costs of disinflation by achieving a U-turn in expectations at 
the time when the policy is changed. A similar argument applies for an unannounced, 
'short sharp shock' disinflation: the quicker the policymaker establishes a 
counterinflation reputation, the shorter will be the transition period during which 
expectations adjust, as pointed out by De Grauwe (1990). Thus, if policymakers are 
planning to implement disinflation policies, they will find it advantageous to establish 
counterinflation reputation and credibility, either on their own by purely domestic 
policy U-turns, or in an international context, by adhering to a system of fixed 
exchange rates such as the Bretton Woods system, the European currency snake 
system, or the European Monetary System (EMS). 
This brings us to the question of whether or not the European Monetary 
System has helped member countries to disinflate during the 1980s. This question is 
at the heart of an on-going debate, and no consensus has yet been reached. Two major 
arguments are usually advanced in support of a positive answer. The credibility 
argument states that the EMS may have reduced the costs of disinflation, whilst the 
discipline argument states that EMS may have raised the costs of inflation. The main 
focus below is on the credibility aspects of the EMS, and on a quantified assessment 
of the presumed 'credibility bonus' provided by EMS membership. Giavazzi and 
Giovannini (1987) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) were the first to formulate the 
EMS 'credibility' hypothesis. In their opinion the EMS represents an institutional 
arrangement which has enabled the non-German EMS member countries to borrow 
counterinflation reputation from the Bundesbank by credibly pegging their bilateral 
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exchange rates relative to the German mark. This implies that the EMS has worked in 
an asymmetrical fashion: the Bundesbank has chooses its monetary policy 
independently, whilst all the remaining EMS member countries have 'tied their hands' 
on monetary policy and simply targeted their bilateral German mark exchange rates. 
Hence the EMS may be viewed as a de facto 'DM-zone'. To date, no firm empirical 
evidence supporting this 'credibility' hypothesis has been provided. On the contrary, 
the 'DM-zone' story of the EMS has recently been criticised by De Grauwe (1988), 
Fratianni and von Hagen (1989, 1990a,b) and Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) and Weber 
(1992b), amongst others, mainly on empirical grounds. Also, the 'DM zone' argument 
appears to be inconsistent with the empirical findings of Rogoff (1985b), Ungerer et 
al. (1983, 1986), Collins (1988), Artis (1987) and Weber (1990b) that disinflation 
inside the EMS has not been vastly different from the disinflation experience outside 
the system. 
An explicit empirical analysis of policy credibility in the context of EMS 
membership is to be found in Weber (1991a, 1992b). Subsequent empirical studies 
and alternative approaches are to be found in Bolazzi (1991), Agénor and Taylor 
(1991) Egebo and Englander, Blackburn, Mongiardino and Soal (1992), Masson 
(1992), Ayuso, Jurado and Restoy (1993) and Revenga (1993), amongst others. In 
Weber (1991a, 1992b) it is shown that credible level pegging of exchange rates 
relative to the German mark was not a feature of the EMS from the beginning; it 
emerged in a later phase and at various points in time as the result of deliberate policy 
switches in the various EMS economies. Consequently, no unique pattern of 
credibility gains has been found across EMS countries. In fact, Weber (1992b) shows 
that only the small EMS countries appear to have gained anti-inflation reputation by 
credibly pegging to the German mark, whilst no such gains are to be found for the two 
large EMS countries, France and Italy.  
Obstfeld (1991) makes the critical comment that Weber (1991a) evaluates 
the credibility of policy target range announcements by focusing on the mid-points of 
these ranges and completely ignoring all distributional aspects. Indeed, the probability 
density distribution of policy outcomes within the announced target ranges need not 
be uniform, and this may seriously bias the derived credibility estimates. For example, 
in Krugman's (1991) model the intrinsic dynamics of exchange rates within a fully 
credible currency band or target zone give rise to a bimodal distribution of exchange 
rates, with more mass concentrated near the zone's edges. However, in the Bertola and 
Caballero (1990, 1991) model of imperfectly credible target zones an unimodal 
exchange rate distributions is to be found for low degrees of target zone credibility. 
The concept of exchange rate credibility thus also play a kex role in this recent target 
zone literature. Target zone credibility thereby typically refers to whether or not it is 
believed that a pre-announced exchange rate band of a given width will be defended 
by central bank intervention at the edges of the band, rather allowing a realignment to 
occur. Thus, high target zone credibility is closely associated with a low realignment 
probability. The key aspect of models of imperfectly credible target zones is that low 
target zone credibility can have adverse effects: announcing a non-credible band can 
fuel speculative attacks on currencies in expectation of future realignments. As a 
result, a run on central bank reserves may take place. The important point about target 
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zone models is that the intrinsic dynamics of exchange rates within bands give rise to 
alternative ways of measuring exchange rate credibility, as has been outlined in a 
series of papers by Svensson (1989, 1991a, b, c, d). 
      The present study aims at systematically reviewing and comparing the various 
concepts and empirical implications of credibility and reputation in both the policy 
game and the target zone literature. Based on this analysis, an attempt will be made to 
produce empirical estimates of the various measures of policy credibility and 
counterinflation reputation for EMS and a control group of non-EMS countries. In 
this analysis the credibility of the exchange rate commitment of central banks within 
the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the EMS plays a key role, and it will be 
shown that the recent collapse of the ERM after the heavy speculative attacks on the 
British Pound and the Italian Lira in September 1992, and on the Spanish Peseta, 
Belgian Franc, Danish Krona and French Franc in August 1993 come as little surprise 
when taking into account the evidence from the various credibility measures. It is a 
fact that until recently most countries have failed to establish credible exchange rate 
parities vis-a-vis the German Mark, and also in some cases substantial credibility 
gains have materialised, the empirical evidence nonetheless suggests that only the 
Dutch guilder exchange rate vis-a-vis the German mark has achieved almost perfect 
credibility. Thus, it is no coincidence that only this single exchange rate link survived 
the August 1993 ERM crisis. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: chapter 2 reviews the 
theoretical concepts of reputation, policy credibility and target zone credibility. 
Chapter 3 discusses potential econometric approaches to implementing the competing 
concepts of reputation and credibility empirically. The stylised facts implied by the 
various models are thereby summarises in a number of testable propositions, and the 
econometric tools for implementing these tests are discussed. Chapter 4 presents the 
estimates derived from these tests. The prime focus of the empirical analysis thereby 
is on those countries which participated in the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, 
but corresponding results for a control group of non-EMS countries is also presented. 
Chapter 5 concludes the study with a summary of the main results and a discussion of 
policy implications and policy recommendations. 
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2 
THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF 
POLICY CREDIBILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical concept of reputation and credibility in both the 
policy game literature of the 1980's and the more recent target zone literature of the 
early 1990's. Despite of the fact that reputation and the perceived credibility of 
policies play a key role in determining policy outcomes in the both of the above 
strands of the macroeconomic literature, these concepts are frequently used in a rather 
elusive and vague fashion. Only few operational and empirically meaningful concepts 
of credibility and reputation are to be found in the literature.  
 Section 2.1 discusses some of those models of monetary policy games which 
imply very specific and explicitly stated concepts of credibility and reputation. By 
building on a stylised formal presentation of the basic policy game model of Barro 
and Gordon (1983a,b), the counterinflation reputation measure of Backus and Driffill 
(1985a, b) is derived. The concept of policy credibility is given content by referring to 
the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model for money growth target announcements. 
Two measures of the credibility of policy announcements are formally derived. In 
addition, two modifications of the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model for both 
interest rate target and exchange rate target announcements are presented. As in the 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model, the focus of the analysis is on the midpoint of 
the target announcements, even if targets are typically announced as ranges rather 
than point estimates.  
 Section 2.2 reviews the more recent target zone literature, where the concept 
of credibility applies to the announcement of the band rather than just its mid-point. 
By extending Krugman's (1991) basic model of a fully credible target zone model, 
various models of imperfectly credible target zones are discussed (Krugman, 1991 
and Bertola and Caballero, 1990, 1991). In principle these models differ from the 
basic Krugman (1991) model only with respect to the policy rule which the central 
bank follows once exchange rates reach the boundaries of the band. It is shown that 
the concept of target zone credibility is closely related to a measure of realignment 
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probabilities. Also, following Svensson (1989, 1991a,b,c,d) and Bartolini and Bodnar 
(1991) the implications of fully and imperfectly credible exchange rate target zones 
for interest rate differentials are explored. In addition, second generation target zone 
models with imperfect credibility and two state variables are presented. It becomes 
obvious that in these models target zone credibility is inversely related to perceived 
realignment risks. 
Section 2.2.3 concludes the discussion of the theoretical concepts of credibility 
and reputation by drawing some comparison between both groups of models. On the 
basis of this analysis an attempt will be made in the chapter 3 of this study to derive 
corresponding empirical measures of credibility and reputation, and to quantify them 
in chapter 4 on the basis of real world data. 
 
 
2.1.  REPUTATION AND CREDIBILITY IN POLICY GAME MODELS 
 
2.1.1. The Basic Monetary Policy Game Model 
 
The basic model of monetary policy games, as discussed in Cukierman (1986), is 
described in Box 1. It is assumed that the monetary authority and the public are 
engaged in a policy game which determines the equilibrium level of output yt and 
inflation . Equation (1.1) states that inflation is a monetary phenomenon. According 
to equation (1.2) output is determined by a Lucas-type supply function, which states 
that monetary policy is unable systematically to manipulate the level of output.
1
 The 
central banker's objective function Wt, which may possibly be identical to the social 
welfare function, assumes that he dislikes inflation t and likes economic stimulus, 
defined in equation (1.3) as a level of output yt above its natural level y
n. The public's 
move in the game is to form expectations which in equation (1.6) are defined to be the 
least-squares error type. Expectations are further assumed to be formed rationally on 
the basis of all available information in equation (1.7).
2
  
 As a result of this policy game, the optimal rate of inflation or monetary 
expansion under discretionary policymaking and rational expectations is some 
positive constant b, which in equation (1.4) characterizes the inflationary bias of the 
Nash solution. The temptation of policymakers to aim at the unsustainable first-best 
solution (with mt=b and E(mt-1)=0) drives the economy away from the second-
best incentive incompatible solution (with mt=E(mt-1)=0) to the inferior but stable 
third-best Nash solution (with mt=E(mt-1)=b). Note that inflation rates lower than 
b, say zero, are in this static version of the basic monetary policy game model only 
achievable if the monetary authority can issue a credible commitment to zero 
inflation. Lucas and Stockey (1983) point out that this may be achieved via a 
constitutional amendment. For example, writing low inflation as the sole policy 
objective into the central bank's statutes would serve this purpose. Recently Persson 
and Tabellini (1993) have put forward a model in which state contingent contracts are 
used to make it incentive compatible for policymakers to tie their hands on inflation. 
This eliminates the inflation bias of market economies under discretionary 
policymaking,  and  could  be  implemented  by  making  the  appointment  of  central 
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BOX 1 
A Stylised Static Model of Monetary Policy Games 
Barro and Gordon (1983a, b) 
   
t tm  money growth causes inflation (1.1) 
 n et t ty y       output equation (1.2) 
 
2
2
n
t tW b y y

     
policymakers' objectives (1.3) 
 
2
2
n
t t
m
W b y y     
policymakers' objectives (1.4) 
m bt   optimal policy under discretion (1.5) 
 
2
e
t t tU      
public's objectives (1.6) 
 1et t tE b      rational expectations (1.7) 
 
 
bankers conditional on contracts which force them to resign once inflation exceeds a 
low critical value.  
In this basic one-shot policy game credibility and reputation play no role. 
However, if the policy game is played repeatedly, credibility and reputation may be 
introduced in a variety of ways. 
 
2.1.2. The Concept of Reputation in Policy Game Models 
 
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) show that in infinitely repeated full information policy 
games the second best solution (with mt=E(mtt-1)=0) may be sustained by 
reputational forces which operate through credible threats and pre-specified 
punishment strategies on the side of the public.
3
 These essentially arbitrary trigger 
mechanisms, however, imply no empirically testable hypotheses with respect to the 
concept of reputation. Empirically meaningful concepts of credibility and reputation 
are only derived in policy games with imperfect information, as will be discussed 
below. 
 
2.1.2.1. Reputation in the Backus and Driffill Model 
 
A prominent finite horizon monetary policy game with incomplete information is set 
out in the sequential equilibrium model of Backus and Driffill (1985a,b), described in 
equations (2.1) to (2.7). The important feature of this informational game is that the 
public faces two potential types of policymaker, with preferences described in 
equations (2.3a) and (2.3b). Throughout the game the public is uncertain as to which 
type of policymaker is in office. This is only revealed at the end of the game in a 
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known terminal period . This uncertainty, in connection with strategic behaviour 
(disguise) on the part of the policymaker, prevents the public from inferring the true 
state of the central bankers' preferences from the observable inflation or money 
growth process. This is formalised in equations (2.5a) and (2.5b) by noting that the 
observation of zero money growth may be due to the move of a 'hard-nosed' 
policymaker who always plays zero inflation (mt=0) with probability one, but may 
also represent the move of a 'wet' policymaker who pretend to be 'hard-nosed' with a 
time-varying probability t. Consequently the public's rational expectations of money 
growth in equation (2.7) is given by the expectation of the discretionary outcome (b) 
multiplied by the joint probability that the policymaker is in fact 'wet' (1-) and will 
not masquerade as 'hard-nosed' (1-).4 Counterinflation reputation in the sense of 
Backus and Driffill (1985a,b) is thereby a state variable, conceived as the subjective 
probability  that the central banker is a non-inflationary or 'conservative' type. 
 
 
BOX 2 
A Stylised Model of Reputation in Monetary Policy Games: 
Backus and Driffill (1985a, b) 
t tm    (2.1) 
 n et t ty y         (2.2) 
 
2
0 2
w t et
t t t
t
m
W b m m

 

 
    
 
  (2.3a) 
2
0 2
w t t
t
t
W
 


 
  
 
  (2.3b) 
 
2
0 2
w t et
t t t
t
m
W b m m

 

 
    
 
  (2.4a) 
2
0 2
w t t
t
t
m
W



 
  
 
  (2.4b) 
 t tm b   (2.5a) t tm  0 (2.5b) 
 
2
e
t t tU        (2.6) 
    1 1 1et t t t tE b            (2.7) 
 
1
1 1 1
, 0
1
t
t
t t t


 
  

  
 
 
 
  (2.8) 
 
 
 Besides giving content to the notion of reputation, Backus and Driffill 
(1985a,b) also specify how reputation evolves over time: their counterinflation 
reputation measure t is updated continuously via Bayesian probability learning, as is 
indicated in equation (2.8). It can be shown that in order to maximise the output 
effects from future surprise money growth (mt+=b), it pays for the inflationary 'wet' 
policymaker to invest into reputation building at the start of the game by strategically 
playing zero inflation (mt+j=0 for j<) for some time.
5
 This reduces the probability  
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(1-) and hence expected future inflation, which in turn allows for higher surprise 
inflation and more economic stimulus in the future. Reputation increases as long as 
zero inflation is observed, but is completely destroyed by the occurrence of positive 
inflation mt=b, which fully reveals the inflationary government. In view of real 
world inflation experience this would, however, imply that all countries have lacked 
counterinflation reputation, since zero inflation rates have been the exception rather 
than the rule in advanced economies during the post-war period. Thus, an empirically 
more meaningful concept of reputation has to be derived. In chapter 3 an attempt is 
made to do precisely this by making qualitatively different assumptions about the time 
series properties of the policymakers' trade-off parameter b and hence about 
observable inflation rates mt=b, which for simplicity were assumed to be constant 
here.  
 
2.1.2.2. Reputation in the Cukierman and Meltzer Model 
 
A second class of monetary policy games with incomplete information derives from 
the model of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986a), which is outlined in equations (3.1) to 
(3.7). As above inflation is a monetary phenomenon and policymakers like economic 
stimulus and dislike inflation. However, rather than facing two types of policymakers 
as in the Backus and Driffill (1985a,b) model, the public now faces a single 
policymaker whose preferences shift over time according to the time series process 
specified in equation (3.3.). The important feature of the Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986a) model thereby is that these gradually and persistently changing policy 
objectives bt in connection with incomplete monetary control in equation (3.5) 
prevent the public from inferring the true state of the central banker's preferences 
from the actual observable money growth process. However, central bank watching 
gradually reveals information about the unobservable state of the policymaker's 
preferences since it provides evidence on the degree of monetary noise contributed by 
the shifting policy objectives. To capture this formally, the public's optimal money 
growth expectations in equation (3.7.) are based on an elaborate weighting scheme, 
where the discounting of past information reflects the degree to which permanent 
shifts in policy preferences influence money growth and inflation dynamics. 
 Counterinflation reputation in the sense of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986a) is 
conceived as the speed  with which the public recognises that a change in the 
policymaker's objectives has actually occurred, as is outlined formally in equation 
(3.7). Inflationary policymakers here do not mind having a low counterinflation 
reputation as this slows down the speed with which the public learns about their 
changing policy objectives when they shift to stimulating the economy through 
surprise inflation. Consequently, inflationary policymakers will tend to use a noisy 
monetary policy instrument in order to mask their true policy intentions even if 
perfect monetary control is feasible. 
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BOX 3 
Reputation in a Stylised Model of Monetary Policy Games:  
Cuckierman and Meltzer (1986a) 
t tm  (3.1) 
 n et t ty y       (3.2) 
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 
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(3.4) 
m mt t t 
~  1 ,   2~ 0,t N    (3.5) 
 
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(3.6) 
       0 1 1 21et t t t t tm E m b m E m               
                            0 1
0
1j t j
j
b m    

 

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with    
2
1 1 1 1
1
2 4
r r
  
 
    
       
   
,     r v


2
2
   
(3.7) 
Key to symbols:  inflation, e expected inflation, m actual money growth, ~m 
planned growth, me  expected money growth, y output, yn natural output,  tE x   
rational expectations of x conditional on the information set  t , W policymakers' 
objective function, U public's objective function, b,,,r,,0,1, parameters, vt, t 
i.i.d. error terms with zero means and variances v
2 .and 
2 . 
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2.1.3. The Concept of Credibility in Policy Game Models 
 
Rogoff (1985a) states that the widespread adoption of intermediate monetary quantity 
target announcements during the seventies may be viewed as an institutional reform 
by central banks aimed at resolving their credibility problem. He demonstrates that 
monetary targeting under a 'conservative', that is, counterinflationary, central banker 
can reduce the time-consistent rate of inflation. The role of credibility in this process 
is modelled in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) who show that 'credible' monetary 
target announcements can speed up the transition to a low-inflation equilibrium and 
hence reduce the welfare costs of disinflation. 
 
2.1.3.1. Establishing Credibility by Monetary Target Announcements 
 
The Cukierman and Meltzer's (1986b) analysis of the credibility of monetary target 
announcements is presented in equations (4.1) to (4.7) of Box 4. This model has the 
same basic structure as Cukierman and Meltzer (1986a), but now the central bank is 
assumed in equation (4.5a) to issue a noisy monetary announcement signal in addition 
to the information derived by the public from watching the actual money growth 
process, specified in equation (4.5b). The public treats the announcement as 
contemporary information which, if credible, is used in forming expectations, as 
outlined in equation (4.7).
6
 Two measures of credibility are proposed by Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986b): 
Average credibility (  at t tAC m E m    ) is conceived as the extent to 
which the public's rational expectations deviate from the current money growth 
announcement (mt
a ). Average credibility is perfect for both perfect monetary control 
or fully precise monetary announcements. Furthermore, whilst large unexpected 
changes in announcements lead to a direct decrease in AC, large unexpected changes 
in actual money growth influence AC only with a time lag. If policymakers aim at 
maintaining a given level of average credibility under asymmetric information, a shift 
in the government's policy preferences is unlikely to be revealed to the public in the 
form of surprise announcements and is more likely to result in surprise money growth. 
Marginal credibility (MC) is defined as the extent to which a unit change in 
the announcement mt
a  affects the public's money growth expectations  t tE m  , as 
formally given by the weight () placed on the announcement in the public's 
expectations formation process in equation (4.6). This marginal credibility measure 
depends on the magnitude of the variance of the monetary control errors (
2) relative 
to the variance of the announcement bias ( 
2 2 u). If the policymaker always makes 
completely accurate announcements (
2=0), credibility is perfect (MC=1). However, 
extremely noisy announcements (lim 
2) convey little information and tend to be 
disregarded (MC=0). 
From the above discussion it should be obvious that the concept of 
credibility must not be limited to monetary target announcements. In the two sections 
below the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) framework will be used to derive a formal 
concept of credibility in the context of interest rate and exchange rate targeting 
policies. 
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BOX 4 
Reputation in a Stylised Model of Monetary Policy Games: 
Cuckierman and Meltzer (1986b) 
t tm  (4.1) 
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(4.7) 
Key to symbols:  inflation, e  expected inflation, m actual money growth, ~m 
planned growth, m
a
 announced money growth, me  expected money growth, y 
output, y
n
 natural output,  tE x   rational expectations of x conditional on the 
information set  t , W policymakers' objective function, U public's objective 
function, b,,,r,,0,1 parameters, vt,ut, t , i.i.d. error terms with zero means 
and variances v
2 , u
2 .and 
2 . 
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2.1.3.2. Establishing Credibility by Interest Rate Target Announcements 
 
Interest rate target announcements may provide an alternative to establishing 
credibility by money growth target announcements. In this case the credibility of the 
official interest rate (e.g. discount rate) announcements may be used as an important 
indicator of the central bank's commitment to interest rate targeting policies. The 
modified Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model presented in equations (5.1) to (5.7) 
of Box 5 aims at formally capturing this. Policymakers are assumed to exercise short-
run inflation control through open market operations. Inflation causes deviations of 
the nominal interest rate (it) from the real interest rate (r), which in equation (5.1) is 
assumed to be constant in the short-run. The public is uncertain about the true planned 
level of interest rates (it), due to the gradual changes in the policymaker's preferences 
in equation (5.3), and the imprecise control of the monetary authority over the market 
determined interest rate in equation (5.5a). To reduce this uncertainty the policymaker 
is assumed in equation (5.5b) to issue a noisy interest rate announcement signal in 
addition to the information provided to the public by observing past interest rate 
movements. The public treats the interest rate announcement as contemporary 
information which, if credible, is used when forming expectations in equation (5.7). 
This defines the average credibility (  at t tAC i E i    ) and marginal 
credibility (MC=) of the interest rate target announcements. 
 
2.1.3.3. Establishing Credibility by Exchange Rate Target Announcements 
 
An interesting scenario for gaining credibility is outlined in Giavazzi and Spaventa 
(1989), who state that for a small open economy an institutional reform, such as 
entering a fixed exchange rate system may help to establish credibility. In this case, 
announcing an exchange rate target relative to a low-inflation country provides 
credibility. 
 The commitment of policymakers to targeting the exchange rate in systems 
of fixed but adjustable parities may thus be judged on the basis of the average or 
marginal credibility of the official central parity announcement, as is outlined in the 
modified Cukierman and Meltzer model of equations (6.1) to (6.7). The nominal 
exchange rate (et) in equation (6.1) is assumed to be determined in the long run by a 
purchasing power parity condition. This allows the central bank of the small open 
economy to implement inflation control by level-pegging its bilateral exchange rate 
(et) with the foreign country, which is assumed to have zero inflation (*=0). As 
before, the policymaker is assumed to like economic stimulus (yt) and to dislike 
inflation (t), here equivalent to deviations of the exchange rate (et) from its long-run 
purchasing power parity level ().7  This then allows the average credibility 
(  at t tAC e E e    ) and marginal credibility (MC=) of the central bank's 
exchange rate commitment to be measured in the same way as the credibility of 
money growth target announcements or interest rate target announcements was 
measured above. 
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BOX 5 
Credibility in a Stylised Model for Interest Rate Targeting: 
A Modified Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) Model 
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(5.7) 
Key to symbols:  inflation, e expected inflation, i actual interest rate, 
~
i  interest 
rate target, i
a
 interest rate announcement, i
e
 expected interest rate, y output, y
n
 
natural output,  tE x   rational expectations of x conditional on the information 
set  t , W policymakers' objective function, U public's objective function, b,,,r,
,0,1 parameters, vt,ut, t , i.i.d. error terms with zero means and variances v
2 , 
u
2 .and 
2 . 
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BOX 6 
Credibility in a Stylised Model for Exchange Rate Targeting: 
A Modified Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) Model 
p e p pt t  , 1 (6.1) 
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(6.7) 
Key to symbols: p domestic price level, p* foreign price level, pe  expected 
domestic price level, e actual exchange rate, e
T
 exchange rate target, e
a
 exchange 
rate rate announcement, e
e
 expected exchange rate, y output, y
n
 natural output, 
 tE x   rational expectations of x conditional on the information set  t , W 
policymakers' objective function, U public's objective function, b,,,r,,0,1 
parameters, vt,ut, t , i.i.d. error terms with zero means and variances v
2 , u
2 .and 

2 . 
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2.2. CREDIBILITY IN TARGET ZONE MODELS 
 
2.2.1. The Basic Exchange Rate Target Zone Model 
 
The basic target zone model, which originates in the work of Krugman (1991), may 
be characterised by equations (7.1) to (7.8) in Box 7 below. Equation (7.1) states that 
deviations of the exchange rate et from a stochastic forcing process ft, which is 
referred to as fundamentals,8 are due to speculative bubbles Et(det/dt). The 
fundamentals ft typically include both variables with autonomous dynamics and 
variables under the direct control of the monetary authority, which aims at 
maintaining a target zone for the fundamentals via foreign exchange intervention at 
pre-specified upper (fU) and lower (fL) bounds. As will be shown below, such 
intervention implies well-specified bounds (eL, eU) for the exchange rate. Equation 
(7.2) states that in the absence of intervention the fundamentals ft follow a continuous 
Brownian motion (or Wiener, or Wiener-Levy) process with instantaneous mean drift 
 and variance 2, where dzt is the standard Wiener process.  
 By postulating et to be a non-linear, twice continuously differentiable 
function x(.) of the state ft and using Ito's lemma to derive an expression for the 
expectations in equation (7.1), the exchange rate may be derived as equation (7.3). 
This second order differential equation has, as shown in Froot and Obstfeld (1989a), 
the general stationary solution (7.4), with 1 and 2 in equations (7.5a) and (7.5b) 
being the roots of the characteristic equation 22/2+-1=0. The constants A1 
and A2 are thereby determined by the boundary conditions satisfied for the exchange 
rate et at the edges of the band. As will be shown below, models of perfectly and 
imperfectly credible target zone differ primarily in these boundary conditions. 
 
2.2.2. Models of Perfectly Credible Target Zones 
 
2.2.2.1. The Krugman Model 
 
In Krugman's (1991) model of a perfectly credible target zone the so-called "smooth 
pasting" conditions in equation (7.6.) ensure that x(fL) and x(fU) are flat at the 
boundary of the fundamentals band and tangent to the boundaries of the implied 
exchange rate band, which is maintained by infinitesimal marginal intervention. In 
economic terms, "smooth pasting" implies that the exchange rate is never expected to 
jump in response to intervention.9 This results in a set of implicit equations (7.7a) and 
(7.7b) for A1 and A2 which can be solved as shown in equations (7.8a) and (7.8b). 
Two types of settings for A1 and A2 may be found in target zone models:  
(a) In perfectly credible target zones "smooth pasting" ensures A1<0 and A2>0, 
and the non-linear relationship between the exchange rate and its fundamentals 
has the well-known S-shape. The slope of the exchange rate function is always 
less than one, which reflects Krugman's "honey moon" effect: the existence of 
a perfectly credible fundamentals band gives rise to speculative bubbles, which 
stabilise the behaviour of the exchange rates within an even narrower band.  
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BOX 7 
A Stylised Model of a Perfectly Credible Exchange Rate Target Zone:  
Krugman (1991) 
  ,t t t te f E de
dt

    
exchange rate equation (7.1) 
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Key to symbols: et exchange rate, ft fundamentals,  instantaneous mean drift of ft, 
2 instantaneous variance of ft, Et(det/dt) expected exchange rate change, x(f) 
exchange rate function, xf (xff) first (second) derivative of x with respect to f, zt 
stochastic Wiener process, fL and fU (eL and eU) upper and lower bound of 
fundamentals (exchange rate), 1, 2, A1, A2,  parameters. 
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(b) Completely ruling out speculative bubbles and ignoring the existence of a 
target zone (A1=A2=0) results in a linear relationship between the exchange 
rate et and its fundamentals ft . This basically is the free float solution under 
which exchange rates are always driven by a random walk stochastic process. 
This may be derived formally from the coefficient restriction (7.8a,b) by 
assuming infinitely wide fundamental bands and hence letting the lower bound 
fL go to minus infinity and the upper bound fU to infinity.   
The exchange rate functions under both the free-float (linear function) and the fully 
credible target zone (S-shaped function) are depicted in Figure 2.1, which following 
Svensson (1990b) uses a zero fundamental drift (=0), =0.1, =3 and a symmetrical 
fundamental band of fU=-fL=0.094. This implies a symmetrical exchange rate band of 
eU=-eL=0.015.
10 11 Note that the target zone exchange rate function in Figure 2.1 is 
bent away from the free float rate, and, in accordance with the "smooth pasting 
conditions (7.6) is tangent to the edges of the exchange rate band. The target zone 
exchange rate furthermore is less responsive to movements in fundamentals than the 
free float exchange rate, which implies xf(ft)<1, a phenomenon which Krugman 
(1991) labelled "honey moon" effect. As a result of the "honey moon" effect in a 
perfectly credible target zone, the exchange rate is stabilised in a band which is 
narrower than the band of the fundamentals. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. 
Exchange Rates and Fundamentals in a Perfectly Credible Target Zone 
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 The target zone exchange rate function in Figure 2.1 also implies a specific 
exchange rate distribution. The (unconditional) asymptotic probability distribution of 
the fundamentals is that of a regulated Brownian motion with both upper and lower 
bounds. Harrison (1985) shows that this probability distribution of the fundamentals is 
uniform for a zero fundamental drift (0) and is truncated exponentially for a non-
zero fundamentals drift ( 0), as indicated in equations (8.2a) and (8.2b) of Box 8, 
respectively.  
 The target zone exchange rate function in Figure 2.1 also implies a specific 
exchange rate distribution. The (unconditional) asymptotic probability distribution of 
the fundamentals is that of a regulated Brownian motion with both upper and lower 
bounds. Harrison (1985) shows that this probability distribution of the fundamentals is 
uniform for a zero fundamental drift (0) and is truncated exponentially for a non-
zero fundamentals drift ( 0), as indicated in equations (8.2a) and (8.2b) of Box 8, 
respectively.  
 
 
BOX 8 
Testable Implications of the Perfectly Credible Target Zone Model 
 of Krugman (1991) 
xf(ft)<1, 'honey moon' effect (8.1) 

f
(f)=1/(fU-fL),                =0,  
fundamentals' instantaneous density 
distribution for =0 
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,  0 fundamentals' instantaneous density 
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(8.2b) 

e
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(e)]/xf[x
-1
(e)], exchange rate's density distribution 
for  0 and eL<e<eU, 
(8.3) 
e(e)=xf[x
-1
(e)], exchange rate's instantaneous 
standard deviation 
(8.4) 
Key to symbols: et exchange rate, ft fundamentals,  instantaneous mean drift of ft, 
2 instantaneous variance of ft, 
e
(e) instantaneous variance of et, x(f) exchange 
rate function, xf (xff) first (second) derivative of x with respect to f, 
f
(f) density 
distribution of fundamentals, 
e
(e) density distribution of exchange rate, fL and fU 
(eL and eU) upper and lower bound of fundamentals (exchange rate), 1, 2, A1, 
A2,  parameters. 
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 The target zone exchange rate function in Figure 2.1 also implies a specific 
exchange rate distribution. The (unconditional) asymptotic probability distribution of 
the fundamentals is that of a regulated Brownian motion with both upper and lower 
bounds. Harrison (1985) shows that this probability distribution of the fundamentals is 
uniform for a zero fundamental drift (0) and is truncated exponentially for a non-
zero fundamentals drift ( 0), as indicated in equations (8.2a) and (8.2b) of Box 8, 
respectively.  
 By using the "change of variable in density function lemma"12 the exchange 
rate's unconditional asymptotic density function can be derived as equation (8.3), 
which only holds in the interior of the band (eL<e<eU). In equation (8.3.) the 
fundamentals function f(e)=x-1(e) denotes the inverse of the exchange rate function 
e=x(f). For the above example of a zero fundamentals drift (=0) with =0.1, =3, 
and a fundamentals band of fU=-fL=0.094 (eU=-eL=0.01) the probability density 
distribution displayed in Figure 2.2 can be computed.13 This density distribution is 
only defined in the interior of the band,14 and is bimodal with more mass towards the 
edges of the band. Given the uniform distribution of the fundamentals, it is obvious 
that the U-shaped distribution of the exchange rate is a direct result of the S-shape of 
the exchange rate function: for a constant nominator in equation (8.3), the derivative 
xf in the denominator is smaller close to the edges of the band, and this makes the 
density larger. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. 
Probability Density Function of the Exchange Rate in a Perfectly Credible 
Target Zone 
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 Applying Ito's lemma to the exchange rate function x(ft), the instantaneous 
(conditional) standard deviation of the exchange rate e(e) may be obtained as 
equation (8.4).15 It is the product of the standard deviation of the Brownian motion 
fundamentals  and the derivative xf[x
-1(e)] of the exchange rate function. Figure 2.3 
displays the exchange rate's instantaneous standard deviation graphically. Its inverted 
U-shape of this function suggests that in a perfectly credible target zone the 
instantaneous standard deviations of the exchange rate are largest in the middle of the 
exchange rate band, and fall towards zero at the edges of the band, due to the "smooth 
pasting" conditions. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. 
Instantaneous Conditional Standard Deviation of the Exchange Rate 
 in a Perfectly Credible Target Zone 
 
 
 
 The above intrinsic dynamics of exchange rates in a fully credible target 
zone has been shown by Svensson (1989, 1991b) to also have important implications 
for expected future exchange rates and interest rate differentials, as will be discussed 
below. 
 
2.2.2.2.  The Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials in Perfectly Credible 
 Target Zones: the Svensson Model 
 
This section discusses the effect of an exchange rate target zone on interest rate 
differentials, which was first derived formally in Svensson (1989, 1991b). Let 
*
ti () 
denote an exogenous foreign nominal interest rate on a pure discount bond purchased 
at time t with term , that is, maturing at time t+, >0. Further define it(ft,) as the 
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nominal interest rate on a home currency pure discount bond, purchased at time t with 
the fundamental ft equal to f, and maturing at time t+, >0. Svensson (1991b) shows 
that the interest rate differential (f;) in a target zone may then be derived as outlined 
in Box 9. Equations (9.1a) describes the instantaneous interest rate differential (=0), 
whilst equation (9.1b) applies for positive finite terms (>0). Solving equation (9.1b) 
as a function of fundamentals requires the computing of the expected exchange rate at 
maturity, h(f;)E[x{f(t)} f0 =f], which is a complicated non-linear heteroscedastic 
stochasic process with variable drift and variable instantaneous standard deviation. 
Svensson (1991b) shows that the function h(f;) can be derived as the solution to the 
partial differential equation (9.2a) subject to the initial condition (9.2b) and the 
derivative boundary conditions (9.2c). Svensson (1991b) derives both an analytical 
Fourier-series solution, based on the methods described in Churchill and Brown 
(1987), and a numerical solution, based on the so-called explicit method described in 
Gerald and Wheatley (1989), for this parabolic partial differential equation (3.14a).16 
The computations in the present study are based on the analytical Fourier series 
solution, which is outlined in more detail in Appendix A of this chapter17. The Fourier 
series solution for the parabolic differential equation is illustrated in Figure 2.4, which 
displays the term structure of expected maturity exchange rates as a three-dimensional 
non-linear function of both the fundamentals and the term.18 
 
 
Figure 2.4. 
Expected Maturity Exchange Rate and Fundamentals in  
a Perfectly Credible Target Zone 
 
 
 
 For zero term (=0), the expected exchange rate h(f;), of course, coincides 
with the actual exchange rate et, and consequently the front line in the three-
dimensional plane on the right-hand side of Figure 2.4 is identical to the S-shaped 
exchange rate function from Figure 2.1 above. For positive and short terms the 
Chapter 2 23 
expected exchange rate h(f;) has a similar but flatter S-shape, as is shown most 
clearly in the upper two-dimensional inset on the right-hand side of Figure 2.4. The 
expected exchange rate h(f;) thereby still is increasing in the fundamentals ft and, 
due to the "smooth pasting" conditions, flat at the edges of the band. For longer terms 
the expected exchange rate's band tends to converge to the exchange rate's 
unconditional mean, which is zero in the example with symmetric bands (fU=-
fL=0.094, eU=-eL=0.01) and zero fundamentals drift (=0). This can also be seen 
from the lower two-dimensional inset on the right-hand side of Figure 4.4, which 
displays the fluctuation band of the expected exchange rate h(f;) against the maturity 
. The width of the expected exchange rate's band is decreasing in term  in a non-
linear fashion, and tends to vanish for longer terms. 
 Since equation (7.4) of the target zone model expresses the exchange rate et 
as unique function of the fundamentals process ft, the expected exchange rate h(f;) 
may also be expressed as a function h(e(f);) of the exchange rate et, which is 
displayed in Figure 2.5. For zero term (=0), the expected exchange rate h(e(f),), of 
course, coincides with the 45 degree line, as drawn at the front line in the three-
dimensional plane on the right-hand side of Figure 2.5.  
 
 
Figure 2.5. 
Expected Maturity Exchange Rate and Exchange Rates in  
a Perfectly Credible Target Zone 
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BOX 9 
Testable Implications of the Perfectly Credible Target Zone Model of 
Svenssons (1989, 1991b) for the Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials 
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Key to symbols: it interest rate, i t
*
 foreign interest rate, t interest rate differential,et 
exchange rate, ft fundamentals, 

() instantaneous conditional standard 
deviation of t, 
2
 instantaneous variance of ft, (f) interest rate differential 
function, f (ff) first (second) derivative of  with respect to f, 
f
(f) density 
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() density distribution of interest rate differential, 
fL and fU (L and U) upper and lower bound of fundamentals (interest rate 
differentials),  maturity,  parameters. 
 
Chapter 2 25 
For positive but short terms the expected exchange rate h(f;) has a flatter 
and somewhat more S-shaped slope, as is shown in the upper two-dimensional inset 
on the right-hand side of Figure 2.5. For longer terms the expected exchange rate 
h(e(f);) is still increasing in the exchange rate et, but it tends to converge to the 
unconditional mean of et, which is zero in the current example with symmetric bands 
and zero fundamentals drift. This can again be seen from the lower two-dimensional 
inset on the right-hand side of Figure 2.5, which shows that the fluctuation band of the 
expected exchange rate h(e(f);) is decreasing in term , and tends to vanish for longer 
terms. 
 Given the above behaviour of the expected maturity exchange rate h(f;), it is 
straightforward to calculate the term structure of interest rate differentials (f;) for 
positive terms (>0) from equation (9.1b), which together with the instantaneous 
(=0) interest rate differential from equation (9.1a) is illustrated as a function of the 
fundamentals process ft in Figure 2.6.  
 
 
Figure 2.6. 
Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials and Fundamentals in a Perfectly 
Credible Target Zone 
 
 
 
 
The instantaneous interest rate differential ((f;) for =0), given by the front 
line of the three-dimensional plane on the right-hand side of Figure 2.6, does not 
satisfy the smooth pasting conditions. However, in the model with infinitesimal 
marginal intervention, the upper and lower bounds of the fundamentals process imply 
well-specified upper and lower bounds for the term structure of interest rate 
differential,19 which are decreasing functions of the fundamentals. For positive terms 
(>0) the smooth pasting conditions are fulfilled, and this is why the finite term 
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interest rate differential functions have a negative S-shape. The upper two-
dimensional inset on the right-hand side of Figure 2.6 further shows that the interest 
rate differential functions become flatter and less non-linear for longer maturities. In 
economic terms this implies that when the fundamentals are at the lower boundary of 
the target zone and the domestic currency is strong, expectations of future 
interventions typically result in expectations of a depreciation and hence positive 
interest rate differentials. The lower two-dimensional inset on the right-hand side of 
Figure 2.6 finally shows that the interest rate differential is decreasing in the term , 
except for very long terms, where it is approximately flat. Thus, for a given width of 
the fundamentals band the fluctuation band of the interest rate differential is 
decreasing in term in a non-linear fashion, but it does not completely vanish for long 
maturities. 
 Svensson (1991b) also shows that the interest rate differentials' instantaneous 
standard deviation ( is given by the product of its derivative with respect to the 
fundamentals, f(f;), and the instantaneous standard deviation of the fundamentals 
( as formalised in equation (9.3) of Box 9. Figure 2.7. displays the standard 
deviation of interest rate differentials for the above numerical example of a symmetric 
band with zero fundamentals drift (=0, =0.1, =3, fU=-fL=0.094, eU=-eL=0.01) as 
a function of both the fundamentals ft and the term .
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Figure 2.7. 
Standard Deviation of the Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials in a 
Perfectly Credible Target Zone 
 
 
 
 
 The interest rate differentials instantaneous standard deviation for a zero 
term (=0) is a U-shaped function, as is indicated by the front line of the three-
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dimensional plane on the left-hand side of Figure 2.7, whilst for positive terms this 
function has an inverted U-shape. Thus, in contrast to zero-term interest rate 
differentials, the standard deviation of positive-term interest rate differentials is 
largest in the middle of the band and falls to zero at the edges of the fundamentals 
band. This result derives from the fact that the positive-term interest rate differentials 
fulfil the smooth pasting conditions, whilst the zero-term interest rate differentials do 
not. Hence there is a discontinuity between the finite and zero term interest rate 
differentials at the edges of the fundamentals band, corresponding to the discontinuity 
of the derivative f(f;) at =0. Lindberg and Söderlind (1991) further point out that 
for longer terms  the same fundamentals band fL<f<fU results in an ever narrower 
interest rate differential band L,<<U,. This is why in Figure 2.8. the inverted U-
shape of the standard deviation functions tend to be more compressed if displayed for 
alternative terms (=0,1,3,6,9,12) against the interest rate differential itself. Another 
important result of Svensson (1991b) is that the standard deviation of interest rate 
differentials declines in a non-linear fashion as the terms to maturity of the underlying 
bonds increases. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 
Standard Deviation of the Term Structure and Interest Rate Differentials in a 
Perfectly Credible Target Zone 
 
 
 
 The probability density of interest rate differentials ( is derived in 
Svensson (1991b)21 as equation (9.4), with f(;) denoting the inverse of (f;). 
Figure 2.9, borrowed from Lindberg and Söderlind (1991), displays this probability 
density for alternative terms (=0,1,3,6,9,12) against the interest rate differential itself. 
The probability density functions of positive term interest rate differentials are again 
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more compressed in interest rate differential space and tend to be U-shaped or 
bimodal with more mass towards the edges of the interest rate differential band 
L,<<U,. 
 
 
Figure 2.9. 
Probability Density of the Term Structure and Interest Rate Differentials in a 
Perfectly Credible Target Zone 
 
 
 
 Using the non-linear S-shaped relationship between exchange rates and 
fundamentals from equation (7.4), Svensson (1991b) also derives a functional 
relationship between the term structure of interest rate differentials and the exchange 
rate in a fully credible target zone, as formalised by equation (9.5). The fundamentals 
function f(e)=x-1(e) thereby denotes the inverse of the exchange rate function e=x(f), 
and may easily be computed numerically.22  
Figure 2.10 displays this relationship, which is discontinuous in  at =0. 
Both instantaneous and finite term interest rate differentials are decreasing in the 
exchange rate, and the non-linearity as well as the negative slope of this function are 
more pronounced at the short end of the maturity range (see upper inset). 
Furthermore, the interest rate differential's fluctuation band for a given exchange rate 
band is strictly decreasing in the term (see lower inset). 
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Figure 2.10. 
Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rates in a Perfectly 
Credible Target Zone 
 
 
 
 
2.2.3. Models of Imperfectly Credible Target Zones 
 
Imperfect credibility may be introduced into the standard target zone model in various 
ways: Krugman (1991) analyses the case of a possible collapse of an imperfectly 
credible target zone, which is defined as one in which the probability that the target 
zone will be defended (by infinitesimal marginal intervention) when the fundamentals 
hit the boundary of the fundamentals band is less than unity. In the absence of such 
stabilising intervention, Krugman (1991) assumes that the exchange rate system will 
revert to a free float, and this event has a non-zero probability ex ante. Bertola and 
Caballero (1991) also model an imperfectly credible target zone as one which is 
defended with a probability of less than unity, but they assume that a realignment, 
viewed as an infrequent shift from one target zone to another, will occur with non-
zero probability as the fundamentals hit the edges of the band. Svensson (1991b), on 
the other hand, models imperfectly credible exchange rate target zones by introducing 
an exogenously given constant devaluation risk, and Bertola and Svensson (1991) 
explicitly formalise time-varying devaluation/realignment expectations as a second 
state variable in addition to the fundamentals. 
 In order to discuss formally and compare the various models of imperfectly 
credible target zones, the general solution derived in Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) for 
a number of alternative boundary control hypotheses will be employed. A neat feature 
of the Bartolini and Bodnar solution is that it reduces to the special model of 
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Krugman (1991), Bertola and Caballero (1991), Svensson (1991b) or Flood and 
Garber (1989) under certain parameter restrictions. 
 Figure 2.11 summarises the intervention policies considered in the Bartolini 
and Bodnar (1991) model, whereby allowance is made for different realignment risks 
at the upper and lower boundaries of the fundamentals band, as well as asymmetric 
intervention rules for repositioning fundamentals inside the old band (in case it is 
defended), or inside a new band (in case of a realignment). Let the current central 
parity of the fundamentals be denoted by ct, the width of the symmetric fundamentals 
band by 2f , and the probabilities that the band is realigned when the fundamentals hit 
the upper and lower edges of the band by  and , respectively, When a devaluation 
occurs, the new central parity becomes (c+C), and the position of the fundamentals 
inside the new band becomes (c+C+D). However, if the central bank responds to 
devaluation pressure by defending the central parity, fundamentals are repositioned 
inside the old band at (c+D*). Similarly, when a revaluation occurs, the new central 
parity becomes (c-C), and the position of the fundamentals inside the new band 
becomes (c-C-R), whilst in the case of a defence of the central parity the fundamentals 
are repositioned inside the old band at (c-R*). 
 
 
Figure 2.11. 
Simulation of Possible Time-Paths of Exchange Rate Fundamentals under 
Alternative Boundary Controls 
 
 
 
 In Box 10 the Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) solution for imperfectly credible 
exchange rate target zones like those depicted in Figure 2.11. for alternative boundary 
control scenarios, is spelled out formally. As Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) stress, in a 
fully credible target zone with 0 the Flood and Garber (1989) case of impulse-
control adjustment is obtained. The Krugman (1991) and Svensson (1991b) case of 
fully credible infinitesimal marginal control may, in turn, be obtained for 0 by 
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additionally letting D* and R* go to f .23 Finally, the Bertola and Caballero (1991) 
model of an imperfectly credible target zone follows for , D=D*=R=R*=0 and 
C=2f , whilst Krugman's (1991) case of the collapse of an imperfectly credible target 
zone to a free float derives for , D=D*=R=R*=0 and C=f . 
 
 
Box 10 
Bartolini and Bodnar's (1991) General Solution of Models of Imperfectly 
Credible Target Zones under a Variety of Possible Intervention Policies 
 ,t t te x f c ,    (10.1) 
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Key to symbols: et exchange rate, ct central parity, ft fundamentals,  instantaneous 
mean drift of ft, 
2
 instantaneous variance of ft, Et(det/dt) expected exchange rate 
change, x(f) exchange rate function, xf (xff) first (second) derivative of x with 
respect to f, zt stochastic Wiener process, f =-fL and f =fU (eL and eU) symmetric 
lower and upper bounds of fundamentals (exchange rates),  ,1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 
4, 1, 2, A, A1, A2,  parameters,  realignment probability (01), 
realignment size 2fU (c1=c0+2fU=f0+2fU). 
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 It is obvious from Box 10 that a given fundamentals process with a given 
band width may now result in differing exchange rate processes and bands, depending 
on the probability that the fundamentals band will be defended as the process hits the 
edges of the band. Figure 2.12. displays a number of such processes for a selection of 
values of the realignment probability . To illustrate this point, I have chosen =0.1, 
=0.4, =0.6, and =0.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.12. 
Simulation of Exchange Rates and Fundamentals under Various Degrees of 
Realignment Risks 
     
     
 
 
 Using Figure 2.12 the time-paths of the exchange rate which correspond to 
the given time-path of the fundamentals from Figure 2.11 can be derived. They are 
displayed in Figure 2.13 for various degrees of realignment risks, as measured by the 
realignment probability . In order to demonstrate the effects of a perceived increase 
of realignment risks on exchange rates, I have chosen to report results for =0.1, 
=0.4, and =0.9 respectively. 
 In Figures 2.11 to 2.13 it is assumed that the central bank engages 
exclusively in intervention at the margins of the fundamentals band, although the 
credibility of defending the band is only partial, that is, agents believe that the target 
zone will be defended at the upper and lower boundary with probability , and 
changed in a realignment of size C=2.5f  with probability (1-)=(1-), whereby 
0<<1 holds. 
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Figure 2.13 
Simulations of Exchange Rates under Various Degrees of Realignment Risks in 
Imperfectly Credible Target Zones 
 
(a) Small Realignment Risks (=0.1) 
 
 
(b) Intermediate Realignment Risks (=0.4) 
 
 
(c) Large Realignment Risks (=0.9) 
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 The upper panel of Figure 2.13 displays the time-path of the exchange rate in 
this set-up if the target zone for the fundamentals is relatively credible, and hence the 
probability of defending the target zone is relatively high (=0.1). In this case the 
exchange rate band is much narrower than the corresponding fundamentals band, and 
the inherent stabilisation effect of a target zone is still present, even though the 
credibility of defending the target zone is only partial. In imperfectly credible target 
zones with a low realignment probability (1- ) the exchange rate function still 
has the familiar S-shape, but it is everywhere steeper than the corresponding curve in 
a fully credible target zone (say for ). 
 The panel in the middle of Figure 2.13 displays the time-path of the 
exchange rate under the free float solution of the model, which typically arises for 
intermediate levels of credibility. Note that due to C=2.5f  the free float solution 
(with A1=-A2=0) results in the present example for  whilst in the Bertola and 
Caballero (1991) model with C=2f  the free float emerges for . In this case 
the exchange rate band has the same width as the fundamentals band, and there is no 
inherent stabilisation effect of a target zone whatsoever. 
 The lower panel of Figure 2.13 shows the time-path of the exchange rate if a 
realignment is relatively likely when the fundamentals hit the boundaries of the target 
zone, and hence the probability of defending the target zone is relatively low (=0.1). 
The exchange rate band is much wider than the corresponding fundamentals band and 
the target zone for the fundamentals results in an inherent destabilising effect for 
exchange rates. In imperfectly credible target zones with a high realignment 
probability (1- ) the exchange rate function then has the inverted S-shape 
postulated in the Bertola and Caballero (1991) model, and it is everywhere steeper 
than the corresponding free float curve (which due to C=2.5f  results here for 
). 
 In the target zone literature a number of special cases for the above general 
model of an imperfectly credible target zone from Box 10 have been discussed, where 
differences can be observed primarily in the specification of the behaviour of the 
monetary authority when the target zone is not defended. These models and their main 
implications shall be briefly reviewed below.  
 
 
2.2.3.1. Krugman's Model of a Collapsing Target Zone 
 
Krugman (1991) analyses the case of an imperfectly credible target zone which the 
monetary authority defends by infinitesimal marginal intervention at the upper and 
lower boundary of the fundamentals band with probability (1- 01). In case the 
target zone is not defended it will collapse and revert to a free float with probability . 
What are the effects of this imperfect credibility of the central bank's commitment to 
defending the band on the principle conclusions of the target zone model? 
 Using Krugman's (1991) model of an imperfectly credible target zone this 
may best be illustrated by referring to Figure 2.14. At point A (B) with f=fL (f=fU) the 
familiar S-shaped exchange rate function of a fully credible target zone "smooth 
pasted" to the lower (upper) boundary eL (eU) of the targeted exchange rate band. At 
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f=eL (f=eU) the free float exchange rate function intersects with this currency band. At 
point D (G) with f=fD (f=fG) the equilibrium exchange rate function of Krugman's 
imperfectly credible target zone model hits the boundaries of the targeted currency 
band. At the point D (G) the monetary authority must intervene, either to defend or to 
abandon the target zone.24  
 
 
Figure 2.14. 
Exchange Rates and Fundamentals in Krugman's Model of an Imperfectly 
Credible Target Zone 
 
 
 
If the target zone is defended, the exchange rate e jumps to point E (H) on 
the exchange rate function e f A e A et t
f ft t     1 2
1 2 ,the S-shaped fully 
credible case. If the target zone is abandoned, the exchange rate e jumps to point F (I) 
on the freely floating trajectory e=f. Thus, given the exogenous probability  of an 
exchange rate target zone collapse and given the upper (lower) boundary eL (eU), the 
upper (lower) boundary fD (fG) of the corresponding target zone for fundamentals 
must at the point of intervention satisfy the "no arbitrage" condition: the expected 
jump of the exchange rate in response to the intervention at the lower and upper 
boundaries of a pre-specified exchange rate band must be zero. This is indicated in 
equations (11.4a) and (11.4b) of Box 11. These "zero expected profit" conditions 
imply the boundary conditions (11.5a) and (11.5b).  
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BOX 11 
A Stylised Model of an Imperfectly Credible Exchange Rate Target Zone: 
Krugman's (1991) Regime Collapse Model 
  ,t t t te f E de
dt

    
exchange rate 
equation 
(11.1) 
,t tdf dt dz     
dynamics of 
fundamentals 
(11.2) 
     
2
,
2
t t f t ff tx f f x f x f

     
2nd order partial 
diff. equation 
(11.3) 
  1 21 21 t t
f f
t te f Ae A e
         
  exchange rate 
function 
(11.4) 

 



1 2
2
2
2
2
, 
  
 
characteristic roots (11.5) 
  1 21 20 ( ) 1 D D
f f
D Lf e Ae A e
          
 zero profits at 
upper boundary 
(11.6a) 
  1 21 20 ( ) 1 G G
f f
G Uf e Ae A e
          
 zero profits at 
lower boundary 
(11.6b) 
  1 21 21 D D
f f
L De f Ae A e
         
  lower boundary 
condition 
(11.7a) 
  1 21 21 G G
f f
U Ge f Ae A e
         
  upper boundary 
condition 
(11.7b) 
A
e e
e e
f f
f f f f
U L
U L L U
1
1 1
2 2
1 2 1 2


 
 
    
,  
1st coefficient 
restriction 
(11.8a) 
A
e e
e e
f f
f f f f
L U
U L L U
2
2 2
1 1
1 2 1 2


 
 
    
, 
2nd coefficient 
restriction 
(11.8b) 
 
2 1 2 1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1
U t L t
U L L U
L t U t
U L L U
f f f f
f f f f
f f f f f
f f f f
e e
e e
x
e e
e e
   
   
   
   

 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
slope of exchange 
rate function 
(11.9) 
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1
L U U L
U L L U
f f f f
f f f f f
e e
x
e e
   
   

 
 
 
    
 
=π 
slope at the 
boundary 
(11.10) 
Key to symbols: et exchange rate, ft fundamentals,  instantaneous mean drift of ft, 
2 instantaneous variance of ft, Et(det/dt) expected exchange rate change, x(f) 
exchange rate function, xf (xff) first (second) derivative of x with respect to f, zt 
stochastic Wiener process, fL and fU (eL and eU) upper and lower bound of 
fundamentals (exchange rate), 1,, 2, A1, A2,  parameters,  collapse probability. 
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The collapse probability  appears in these boundary conditions only as a 
multiplicative factor on the non-linear part. For simplicity, consider the case of 
driftless fundamentals with =0. For =1 the boundaries of the equilibrium exchange 
rate trajectory coincides with the free float trajectory and fD=eL  (fG=eU) holds for the 
lower (upper) bound of the implied fundamentals band. For =0 the target zone is 
defended with certainty and the boundaries of the implied fundamentals band fD (fG) 
must be equal to fL (fU), the margins of a fully credible target zone. For 0<<1, 
however, the boundaries of the equilibrium trajectory lie somewhere between those of 
the freely floating trajectory and those of a fully credible target zone. Thereby, the 
higher the collapse probability, the narrower will be the range of intervention-free 
fundamentals movements, which is consistent with a given width of a targeted 
exchange rate band. 
 Given the width of the fundamentals band which is determined implicitly by 
equations (11.7a,b), it is easy to demonstrate that Krugman's solution for the 
equilibrium exchange rate inside the band is determined by equation (11.8a,b) in Box 
11,25 which using the notation from section 2.2.1. may be re-written as equation 
(11.4). The slope of this exchange rate is given by equation (11.9). At the lower and 
upper boundary of the fundamentals band, that is for ft=fL and for ft=fU, this 
expression for the slope of the equilibrium exchange rate function reduces to equation 
(11.10).  
 From equation (11.10) it is obvious that in Krugman's model of a potentially 
collapsing imperfectly credible target zone the "smooth pasting" condition xf=0 only 
holds if the collapse probability is zero (=0). On the other hand, a unit slope of the 
exchange rate function at the boundaries of the fundamentals band (and everywhere 
inside the band) results for a collapse probability equal to unity (=1). In this case the 
target zone is sure to collapse as soon as the fundamentals hit the boundaries of the 
fundamentals band, and in effect there exists a free float system with et=x(ft)=ft. Note 
that in both extreme cases above and in the general cases with 0<<1 the slope of the 
equilibrium exchange rate function at the boundaries of the fundamentals band simply 
reflects the collapse probability . 
 The above effect of an increase of the collapse probability on the width of 
the exchange rate band implied by a given fundamentals band is displayed in Figure 
2.15, again for the above example of a zero fundamentals drift and a symmetric band 
(with =0, = 0.1, =1 and fU=-fL=0.094). For  the exchange rate function 
fulfils the "smooth pasting" condition and Krugman's (1991) model coincides with 
Svensson's (1991b) model of a fully credible target zone with infinitesimal marginal 
intervention. For 0<<1 the slope of the exchange rate function still has the familiar 
S-shape, but it is now everywhere steeper than in a fully credible target zone and 
violates the "smooth pasting" conditions at the boundaries of the fundamentals band. 
Stated differently, for 0<<1 the lower the credibility of defending the target zone, the 
wider will be the exchange rate band implied by the same fundamentals band, and for 
=1 the exchange rate function will lie on the free float locus. Thus, as long as the 
public attaches some non-zero probability to the event that the monetary authority will 
intervene in order to defend the target zone once fundamentals reach the boundaries of 
the band, then the qualitative conclusions about the inherent stabilisation effect of 
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fully credible target zone models will carry over to the case of an imperfectly credible 
target zone, even though the quantitative stabilisation effects may be quite low. 
 
 
Figure 2.15. 
Exchange Rates and Fundamentals in Krugman's Model under Various Degrees 
of Target Zone Credibility. 
 
 
 
 Similar conclusions can be reached for the probability density distribution of 
exchange rates, e(e)=f[x-1(e)]/xf[x
-1(e)], in Krugman's model of a potentially 
collapsing target zone. In fully credible target zones this density was shown to have an 
U-shape, with more mass concentrated at the boundaries of the exchange rate band, 
whilst under a free float the probability density was shown by Harrison (1985) to be 
uniform for a zero fundamental drift [f(f)=1/(fU-fL) for =0], and truncated 
exponential for a non-zero fundamentals drift [f(f)=ef/(efU-efL) for  0 and 
=2/2]. These results imply that in imperfectly credible target zones a less credible 
commitment to intervention at the boundaries of the band (higher 's) result in wider 
exchange rate bands for the same width of the fundamentals band, as may be seen 
from Figure 2.16.26 
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Figure 2.16. 
Probability Density Function of the Exchange Rate in an Imperfectly Credible 
Target Zone 
 
 
 
 The exchange rate's density distribution, which is only defined in the interior 
of the band,27 is U-shaped or bimodal with more mass towards the edges of the band 
for 0<1 and uniform for =1, which is the free float solution of the Krugman 
(1991) model. Furthermore, the density distributions are more compressed for smaller 
's and the bimodality is more pronounced. This flattening of the U-shapes for higher 
collapse probabilities  is a direct result of the flattening of the S-shapes of the 
exchange rate function for larger 's: for a given constant nominator in equation (8.5), 
the derivative xf in the denominator is larger close to the edges of the band the higher 
the collapse probability , and this makes the density smaller. 
 A similar result emerges in Krugman's model of an imperfectly credible 
target zone for the instantaneous standard deviation of the exchange rate, e(e)=xf[x
-
1(e)], which is the product of the standard deviation of the Brownian motion 
fundamentals  and the derivative xf[x
-1(e)] of the exchange rate function. Figure 
2.17 displays this instantaneous standard deviation of the exchange rate with zero drift 
in a symmetric band (=0, =0.1, =0.3 and fU=-fL=0.094). The standard deviation 
of exchange rates still has an inverted U-shape for 0<1, but for the free float 
solution with =1 it is uniform and equal to the standard deviation of the 
fundamentals process. Thus, a comparison of imperfectly and fully credible target 
zones shows with respect to the former that the instantaneous standard deviation of 
exchange rates is still largest in the middle of the exchange rate band, but it now falls 
to  instead of zero at the edges of the band. This is due to the violation of the 
"smooth pasting" condition in imperfectly credible target zones, since the derivative 
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of the exchange rate function at the edges of the band is given by xf[x
-1(e)]=, instead 
of being xf[x
-1(e)]=0, as in the "smooth pasting" case. 
 
 
Figure 2.17. 
Standard Deviation of the Exchange Rate in Krugman's Model Under Various 
Degrees of Target Zone Credibility 
 
 
 
2.2.3.2. Bertola and Caballero's Models of Repeated Realignments 
 
Bertola and Caballero (1990) analyse the case where, as in the Krugman (1991) 
model, the credibility of defending the band is only partial. In case the current target 
zone is not defended by discrete marginal intervention, the monetary authority will 
initiate a realignment. These realignments are viewed as infrequent, recurring 
stochastic regime shifts. 
 Bertola and Caballero (1990) assume that any form of intervention by the 
monetary authority only takes place at pre-specified, common knowledge points ct-fU 
and ct+fU, where ct stands for the no longer immutable current central parity and fU 
for the upper boundary of the band. One form of intervention is a defence of the 
current target zone, where the monetary authority is assumed to bring the exchange 
rate back to the centre of the current band (et=c0=f0).
28  The second form of central 
bank intervention in the Bertola and Caballero (1990) model is a realignment. In a 
realignment the central bank declares a new fluctuation band and central parity (c1) 
and brings the exchange rate to the centre of the new band (et=c1=c0+2fU=f0+2fU). 
Assume that the defence of the target zone occurs with probability 1-, whilst the 
probability of a realignment is  (01). 
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 Figure 2.18 illustrates the effects of realignments in the Bertola and 
Caballero (1991) model for the case of a symmetric band (fU=-fL) and a zero 
fundamentals drift (=0). Point A in Figure 2.18 characterizes the intervention point 
on an exchange rate function in a relatively credible target zone with central parity c0 
and low realignment probability (0<<0.5), whilst point B depicts the intervention 
point in a non-credible target zone with a high realignment probability  (0.5<<1). It 
is obvious that the exchange rate bands over two continuous fundamentals zones 
begin to overlap for 0.5, since for a given parity (ct=eC=fC) the exchange rate band 
becomes wider than the fundamentals band (due to eU=2fU). In this case the 
exchange rate function is everywhere steeper than it would be under a free float. The 
exchange rate function depicts an inverted S-shape. 
 
 
Figure 2.18. 
Realignments in Bertola and Caballero's Model of an Imperfectly Credible 
Target Zone 
 
 
 
 To understand this result, it is again important to discuss formally the 
boundary conditions. Equations (12.5a) and (12.5b) in Box 12 state that the exchange 
rate at the point of intervention must satisfy the "no arbitrage" condition, which states 
that the expected jump of the exchange rate in response to the intervention at the 
lower and upper boundaries of the band must be zero. For the simple but instructive 
case of a zero fundamentals drift (=0 and hence 1=-2 2   ) in a symmetrical 
target zone (fU=-fL) this may, after inserting the relevant exchange rate function 
(12.4), be modified to obtain the boundary conditions (12.7a) and (12.7b), from which 
the constant A (=A1=-A2) can be solved as indicated in equation (12.8).  
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BOX 12 
A Stylised Model of an Imperfectly Credible Exchange Rate Target Zone: 
The Bertola and Caballero (1990, 1991) Model of Repeated Realignments 
  ,t t t te f E de
dt

    
exchange rate 
equation 
(12.1) 
,t tdf dt dz     
fundamentals 
dynamics 
(12.2) 
     
2
,
2
t t f t ff tx f f x f x f

     
2nd order partial 
differential 
equation 
(12.3) 
et=  
   
, ,t t t t
f c f c
t t tx f c f Ae Ae
   
     exchange rate 
function 
(12.4) 
1=-2 2     characteristic 
roots 
(12.5) 
       , 2 , 2 1 ,t U t t U t U t tx c f c x c f c f x c c        no arbitrage at 
upper boundary 
(12.6a) 
       , 2 , 2 1 ,t U t t U t U t tx c f c x c f c f x c c        no arbitrage at 
lower boundary 
(12.6b) 
   2 1U Uf ft U t U tc f Ae Ae c f c
            lower boundary 
condition 
(12.7a) 
   2 1U Uf ft U t U tc f Ae Ae c f c
            upper boundary 
condition 
(12.7b) 
 1 2
U U
U
f f
f
A
e e
 





  
coefficient 
restriction 
(12.8) 
Key to symbols: et exchange rate, ct central parity, ft fundamentals,  
instantaneous mean drift of ft, 
2
 instantaneous variance of ft, Et(det/dt) expected 
exchange rate change, x(f) exchange rate function, xf (xff) first (second) derivative 
of x with respect to f, zt stochastic Wiener process, fL and fU (eL and eU) upper 
and lower bound of fundamentals (exchange rate),  ,1, 2, A, A1, A2,  
parameters,  realignment probability (01), realignment size 2fU 
(c1=c0+2fU=f0+2fU). 
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Obviously, the familiar S-shape29 of the exchange rate function, which 
requires A>0, results in an imperfectly credible target zone only for <1/2, whilst the 
free float solution with A=0 emerges here for =1/2. Finally, for 1/2<1 the 
exchange rate function is everywhere steeper than it would be under a free float. In 
this case the exchange rate function has an inverted S-shape, implying that a non-
credible target zone may have inherently destabilising effects on exchange rates. This 
result of the Bertola and Caballero (1991) model is visualised in Figure 2.19, which 
displays the exchange rate function in an imperfectly credible target zone under 
various degrees of realignment risk, as indicated by realignment probability .  
 
 
Figure 2.19. 
Exchange Rates and Fundamentals under Discrete Marginal Intervention under 
Various Degrees of Realignment Risk 
 
 
 
 
 As in the case of a fully credible target zone, the slope of the exchange rate 
functions in an imperfectly credible target zone has important implications for the 
probability density distribution of exchange rates. Figure 2.21 reports the probability 
density distributions of exchange rates, e(e)=f[x-1(e)]/xf[x
-1(e)], in the Bertola and 
Caballero (1991) model under various degrees of realignment risks. As before, the 
exchange rate's density distribution, which is only defined in the interior of the 
band,30 has the familiar U-shape in both fully (=0) and relatively credible (01/2) 
target zones, and is bimodal with more mass towards the edges of the band. 
Furthermore, the density distributions are more compressed for smaller 's and the 
bimodality is more pronounced. This flattening of the U-shapes for higher 
realignment probabilities  is a direct result of the flattening of the S-shapes of the 
exchange rate function for larger 's: for a given constant nominator in equation (8.3) 
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in Box 8, the derivative xf in the denominator is larger close to the edges of the band, 
the higher the collapse probability , and this makes the density smaller. For =1/2, 
which is the free float solution of the Bertola and Caballero (1991) model, the 
probability density is, as shown by Harrison (1985), uniform for a zero fundamental 
drift [f(f)=1/(fU-fL) for =0], and truncated exponential for a non-zero fundamentals 
drift [f(f)=ef/(efU-efL) for 0 and =2/2]. Finally, for the case of a non-
credible (1/21) target zones the exchange rate's density distribution has an 
inverted U-shape and is uni-modal with more mass towards the middle of the band, 
and again the density distributions are more compressed for smaller 's.  
 
 
Figure 2.20. 
Probability Density Distributions of the Exchange Rate in the Bertola and 
Caballero Model 
 
 
 
 The various slopes of the exchange rate function in an imperfectly credible 
target zone also determine the exchange rate's (conditional) instantaneous standard 
deviation, e(e)=xf[x
-1(e)], which is the product of the standard deviation of the 
Brownian motion fundamentals  and the derivative xf[x
-1(e)] of the exchange rate 
function. Figure 2.21 displays the standard deviation of the exchange rate. In both 
fully (=0) and relatively credible (01/2) target zones the standard deviation of 
exchange rates has an inverted U-shape. For =1/2 the standard deviation of the 
exchange rate is uniform across the band and for a zero fundamental drift (=0) equal 
to the standard deviation  of the fundamentals process. Finally for non-credible (1/2
1) target zones the exchange rate's standard deviation has an U-shape, and in all 
cases the exchange rate's instantaneous standard deviation functions are more 
compressed for smaller 's.  
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Figure 2.21. 
Standard Deviations of the Exchange Rate in the Bertola and Caballero's Model 
 
 
 
2.2.3.3.  Bartolini and Bodnar's Model of Interest Rate Differentials in  
Imperfectly Credible Target Zones 
 
Formally the only difference between models of perfectly credible and imperfectly 
credible target zones lies in the boundary conditions for the exchange rate at the point 
of intervention. Consequently, the determination of the interest rate differential 
t(ft,ct,) it(ft,ct,)-
*
t
i () between domestic and foreign pure discount bond maturing 
at time t+ is given (for ) by equations (9.1a) and (9.1b) in Box 9, which also 
applies for the Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) model. As before, determining (9.1b) 
requires computation the expected exchange rate at maturity, h(f,c,)
E[x{f(),c()} f0 =f]. 
 Extending the work of Svensson (1991b), Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) show 
that in a target zone with limited credibility the function h(f,c,) is the solution for the 
partial differential equation (9.2a) with initial condition (9.2b) and boundary 
conditions (9.2c, d). These boundary conditions are defined by the specific 
intervention rules adopted by the monetary authority, as characterised by the 
restrictions on C, R, D, R* and D* for the exchange rate in Box 10. 
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Figure 2.22. 
The Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials, Exchange Rates and 
Fundamentals in a Target Zone With Relatively High Credibility (=0.2) 
 
(a) Exchange Rates and Fundamentals 
 
 
 
 
(b) Interest Rate Differentials, Fundamentals and Term to Maturity 
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Figure 2.22. continued 
 
(c) Interest Rate Differentials and Fundamentals for Selected Terms to Maturity 
 
 
 
 
(d) Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rates for Selected Terms to 
Maturity 
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 Due to the non-standard nature of the boundary conditions (9.2b) and (9.2c) 
a closed-form analytical solution for h(f,c,) has not yet been derived. However, 
Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) show that a numerical solution for the partial differential 
equation (9.2a) may be obtained by using a numerical procedure, the so-called explicit 
method from Gerald and Weatley (1989). This complex solution procedure is spelled 
out in detail in Appendix B of this chapter. Using the Bartolini and Bodnar procedure 
the numerical solution displayed in Figures 2.22 and 2.23 may be obtained. 
 Consider first the case of a highly, but not fully credible (say ==0.3) 
commitment of the monetary authority to defend the target zone whenever 
fundamentals hit the boundary of the fundamentals band. When the target zone is 
defended, the fundamentals are reset to the middle or parity of the old band (D=R=0), 
whilst in the case of a realignment of size C=2fU the fundamentals are reset to the 
middle or parity of the new band (D*=R*=0). Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) show that 
in the context of the Bertola and Caballero (1991) model such a low realignment 
probability, which in Figure 2.22a implies an S-shaped exchange rate function, results 
in functions for the term structure of interest rate differentials, as displayed in Figures 
2.22b to 2.22d. High credibility of the target zone thus generates a pattern of interest 
rate differentials or forward premia which are positive at the bottom and negative at 
the top of the fundamentals band. As in the Svensson (1991b) model, the interest rate 
differential is decreasing in the fundamentals over a wide range around the middle of 
the band, and becomes flatter and less non-linear for longer maturities. The lower 
two-dimensional zoom on the right-hand side of Figure 2.22b further shows that the 
fluctuation band of interest rate differentials is decreasing in the term . However, the 
combination of high but imperfect target zone credibility and discrete marginal 
intervention results in hump-shaped interest rate differential profiles towards the 
edges of the band, as opposed to the monotonic pattern from the infinitesimal 
marginal intervention case in the Svensson (1991b) model of a fully credible target 
zone from Figures 2.6. By comparing Figures 2.22c and 2.22d, it also becomes clear 
that the above conclusions for the relationship between interest rate differentials and 
fundamentals carry over to the relationship between interest rate differentials and 
exchange rates. which will be the focus of the empirical analysis of the present study.  
 The second case considered by Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) is that of a target 
zone with low credibility and a high realignment probability (==0.8), which is 
displayed in Figures 2.23a to 2.23d. Such a high realignment probability implies the 
inversely S-shaped exchange rate function in Figure 2.23a, which is steeper than the 
free float line. The resulting term structure of interest rate differential functions are 
displayed in Figures 2.23b to 2.23d. The low credibility of the target zone generates a 
pattern of interest rate differentials or forward premia which are negative at the 
bottom of the band and positive at the top of the band. Thus, in contrast to the 
Svensson (1991b) model, the interest rate differential is now increasing in the 
fundamentals over a relatively wide range around the middle of the band. The 
combination of high but imperfect target zone credibility and discrete marginal 
intervention again results in hump-shaped interest rate differential profiles.  
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Figure 2.23. 
The Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials, Exchange Rates and 
Fundamentals in a Target Zone With Relatively Low Credibility (=0.8) 
 
(a) Exchange Rates and Fundamentals 
 
 
 
 
(b) Interest Rate Differentials, Fundamentals and Term to Maturity 
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Figure 2.23. continued 
 
(c) Interest Rate Differentials and Fundamentals for Selected Terms to Maturity 
 
 
 
 
(d) Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rates for Selected Terms to 
Maturity 
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As before, the term structure of interest rate differentials also becomes flatter 
and less non-linear for longer maturities, and the fluctuation band of interest rate 
differentials is decreasing in the term . Comparing Figure 2.23c and 2.23d it further 
becomes obvious that these conclusions for the relationship between interest rate 
differentials and fundamentals also apply to the relationship between interest rate 
differentials and exchange rates.  
 To summarise, the main implication of the Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) 
model is that the a sign of the slope of the non-linear relationship between the term 
structure of interest rate differentials and exchange rates depends strongly on the 
degree of target zone credibility. Depending on the probability  of a realignment this 
slope of the term structure function may have a positive or negative slope near the 
middle of the band.  
 
 
2.2.3.4. Imperfectly Credible Target Zones and Devaluation Expectations 
 
The first attempt to explicitly model devaluation risks in imperfectly credible target 
zones as a process rather than a probability is to be found in Svensson (1989, 1991b). 
He views realignments as re-occurring with some given constant probability, 
irrespective of the exchange rate's position within the band. In particular, a 
realignment is modelled as a shift of magnitude g in the upper and lower bounds of 
the fundamentals band (fL'=fL+gN, fU'=fU+gN) and the same simultaneous shift g in 
the fundamentals process (dft=gdN+dt+dzt). The number of realignments is given 
as N, and dN is equal to unity with probability dt, which is drawn from a Poisson 
distribution. As Svensson (1989, 1991b) shows, these devaluations, which leave the 
relative position of the fundamentals within the band unchanged, result in the 
modified equation (13.2) for the interest rate differential as opposed to equation (13.1) 
in the original Svensson (1991b) model. 
Note that even if no realignments have yet occurred (for N=0), equations (13.2) 
differs from its counterparts (13.1) in Box 13 by the inclusion of the term g. The 
implication of this for the exchange rate function in Figure 2.1 and the term structure 
of interest rate differentials in Figure 2.10 is that constant devaluation risk shifts these 
functions upwards by an amount proportional to g. 
 As noted in Bertola and Svensson (1991), the above constant devaluation 
risk is unlikely to result in empirically more successful target zone models. The 
authors therefore introduce stochastic devaluation risk gt as a second source of time 
variation in exchange rates and interest rate differentials. This second state variable gt 
is thereby assumed to follow a continuous Brownian motion process (dgt=dt+dut) 
with instantaneous mean drift  and variance , where dut is the standard Wiener 
process.31 Solving the model in the two state variables gt and ft then enables Bertola 
and Svensson (1991) to explain much of the residual variation in interest rate 
differentials left unexplained by standard target zone models to the omission of the 
second state variable gt. 
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Box 13 
Empirical Implications of Target Zone Models with Respect to the 
Relationship between Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rates 
Svensson (1991b) 
        t t tc b e          (13.1) 
- the slope coefficient b() are negative and increasing in term. 
- in the absence of any fundamental drift (=0), the the intercept coefficient c() 
should be zero for all  if there is no devaluation risk.. 
Svensson (1991b) 
        t t t, g c , g b e ,           (13.2)  
- the intercept coefficient is negative and depends on both the term  and the 
product of the probability intensity of a realignment () and the expected size of 
the realignment (g):  
Svensson and Bertola (1991) 
        2 2 2 2t t g f t g f t tg , ; c g , b , e            ,  (13.3)  
- the time-varying intercept ct() may take positive and negative values 
- the slope coefficient where  2 2g fb ,    is negative and increasing in term for low 
degrees of variability of expected devaluations (g
2relative to  f
2),  
- in the absence of fundamental drift (=0) the intercept c(gt,) should largely 
reflect devaluation risks.  
Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) 
        2 2 2 2t t t g f t t t g f t tg , , ; c g , , b , , e                  (13.4)  
- the slope coefficient  2 2t t g fb g , , ;     is negative and decreasing in term for low 
realignment probabilities t and low degrees of variability of expected 
devaluation rates g
2  relative to  f
2), but positive and decreasing in term for high 
realignment probabilities t and high degrees of the variability of expected 
devaluationrates (g
2) relative to the fundamentals ( f
2) 
Key to symbols: it interest rate, i t
*
 foreign interest rate, t interest rate differential,et 
exchange rate, ft fundamentals, 

() instantaneous conditional standard 
deviation of t, 
2
 instantaneous variance of ft, (f) interest rate differential 
function, f (ff) first (second) derivative of  with respect to f, 
f
(f) density 
distribution of fundamentals, 

() density distribution of interest rate differential, 
fL and fU (L and U) upper and lower bound of fundamentals (interest rate 
differentials),  maturity,  parameter,  realignment probability (01), 
realignment size 2fU (c1=c0+2fU=f0+2fU). 
Chapter 2 53 
 An interesting result of Bertola and Svensson (1991) is that the negatively 
sloped instantaneous interest rate differential in Figure 2.10 now fluctuates vertically 
as the expected rate of devaluation gt changes over time, so that combined with the 
simultaneous fluctuations in the fundamentals ft almost any pattern of exchange rate 
and interest rate differential observations may result. More specifically, as the 
variability of gt relative to ft increases, the correlation between the instantaneous 
interest rate differential and the exchange rate will be less negative, and may even 
become positive. This is captured by equation (13.3) in Box 13. For positive and finite 
terms matters are even more complicated, as one has to be more specific about what 
happens to the expected rate of devaluation in the future: if expected devaluation rates 
gt being driven by a Brownian motion process across realignment regimes, then 
interest rate differentials will be non-stationary. Alternatively, to obtain stationary 
interest rate differentials, some type of mean reverting properties (or re-setting at a 
realignment) of gt is required. On purely theoretical grounds Bertola and Svensson 
(1991) prefer the latter alternative. Their simulations then show that for a low 
variability of the expected devaluation rates gt relative to the fundamentals ft the 
negative correlation between the term structure of interest rate differentials and 
exchange rates is maintained, but for relatively high degrees of time-variability of 
expected devaluation rates gt this negative correlation may vanish or even become 
positive. This result parallels that of Bartolini and Bodnar (1992) for various degrees 
of realignment probabilities in the Bertola and Caballero model, as formalised in 
equation 13.4 of Box 13. 
 
2.3. Comparing Credibility in Policy Game and Target Zones Models 
 
To summarise, the various models of perfectly credible and imperfectly credible 
exchange rate target zones have strong empirical implications for both exchange rates 
and interest rate differentials. These empirical implications primarily concern the 
probability distributions and variability of both exchange rates and interest rate 
differentials within certain boundaries defined by the target zone framework. Another 
strong empirical implication of the target zone model is that it predicts a specific 
correlation between exchange rates and interest rate differentials. An interesting 
feature of the fully and imperfectly credible target zone models thereby is that they 
contradict each other on almost every of the above aspects. It should therefore be 
easily possible to empirically discriminate between both classes of target zone 
models. 
The empirical analysis of the target zone model is carried out in chapter 4. 
Before turning to this evidence, some remarks on the econometric methods and 
empirically testable propositions with respect to credibility in both the policy game 
and the target zone models are in or order. The following chapter 3 of the study 
discusses these issues. 
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Endnotes to Chapter 2 
                                                          
1 Note that here unexpected inflation rates t (t=pt-pt-1), instead of the unexpected level of 
prices pt as in Lucas (1973), explain the deviation of output from its natural level.  
2 Since the public cannot observe m and there are no contemporary information signals 
available, E(mtt) is identical to E(mtt-1) in this simple version of the basic game. 
3 Note that these reputational equilibria unravel backwards infinitely repeated games with the 
full information, and the above discretionary Nash equilibrium (with mt=E(mtt-1)=b) is 
obtained in all periods. 
4 Note that in the solution of the models of Backus and Driffill (1985a,b) and Barro (1986) the 
government may, after a certain point in time, randomise between the two pure strategies. This 
feature of the solution, which is due to the simple structure of the model, disappears if, for 
example, a continuum of possible government types is postulated. See Driffill (1988) for further 
reverences on this point. 
5 Barro (1986) shows that such strategic behaviour (t>0) of the inflationary policymaker is less 
likely to occur the higher his time preference rate r. Furthermore, the same qualitative 
conclusion holds the shorter the government's planning horizon and the lower its initial 
counterinflation reputation. 
6 Note that the coefficients and in the reduced form for the optimal money growth rate in 
equation (4.4c) are determined by the requirement of rational expectations in the solution of the 
public's signal extraction problem in equation (4.5). See Cukierman and Meltzer (1986c) for the 
details of the derivation of these reduced form coefficient restrictions within an optimising 
framework. 
7 In fixed but adjustable exchange rate systems like the EMS a realignment typically leads to 
new exchange rate parities, which are the outcome of a bargaining process amongst the 
participants and are frequently not fully indexed to cumulated past inflation differentials. This 
fact justifies the formulation in equation (6.3) according to which a central bank's PPP target of 
the exchange rate may differ from the officially announced new central exchange rate parity. 
8  Froot and Obstfeld (1989a) show (in footnote 2) how equation (1) may be derived from a 
monetary model of exchange rates such as Mussa (1976). Miller and Weller (1989, 1990a,b) 
present an interpretation of this equation in terms of Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model. 
9  If such jumps were allowed for, risk neutral investors would face an arbitrage opportunity as 
fundamentals approach the point of intervention at the margins of the band. Flood and Garber 
(1989) further show that this no-jump requirement also provides boundary conditions for more 
general intervention policies, such as finite intervention strictly in the interior of the band. 
10  Svensson (1991a) shows that in case of a symmetrical fundamental band (fU=-fL) and a 
zero fundamentals drift (=0) the target zone model has a neat solution: the roots 1 and 2 are 
given by 1=- and 2= , with = 2   , and the constants A1 and A2  fulfil A1=A and 
A2=-A, with A=1/[2 cosh(fU)]. The target zone exchange rate function can then be written 
as x(f)=f- sinh(f)/cosh(fU). 
11  Lindberg and Söderlind (1991) show that in order for the monetary authority to determine a 
suitable symmetric band around zero  for the fundamentals (fU=-fL) which corresponds to a 
desired symmetrical exchange rate band (eU=-eL), the equation sU=fU-tanh(fU)/. 
12 See, for example, Spanos (1986). 
13  It is obvious that for a zero drift and a symmetrical fundamentals band the derivative of in 
the denominator of (8.3) is given by xf(f(e))=1- cosh(f)/cosh(fU).  
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14  This is true since the exchange rate function is strictly increasing and invertible only in  the 
interior of the band, and its derivative is zero at the edges of the band. 
15  See Svensson (1989, 1991b) and Lindberg and Söderlind (1991). 
16  Of course, both the direct numerical method and the analytical Fourier series method, of 
course,  yield the same quantitative results. Svensson (1991b) uses the direct numerical method 
in calculating the three-dimensional graphs in which he displays his results. However, the 
present analysis uses the analytical Fourier series solution for deriving the same three-
dimensional graphs. 
17  As the published version of the paper by Svensson (1991b) does not contain the analytical 
Fourier series solution on which the graphs in the present paper are based, this Fourier series 
solution is reported here from Svensson's (1991b) Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) Discussion Paper No. 495, pages 29-32. 
18  The analytical Fourier series solution involves the summation of infinitely many terms, 
(n=0,1,2,...) and in practice this analytical solution has to be computed numerically as a 
summation of a truncated series. In the present analysis a truncation at n=9 proved to be 
sufficiently accurately enough to reproduce Svensson's results based on the direct numerical 
method. 
19  In the above example with =0, = 0.1, =3 and fU=-fL=0.094 (eU=-eL=0.01) this results 
in a symmetrical interest rate differential band of approximately U=-L=0.026. 
20  In the case of the instantaneous interest rate differential the derivative in equation (9.4) is 
given by -f(f;)=cosh(f)/cosh(fU), and the derivatives of the instantaneous differential at 
the edges are given by -f(fL;)=-f(fU;)=1/>0, which clearly violates the smooth pasting 
conditions. 
21  See equation (A17) in Appendix A.4 of Svensson's (1991b) Centre for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper No. 495, page 35. 
22  Iterating et in equi-distant steps and at each step numerically optimising the right-hand side 
of equation (7.4) yields the required values of f(et), which then may be used to calculate 
h(f(et);). Computing (f(e);) from equation (9.5) is then straightforward. 
23  Formally this equivalence comes from the L'Hopital's rule:        lim / lim /
x f x f
m x n x m x n x
 
 
.
 
24  See also Pesenti (1990), pp. 26 on this point. 
25  See, for instance, Pesenti (1990). 
26  It is obvious that for a zero drift and a symmetrical fundamentals band the derivative of in 
the denominator of (8.3) is given by xf(f(e))=1- cosh(f)/cosh(fU).  
27  This is true since the exchange rate function is strictly increasing and invertible only in  the 
interior of the band, and its derivative is zero at the edges of the band. 
28  Bertola and Caballero (1990) model central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets 
as discrete (large and infrequent) marginal intervention, as in the Flood and Garber (1989) 
model, instead of infinitesimal (small and frequent) marginal intervention, as in the Krugman 
(1991) and Svensson (1991b) models. 
29  Compared to the fully credible infinitesimal marginal intervention case, these S-shaped 
exchange rate functions in the discrete marginal intervention case do exhibit smooth-pasting at 
the boundaries of the exchange rate band. 
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30  This is true since the exchange rate function is strictly increasing and invertible only in  the 
interior of the band, and its derivative is zero at the edges of the band. 
31   Bertola and Svensson (1991) further allow a non-zero correlation between the increments 
of the stochastic processes driving the expected realignment rates gt and the fundamentals ft, 
which is disregarded here for simplicity.  
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Monetary Policy and Credibility: Theories and Facts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF 
POLICY CREDIBILITY 
 
 
 
3.1.  SURVEY 
 
Despite strong empirical motivation, the analysis of policy credibility and reputation 
from the policy game literature has not been seriously taken to the data, as Persson 
(1988) notes. In sharp contrast, theoretical developments in the target zone literature 
are primarily caused by the fact that the simple Krugman (1991) model of a perfectly 
credible target zone did not explain the data very well. The present section aims at 
briefly surveying recent developments in both strands of the credibility literature.  
 Following Wyplosz (1989) the existing empirical literature on credibility and 
reputation in the policy game context may be divided into the two broad categories of 
indirect and direct evidence. 
 The indirect approach is based on Fellner's (1979) stabilisation policy 
argument that a 'credible policy' is less costly - in terms of output foregone - than a 
policy which the public expects to be abandoned. Consequently, 'credible policies' 
imply more favourable output-inflation trade-offs. Some informal empirical evidence 
on this proposition is provided in Sachs and Wyplosz (1987), Giavazzi and Spaventa 
(1989), Dornbusch (1989) and Ball (1993) by presenting estimates of 'sacrifice ratios', 
defined as the cumulated increase in unemployment rates divided by the total decrease 
in the rate of inflation. Along the same lines De Grauwe (1988) compares the history 
of output-inflation trade-offs between countries. Slightly more formal evidence on 
output-inflation trade-offs is presented in Perry (1983), Blanchard (1984), Christensen 
(1987a,b, 1988) and Kremers (1990), who examine whether suspected deflationary 
policy shifts were 'credible' in the sense that actual inflation or interest rates were 
lower than those predicted by structural Phillips curve models estimated over the 
period prior to the policy shift. A similar approach is taken in Giavazzi and 
Giovannini (1989), who use vector autoregressive models of inflation and output 
growth to search for policy shifts to more credible policies in EMS member countries. 
Similar approaches are to be found in the more recent studies by Bolazzi (1991), 
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Agénor and Taylor (1991) Egebo and Englander (1992), Blackburn Mongiardino and 
Sola (1992), Masson (1992), Ayuso, Jurado and Restoy (1993) and Revenga (1993), 
amongst others. The main problem with this indirect evidence is that it is typically 
very vague with respect to precisely what is meant by credibility and how it may be 
measured. 
 Less illusive concepts are used in the direct approach to estimating 
credibility and reputation. The aim of this literature is to empirically estimate a pre-
specified measures of credibility. Such credibility measures have been derived from 
the policy-game literature, and, more recently, the target zone literature. 
 The direct approach to estimating policy credibility is pursued in papers by 
Baxter (1985), Hardouvelis and Barnhart (1987), and Weber (1990a, 1991a, 1992b). 
Baxter (1985) follows McCallum (1985) in using the term 'credibility of policies' to 
characterise a 'believable policy'. She assumes that credibility is obtained to the extent 
that beliefs concerning a policy conform to the way in which the policy is actually 
being conducted and to official announcements about its conduct. In this context 
'credibility' implies 'precommitment'. In studying the Chilean and Argentine 
stabilisation efforts, Baxter (1985) draws on the Sargent (1982, 1983, 1986) argument 
that a credible monetary reform implies a path for the fiscal deficit which is 
compatible with the long-run sustainability of national debt. Credibility in Baxter 
(1985) is defined as the probability that the estimated coefficients of a reduced form 
model of government debt and money growth satisfy the parameter restrictions 
implied by a feasible monetary reform aimed at stabilising inflation. Note that Baxter 
(1985) uses Bayesian regression inference to estimate credibility as a time-varying 
conditional posterior probability. Bayesian inference is also used in Weber (1992b) by 
applying Bayesian multi-process Kalman filters to estimate the prior probability that 
observable inflation rates follow stationary stochastic processes. This prior probability 
is interpreted as an empirical counterpart to the Backus and Driffill (1985a,b) measure 
of the counterinflation reputation of policymakers. This concept will be discussed in 
some depth in section 3.2. below.  
 A different approach to estimating credibility directly is applied in Weber 
(1989a, 1991a) by estimating the Cukierman and Meltzer (1983, 1986b) measures of 
the credibility of announcements concerning the future course of monetary policy. 
Credibility here is defined as the weight attached to the money growth announcement 
signal in the public's money growth expectations. In Weber (1991a) the empirical 
estimates of these Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) credibility measures are derived by 
using Bayesian Kalman filtering and recursive least squares methods. A similar 
approach without explicit reference to the Cukierman and Meltzer model is pursued in 
Hardouvelis and Barnhart (1987). The concept used in Weber (1991a) will be 
discussed in detail in section 3.3. below.  
 The detailed empirical analysis of exchange rate target zone models was 
initiated by Svensson's (1989, 1991a,b,c) analysis of the unilateral Swedish target 
zone. Additional evidence about the Swedish experience id provided in Lindberg and 
Söderlind (1991). Svensson (1991b) estimates a linearized version of his model by 
regressing interest rate differentials of various maturity on the parity deviation of the 
exchange rate. The estimated slope coefficients exhibit the expected pattern of being 
Chapter 3 59 
negative and smaller for longer maturities, as postulated by the simple target zone 
model. However, the fit between theory and data is far from perfect, and a strongly 
serially correlated component is left unexplained in the relationship between exchange 
rates and interest rate differentials, as Bertola and Svensson (1991) note. Serious 
doubts about the empirical validity of the standard target zone model for the Swedish 
data are also raised in Lindberg and Söderlind (1991), who apply parametric methods 
to daily data and show that their results in most cases refute the standard target zone 
model.  
 For the EMS extensive empirical evidence on the validity of the target zone 
model is provided in Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1990), who find no compelling 
evidence of the type of non-linearities implied by standard target zone models. Again 
the components left unexplained by non-linear models are highly serially correlated 
and, in many cases, so large as to raise serious doubts about the validity of target zone 
models, as Bertola and Svensson (1991) stress.  
 In order to close the obvious gap between the theory of a fully credible target 
zone and empirical facts, Bertola and Caballero (1990) have developed a model of an 
imperfectly credible target zone in which realignments are permitted to occur with a 
given constant probability, and confront this model with data from the EMS. They 
find that their model is more consistent with the EMS experience than the fully 
credible target zone model of Krugman (1991). Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) formalise 
the link between exchange rates and the term structure of interest rate differentials in 
such imperfectly credible target zones, and provide simulation results for the EMS. As 
above, their model produces more coherent results than the Krugman (1991) model.  
 Another way of incorporating time-varying devaluation risks into the target 
zone model has been adopted by Bertola and Svensson (1991), who model stochastic 
fluctuations in expected devaluation rates as a second state variable (in addition to 
fundamentals) in order to introduce noise in the empirical relationship between 
interest rate differentials and exchange rates. The authors use simulation experiments 
to show that this can account for some of the stylised empirical facts found in Flood, 
Rose and Mathieson (1990) for the EMS. Further evidence on the relevance of this 
type of model is provided in Rose and Svensson (1991, 1993) and Svensson (1991d) 
for EMS exchange rates and interest rate differentials relative to Germany. Rose and 
Svensson (1991) show that many of the features of the Bertola and Svensson (1991) 
model seem to be consistent with the data: adding fluctuating devaluation risk can 
reconcile some of the problems associated with early target zone models which have 
only a single forcing variable, the fundamentals process. Similar evidence based on 
the Bertola and Svensson (1991) model is provided in Weber (1992a). The various 
approaches to evaluating the relevance of the different types of target zone models is 
outlined in detail in section 3.4 below. In order to provided some discriminating 
evidence on the fully credible versus the imperfectly credible target zone models a 
number theoretical proposition and their empirical implications are thereby spelled 
out in detail. Before turning to this analysis, some empirically meaningful concepts 
and implications of credibility and reputation in the policy game literature are 
discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 below.  
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3.2. Measuring Counterinflation Reputation 
 
The interesting point about the Backus and Driffill (1985a,b) model is that in general 
the public will not know what type of policymaker is in office. Instead, this 
information has to be inferred from observing inflation. The problem thereby is that 
zero inflation realisations do not fully reveal whether the policymaker in office is in 
fact the anti-inflationary type: zero inflation may also be the outcome under an 
inflationary policymaker who for some time masquerades as the counterinflationary 
type. But as long as zero inflation is observed, the counterinflation reputation of the 
policymaker in office increases due to the Bayesian probability updating process. 
However, this reputation is completely destroyed if positive surprise inflation t=b 
occurs, which fully reveals the inflationary central banker. In view of real world 
inflation experiences this would, however, imply that all countries have lacked 
counterinflation reputation since zero inflation rates have been the exception rather 
than the rule in post-war history. Thus, to provide an empirically meaningful concept 
of reputation different assumptions about the time series properties of the 
policymakers trade-off parameter b and hence observable inflation rates t=b are 
required. 
 
3.2.1. An Empirically Meaningful Concepts of Reputation  
 
One possible approach to implementing reputation in an empirically meaningful way 
would be to follow Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) and to allow the preference parameter 
bt and hence the inflation rate t=bt to be randomly time-varying. For example, 
inflation t may be given by the sum of a fixed controllable component () and a 
normally distributed random component (nt) with zero mean and constant finite 
variance n
2 . As before the two types of policymakers are still characterised by 
whether they choose to set the controllable component of inflation equal to w=b or 
h
=0 respectively. Depending on the magnitudes of n
2  and w=b, a positive inflation 
realisation will now no longer necessarily reveal the type of policymaker and hence 
may leave reputation intact for a some time.1 During this period the public will 
observe inflation in order to infer whether the mean of inflation t tends towards zero 
or towards w=b. In this context reputation is destroyed as soon as the mean ( ) of t 
deviates significantly from zero, which is the case for >2n
2 . 
 Although it is more realistic, a major problem with the above empirical 
concept of reputation is that it only allows for stationary stochastic variations in 
inflation rates. This stationarity assumption conflicts sharply with the empirical 
evidence that inflation rates frequently exhibit unit roots, as demonstrated 
Alogoskoufis (1991) and Weber (1993) by using Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron 
non-stationarity tests. Thus, in order to make empirically reasonable assumptions, the 
analysis below will follow Cukierman and Meltzer (1985a,b) by allowing the 
policymaker's preference parameter bt and hence the resulting inflation rate t=bt to 
follow non-stationary time-paths. 
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3.2.1.1. Inflation and Reputation  
 
Instead of being a dichotomous (0,b)-variable as in Backus and Driffill (1985a), 
inflation is assumed to be determined by an ARIMA time series model which, in 
order to be more general, is formulated below in terms of the price level rather than 
the inflation rate. The observable price level Pt is assumed to be the sum of a 
controllable component pt, determined by the government's monetary policy actions, 
and a stochastic control error vt, which is independently randomly distributed with 
mean zero and constant finite variance v
2 . This is formalised in the linear 
measurement equation (14.1a) for the unobservable state pt in Box 14. The dynamics 
of the policy determined component pt of the price level are described by the set of 
three state transition equations (14.1b) to (14.1d) with nt, rt and st defined as 
independently distributed random variables with mean zero and constant finite 
variances n
2 ,  r
2 and s
2  respectively. Thus, inflation t=bt is allowed to follow a 
random walk with a stochastic drift dt,which itself may follow a random walk. 
 In order to derive a measure of reputation t, defined in Backus and Driffill 
(1985a,b) as the probability of a government being the anti-inflationary type, two 
alternative models of inflation behaviour under an inflationary and an anti-inflationary 
government have to be specified. 
 The anti-inflationary policymaker is assumed to aim at maintaining some 
initially low2 level of inflation, regardless of the output costs. In terms of the above 
time series model this implies that the counterinflationary policymaker will attempt to 
offset any permanent exogenous shocks (rt, st) to inflation t. In this case the dynamic 
linear model reduces to equations (14.2a)-(14.2c), which derive from equations 
(14.1a) to (14.1d) for dt=dt-1=0 and  r
2=s
2=0. In this special case observable inflation 
will be a stationary stochastic process with a constant mean      (t=t-1=0) and a 
finite variance (n
2 +2v
2 ), whilst the observable price level follows an integrated 
autoregressive moving-average process, or ARIMA(0,1,1) process. 
 The inflationary policymaker on the other hand is assumed to allow or to 
generate permanent inflation shocks and may even permanently accelerate inflation 
rates in order to stimulate the economy. In this case inflation behaviour is described 
by the more general dynamic linear model (14.1a)-(14.1d) from above. Thus, under 
the inflationary policymaker inflation rates are non-stationary and integrated of order 
one or two, in which case the observable price level follows an ARIMA(0,2,2) or 
ARIMA(0,3,3) process.  
 In specifying an empirically meaningful concept of reputation it now makes 
sense to adopt the stringent criterion that a counterinflationary government will 
attempt to preserve the initially low levels of inflation according to the time series 
model (14.2a)-(14.2c), whilst the occurrence of repeated permanent shocks to 
inflation levels t or first differences dt reveals the inflationary government, under 
which inflation rates will be non-stationary and unbounded in the long run. 
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Box 14 
State Space Representation of Prices Under Both Inflationary and 
Counterinflationary Policymakers 
 
(a) State Space Model for an Inflationary Policymaker 
Equations (14.1a)-(14.1d) 
  P p vt t t  ,       ,00,,0 2   jvvEvvEvE T jttvTttt   (14.1a) 
  p p nt t t t  1  ,       ,00,,0 2   jnnEnnEnE T jttnTttt   (14.1b) 
   t t t td r  1 ,       ,00,,0 2   jrrErrErE T jttrTttt   (14.1c) 
  d d st t t 1 ,       ,00,,0 2   jssEssEsE T jttsTttt   (14.1d) 
 
(b) State Space Model for a Counterinflationary Policymaker 
Equations (14.2a)-(14.2c) 
  P p vt t t  ,       ,00,,0 2   jvvEvvEvE T jttvTttt   (14.2a) 
  p p nt t t t  1  ,       ,00,,0 2   jnnEnnEnE T jttnTttt   (14.2b) 
    t t 1 0 ,       ,00,,0 2   jrrErrErE T jttrTttt   (14.2c) 
 
 
 
3.2.1.2. The Concept of Borrowing Counterinflation Reputation 
 
Assume now that a government in an open economy with flexible exchange rates has 
been acquired a low counterinflation reputation due to inflationary behaviour in the 
past. According to Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989) an 
institutional reform such as entering a fixed exchange rate system with a low-inflation 
centre country may help to gain counterinflation reputation. This may be achieved by 
credibly pegging the level of the exchange rate vis-a-vis the low-inflation centre on 
the basis of a purchasing power parity (PPP) condition. This is formalised in equation 
(15.3) in Box 15, where t is the logarithm of the official bilateral nominal exchange 
rate and Pt
* is the logarithm of the domestic price level, as described in eqiations 
(15.1a) to (15.1d). The evolution of the foreign price level is described in equations 
(15.2a) to (15.2c). Under relatively fixed exchange rates (say t-t-10) inflation rates 
in the domestic country (t=Pt-Pt-1) will now closely resemble inflation rates in the 
low-inflation centre country ( t
*=Pt
*-Pt1
* ), which follow a stationary stochastic 
process. In the terminology of Rogoff (1985a) this is equivalent to appointing a 
'conservative' foreign central banker. Consequently, as the public is observing low and 
stationary domestic inflation rates, as indicated in equations (15.4a) to (15.4c) it will 
gradually learn that a policy switch has occurred, lower its inflation expectations and 
update the probability that the policymaker in office is the counterinflationary type. 
Thus, anti-inflation reputation is gained simply by pegging the exchange rate and 
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'tying the policymakers' hands on monetary policy', as postulated by Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1988). 
 
 
Box 15 
The Concept of Borrowing Counterinflation Reputation 
 
(a) State Space Model for an Inflationary Domestic Policymaker 
Equations (15.1a)-(15.1d) 
       P p vt t t  ,       ,00,,0 2   jvvEvvEvE T jttvTttt   (15.1a)  
       p p nt t t t  1  ,       ,00,,0 2   jnnEnnEnE T jttnTttt   (15.1b)  
        t t t td r  1 ,       ,00,,0 2   jrrErrErE T jttrTttt   (15.1c)  
       d d st t t 1 ,       ,00,,0 2   jssEssEsE T jttsTttt   (15.1d)  
 
(b) State Space Model for a Counterinflationary Foreign Policymaker 
Equations (15.2a)-(15.2c) 
       P p vt t t
* * *,         ,00,,0 **2****   jvvEvvEvE TjttvTttt   (15.2a)  
       p p nt t t t
* * * *,  1         ,00,,0 * 1*2****   jnnEnnEnE TttnTttt   (15.2b)  
         t t
* * * , 1 0        ,00,,0 *1*2****   jrrErrErE TttrTttt   (15.2c)  
 
(c) Borrowing Counterinflation Reputation by Exchange Rate Pegging 
  P Pt t t 
* ,     t t 1 0 , (15.3)  
 
(d) Resulting Domestic State Space Model under Exchange Rate Pegging  
in the Presence of a Counterinflationary Foreign Policymaker 
Equations (15.4a)-(15.4c) 
       P p vt t t  
* *,0        ,00,,0 **2****   jvvEvvEvE TjttvTttt   (15.4a)  
       p p nt t t t
* * * *,  1         ,00,,0 * 1*2****   jnnEnnEnE TttnTttt   (15.4b)  
         t t
* * * , 1 0        ,00,,0 *1*2****   jrrErrErE TttrTttt   (15.4c)  
 
 
3.2.2. Estimating Counterinflation Reputation  
 
To obtain an estimate of counterinflation reputation a Bayesian learning algorithm, a 
variant of the so-called Bayesian multi-process Kalman filter of Harrison and Stevens 
(1971, 1976), is employed. For a more formal description of this method and for 
references to other applications in economics the discussion in Weber (1988) should 
be consulted. 
 In order to use this algorithm to derive a measure of counterinflation 
reputation the above model is transformed into its general state-space form with 
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measurement equation (16.1a) and state transition equation (16.1b), whereby the 
vector and matrix conventions in (16.2) apply.  
      The multi-process framework now requires that the alternative process models are 
specified as sub-models of the above general state-space model. In the present context 
this is done by simply introducing certain zero restrictions for the variance-covariance 
matrices of the residuals. For example, the reference model for inflation under a 
counter-inflationary policymaker assumes q2=q3=0 and thus only allows for a 
combination of purely transitory price level shocks (model M t
1 with q1=q2=q3=0) 
and/or purely transitory inflation shocks (model M t
2  with h=q2=q3=0). On the other 
hand, inflation under an inflationary policymaker may be generated by higher order 
shocks (q1,q2>0), which may be purely permanent inflation shocks (model M t
3  with 
h=q1=q3=0) and/or purely permanent shocks to the drift in inflation rates (model M t
4  
with h=q1=q2=0).
3 
 
 
Box 16 
State Space Representation of an Hybrid Model of Prices Under Both 
Inflationary and Counterinflationary Policymakers 
 
(a) State Space Representation of Equations (14.1a)-(14.1d) 
          2, 0, , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t t t t t jy z a S v E v E v v H E v v j         (16.1a) 
          21 , 0, , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t t t ja Ta Ru E u E u u Q E u u j         (16.1b) 
 
(b) Matrix and Vector Conventions 
 
          
1
2
3
, , 1 0 0 , , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1, , 0 1 1 , 0 1 1 , 0 0 .
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
T T
t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
y P a p d z v v u n r s
q
S H h T R Q q
q
    
     
         
     
          
 
(16.2) 
 
 
 
Given these four alternative specifications of the variance-covariance 
matrices Q
i
 and H
i
 (i=1,2,3,4), estimates of the unobservable state vectors a t
i
 and their 
variance-covariance matrices 2 t
i  may now be extracted from the observable 
process Pt by using the Kalman filter. In doing so, the possibility of stochastic process 
switching is explicitly taken into account. 
     Assume that the observable price level process switches from model M t
i
1
 
(i=1,2,3,4) in period t-1 to model M t
j (j i) in period t. Let the model which captures 
this process switching be denoted by M t t
ij
, 1
. The Kalman filter's prediction equations 
(17.1a)-(17.1b) and the update equations (17.1c) to (17.1g) in Box 17 may then be 
used to forecast price level movements under four types of pure stochastic processes 
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and twelve types of stochastic process switching, given a suitable initialisation of the 
state vector (a t0
) and its variance-covariance matrix (
0
2
t  ). The empirical relevance 
of stochastic process switching may thereby be evaluated in probabilistic terms.  
       In order to calculate an overall estimate of the state vectors a t
i
 and their variance-
covariance matrices 2 t
i , the probability weighted averages of the individual state 
and variance estimates in equations (17.8a) and (17.8b) are calculated, where 
 t
j
t
ij
i
  holds. Note that the inclusion of the term   
T
ij j ij j
t t t ta a a a   in addition 
to the individual estimates  t
ij in equation (17.8b) is justified by the fact that a large 
dispersion of the point estimates around their average should reduce confidence in the 
precision of the average point estimate.  
     The probability distribution of the alternative process models is calculated and 
recursively updated in the Bayesian part of the multi-process Kalman filter by using 
Bayes' law. To illustrate this process, assume that each model M t
i  at each point in 
time has a prior probability E t t
j
 2 1 , as well as a posterior probability  t
i , and that the 
probability of process switching M t t
ij
, 1
 is denoted by  t
ij. According to Bayes' 
theorem, the conditional posterior probability  t
ij of each model may then be 
calculated as formalised in equation (17.2), which corresponds to equation (17.3) in 
the notation of the Kalman filter. Equation (17.3) states that the transformation of old 
prior (E t t
j
 2 1 ) and posterior ( t
j
1
) probabilities into new prior probabilities (E t t
j
1 ) 
for the subsequent period represents the Bayesian learning mechanism. This 
probability learning is largely determined by the relative likelihood of the individual 
models, as measured by the likelihood function (17.4) of each model. Driffill (1988) 
states that the multi-process Kalman filter set-up closely parallels the Bayesian 
probability learning of the Backus and Driffill (1985a) model. It is thus viewed here 
as its empirical counterpart and allows a measure of counterinflation reputation to be 
formalised. 
 
Proposition 1 
 Counterinflation reputation t is defined as the sum of the two 
probabilities E t t1
1  and E t t1
2  of the transitory and permanent price 
level shock models. This implies that under a counterinflationary 
policymaker inflation rates are stationary at their initially low levels.  
 
Estimates of counterinflation reputation based on this measure are provided in Weber 
(1992b) for both EMS and a number of non-EMS countries. It is found that in most 
cases the reputation measure accords well commonly held beliefs about the 
counterinflation orientation of various countries. The empirical evidence provided in 
section 4.1 below extents the analysis of Weber (1992b) by including the more recent 
period of EMS crisis around September 1992 and August 1993.  
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Box 17 
The Multi Processs Kalman Filter Algorithm for Extracting a Measure of 
Counterinflation Reputation from Observable Price Data 
 (a) Multi Process Kalman Filter's Prediction and Update Equations 
 
 a Tat t
ij
t t
ij
, , ,  1 1 1    (17.1a) 
  t t
ij
t t
ij T j TT T RQ R, , ,   1 1 1   (17.1b) 
 a a Kt t
ij
t t
ij
t
ij
t
ij
, , , 1     (17.1c) 
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  t
ij
t t t t
ijy z a  , ,1    (17.1e) 
  
1
, 1 ,
ij ij T ij
t t t t tK z F

   (17.1f) 
 F z z SH St
ij
t t t
ij
t
T j T  , ,1   (17.1g) 
 (b) Multi Process Kalman Filter's Bayesian Probability Learning 
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   t
ij
t t
ij
t t
j
t
ik L E  1 1,   (17.3)  
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 
21 2
2 22 exp 2 ,ij ij ij ijt t t tL F F  
         
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 
2 1 1
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2 1 1
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j t t t
t t j j
t t t
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E
E
E
  

  
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

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  t
i
t
ji
j
 1 1    (17.6) 
  t
j
t
ji
i
 1 1    (17.7) 
 (c) Multi ProcessKalman Filter's Condensation Conventions 
 a at
j
t
ij
t
ij
i
t
j  ,
  
 (17.8a) 
     ,Tj ij ij ij j ij j jt t t t t t t t
i
a a a a       
  
 (17.8b)  
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3.3. Measuring the Credibility of Policy Announcements 
 
A detailed discussion of the concept of policy credibility is found in Weber (1990a, 
1991a). The derivation of an empirical counterpart to the credibility measures from 
the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model from section 2.1 is briefly outlined below. 
 In order to obtain an estimate of the marginal and average credibility 
measures (MC and AC hereafter), it is neccessary to model the public's expectations 
formation process. In the present study a two-step approach is adopted: first the 
optimal time series expectations of the unobservable planned policy targets 
conditional on past information are calculated. The MC credibility measure is then 
derived by incorporating the policy target announcements into the above time series 
expectations by using least-squares regression methods. 
 In implementing the money growth, interest rate and exchange rate 
expectations conditional on past information, a time series model for these policy 
variables is required. The theoretical model of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) in 
section 2 implies the time series models (18.1a) and (18.1b) for the actual observable 
policy outcomes (mt) and (18.2a) and (18.2b) for the money growth announcements 
(mt
a ) respectively. For the purpose of an empirical evaluation a slightly modified 
version of these dynamic linear models has been employed by using the signal 
extraction method outlined in the section 3.1 above in the context of price level 
predictions.4 
 The time series projections obtained by the multi-process Kalman filter are 
then used as input for the rational expectations equation (18.4). These rational 
expectations were derived as the fitted values of a least-squares regression of the 
actual observable policy outcome (xt={mt, it, t}) on the policy announcements 
(x t
a
={m t
a
, i t
a
,  t
a
}) and on the expected policy outcome conditional on past 
information (Ext|t-1), which itself may in principle be calculated by iterating , the 
relative weigh of the two univariate time series expectations from equation (18.3), 
between zero and one and selecting that value of  which minimises the overall sum 
of squared residuals of the regression equation. Since all three types of 
announcements are low frequency signals, that is, they change infrequently, the 
information content of past announcements is typically found to be very low and  is 
close to one in many cases.5 Consequently, for the results discussed in the present 
study the restriction =1 was imposed and the influence of the announcement on 
expectations was estimated directly from equation (18.5), which states that the change 
in expectations due to new information is proportional to the unexpected bias (x t
a
-
Ext|t-1) revealed by the current announcement signal relative to projections of policy 
outcomes based on past information only. This allows the marginal credibility 
measure for money growth target, exchange rate target and interest rate target 
announcements to be formalised. 
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Box 18 
Measuring the Credibility of Money Growth Target, Exchange Rate Target and 
Interest Rate Target Announcements 
 
(a) Time Series Model for Observable Policy Outcome xt={mt, it, t)  
x xt t
p
t  ,         21 , 0 , , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t t t jE E E j                (18.1a) 
x xt
p
t
p
t  1 ,      21 , 0 , , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t t t jv E E E j               (18.1b) 
 
 (b) Time Series Model for Policy Announcements x t
a
={m t
a
, i t
a
,  t
a
) 
x xt
a
t
p
t  ,      21 , 0 , , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t t t ju E E E j             (18.2a) 
x xt
p
t
p
t  1 ,      21 , 0 , , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t t t jv E E E j               (18.2b) 
 
 (c) Optimal Prediction of Planned Policy under Past Information 
                        1 1 2 1 1, ,... 1 , ,... ,p a a at t t t t t t tE x E x x x E x x x              (18.3) 
 
(d) Optimal Prediction of Planned Policy under Current Information 
                                                11 ,p a pt t t t tE x x E x            (18.4) 
 
 (e) Influence of Announcement on Expectations under Current Information 
                                          1 1p p a pt t t t t t tE x E x x E x       ,     (18.5) 
 
 (f) Marginal Credibility Measure 
                                                MC  ,      (18.6) 
 
 (g) Average Credibility Measure 
                                          a pt t tAC x E x    .     (18.7) 
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Proposition 2.1. 
 The marginal crediblity of policy announcements is measured for 
money growth target, exchange rate target and interest rate target 
announcements alike. The marginal credibility (MC) measure is given 
by the slope coefficient of a regression of policy projection errors (xt-
Ext|t-1) on the policy announcement bias (x t
a
-Ext|t-1). The more 
informative the announcement bias, the higher is marginal credibility.  
 
Given a quantified measure of the above projections, the measure of average 
credibility for money growth target, exchange rate target and interest rate target 
announcements may also be formulated. 
 
Proposition 2.2. 
 The average credibility of policy announcements is measured for 
money growth target, exchange rate target and interest rate target 
announcements alike. The average credibility (AC) measure is given by 
the negative value of the absolute policy announcement bias -|(x t
a
-Ext|
t-1)|. The smaller the announcement bias, the higher is average 
credibility. 
 
Both the AC and the MC measures will be used in the empirical analysis for assessing 
the credibility of the monetary policy stance of EMS countries. However, due to its 
intuitive appeal, the MC credibility measure will be at the centre of the discussion. 
Before turning to the empirical section, a brief discussion of the approach to assessing 
target zone credibility is in order.  
 
 
3.4. Measuring Target Zone Credibility 
 
3.4.1. Indirect Evidence About Target Zone Credibility 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown that standard models of fully credible target 
zones imply a deterministic, non-linear (S-shaped) relationship between the exchange 
rate and its fundamentals, as derived in Krugman (1991). This may be summarised as 
Proposition 3.1:  
 
Proposition 3.1 
In models of fully credible target zones the exchange rate is a non-
linear, S-shaped function of the fundamentals and the slope of this 
function is always less than unity.  
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The problem with this Proposition is that in all target zone models the term 
"fundamentals" refers to a rather illusive and vague concept, which has no obvious 
empirical counterpart. Thus, unless some completely ad hoc measure of fundamentals 
is specified, it is impossible to test this proposition about the specific type of non-
linearities of the exchange rate function. However, some evidence on the relevance of 
non-linearities may be obtained by focusing on the intrinsic dynamics of exchange 
rates within the band.  
 Svensson (1991a, b) shows that owing to the above non-linear intrinsic 
dynamics of exchange rates within the band the probability density distribution and 
instantaneous standard deviation of exchange rates within the band also have very 
distinctive characteristics, which are summarised in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 
 
Proposition 3.2 
In models of fully credible target zones the exchange rate's probability 
density distribution inside the band has a U-shape, with more mass 
concentrated towards the edges of the band.  
 
Proposition 3.3 
In models of fully credible target zones the exchange rate's conditional 
standard deviation inside band has an inverted U-shape.  
 
Evidence about this type of non-linearity may then be interpreted as indirect evidence 
on target zone credibility. Svensson (1989,1991b) further shows that a fully credible 
target zone also implies an inverse non-linear relationship between exchange rate 
deviations from parity and the term structure of interest rate differentials, which 
results in Propositions 3.4 and 3.5.  
 
Proposition 3.4 
In models of fully credible target zones the term structure of interest 
rate differentials is a negatively sloped non-linear (inversely S-shaped) 
function of the fundamentals. The slope of the interest rate differential 
function tends to be flatter and less non-linear for longer maturities.  
 
Proposition 3.5 
In models of fully credible target zones the term structure of interest 
rate differentials is a negatively sloped non-linear (inversely S-shaped) 
function of the exchange rate. The slope of the interest rate differential 
function tends to be flatter and less non-linear for longer maturities.  
 
As before, unless some measure of fundamentals is constructed, Proposition 3.4 is 
impossible to test. However, since both interest rate differentials and exchange rates 
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are readily observable economic variables, Proposition 3.5 of the target zone model 
can be tested directly.  
 The above link between exchange rates and interest rate differentials implies 
that the target zones for the instantaneous and expected future exchange rates 
translates into a target zone for the term structure of interest rate differentials. This 
fact, combined with the intrinsic dynamics of the exchange rates within the band then 
leads to Propositions 3.6 and 3.7, as derived in Svensson (1991b).  
 
Proposition 3.6 
In models of fully credible target zones the probability density 
distributions of interest rate differentials are bi-modal or U-shaped 
inside the interest rate differential bands, and tend to be more 
compressed for longer terms.  
 
Proposition 3.7 
In models of fully credible target zones the conditional standard 
deviations of interest rate differentials are unimodal or inversely U-
shaped inside the interest rate differential's band, and tend to be more 
compressed for longer terms.  
 
The above seven propositions have been the focus of much of the early empirical 
literature on exchange rate target zones. The literature has failed on a 'grand scale' in 
producing any evidence that is consistent with any of these propositions relating to 
fully credible target zone models.  
 In order to close the obvious gap between the theory of a fully credible target 
zone and the empirical facts, a variety of models have been put forward which 
introduce realignments and imperfect credibility into the target zone model. A number 
of these models has been discussed in chapter 2. What stylised facts do these models 
suggest in connection with the above seven propositions of the fully credible target 
zone model? The answer is fairly simple: all propositions are turned on their head 
when non-credible target zones with high realignment probabilities are considered.  
 In the Bertola and Caballero (1990) model, which permits realignments to 
occur with a given probability, the S-shaped relationship between exchange rates and 
fundamentals still holds in relatively credible target zones with a low realignment 
probability, but an inversely S-shaped relationship emerges for non-credible target 
zones with high realignment probabilities. This allows us to modify Propositions 3.1 
to 3.3 as follows:  
 
Proposition 4.1 
In models of imperfectly credible target zones the exchange rate is a 
non-linear, S-shaped function of the fundamentals only for low 
realignment probabilities, whilst for high realignment probabilities an 
inversely S-shaped function results.  
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Proposition 4.2.  
In models of imperfectly credible target zones the exchange rate's 
probability density distribution inside the exchange rate band has a U-
shape only for low realignment probabilities, whilst for high 
realignment probabilities an inversely U-shaped function results.  
 
Proposition 4.3.  
In models of imperfectly credible target zones the exchange rate's 
conditional standard deviation inside the exchange rate band has an 
inverted U-shape only for low realignment probabilities, whilst for high 
realignment probabilities an U-shaped function results.  
 
Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) formalise the link between exchange rates and the term 
structure of interest rate differentials in such imperfectly credible target zones. They 
show that a negative non-linear relationship between exchange rates and interest rate 
differentials again emerges in relatively credible target zones with a low realignment 
probability, but that a positive non-linear relationship results in non-credible target 
zones with high realignment probabilities. Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) further 
demonstrate that whilst the relationship between the exchange rate and the interest 
rate differential is in principle non-linear and has a hump-shaped profile, it becomes 
flatter and less non-linear for longer maturities, regardless of whether relatively 
credible or non-credible target zones are concerned. This allows us to modify 
Propositions 3.4 to 3.7 as follows:  
 
Proposition 4.4 
In models of imperfectly credible target zones the term structure of 
interest rate differentials is a negatively sloped non-linear (hump-
shaped) function of the fundamentals only for low realignment 
probabilities, whilst for high realignment probabilities a positively 
sloped non-linear (hump-shaped) function results. In both cases the 
slope of the function is flatter and less non-linear for longer maturities.  
 
Proposition 4.5 
In models of imperfectly credible target zones the term structure of 
interest rate differentials is a negatively sloped non-linear (hump-
shaped) function of the exchange rate only for low realignment 
probabilities, whilst for high realignment probabilities a positively 
sloped non-linear (hump-shaped) function results. In both cases the 
slope of the function is flatter and less non-linear for longer maturities.  
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Proposition 4.6 
In models of imperfectly credible target zones the probability density 
distributions of the term structure of interest rate differentials are bi-
modal or U-shaped inside the interest rate differential bands only for 
low realignment probabilities, whilst for high realignment probabilities 
unimodal and inversely U-shaped functions result. In both cases the 
probability distributions are more compressed for longer terms.  
 
Proposition 4.7 
In models of imperfectly credible target zones the conditional standard 
deviations of the term structure of interest rate differentials are 
unimodal or inversely U-shaped inside the interest rate differential band 
only for low realignment probabilities, whilst for high realignment 
probabilities bimodal and U-shaped functions result. In both cases the 
standard deviations are more compressed for longer terms.  
 
The above Propositions 3.1 to 3.7 for fully credible target zones and their counter-
Propositions 4.1 to 4.7 from models of imperfectly credible target zones may be used 
to obtain some indirect evidence on the degree of target zone credibility. Since 
Propositions 4.1 to 4.7 include Propositions 3.1 to 3.7 as special cases, the analysis 
below will focus on them. The problem with these propositions is that they allow only 
rather informal testing, since with the exception of Propositions 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5 only 
the sample properties of the distributions of the first and second moments of the 
exchange rate and interest rate differentials series are examined. Propositions 4.1 and 
4.4 are furthermore not testable without arbitrarily specifying a measure of 
fundamentals. The only proposition which allows more rigorous econometric testing 
is Proposition 4.5 on the link between interest rate differentials and exchange rates in 
target zones, which will be the focus of the analysis below. Incorporating expected 
devaluation rates into the basic target zone model thereby allows a more direct testing 
of the credibility of target zones.  
 
 
3.4.2. Direct Evidence on Target Zone Credibility 
 
Svensson's (1991b) study  uses a linear approximation6 of equation (9.1) in Box 9 for 
testing Proposition 3.5 of the perfectly credible target zone model. This equation is 
displayed as equation (13.1) in Box 13, and is reproduced here as Box 19 for 
convenience. According to theory, the coefficients b() should be negative and 
decreasing in term. Furthermore, in the absence of any fundamental drift (=0), the 
constant c() should be zero for all  if no devaluation risks exist. In order to obtain 
estimate of c() and b() ordinary least squares regression may be used.  
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Box 19 
Empirical Implications of Target Zone Models with Respect to the 
Relationship between Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rates 
Svensson (1991b) 
        t t tc b e          (19.1) 
- the slope coefficient b() are negative and increasing in term. 
- in the absence of any fundamental drift (=0), the the intercept coefficient c() 
should be zero for all  if there is no devaluation risk.. 
Svensson (1991b) 
        , , ,t t tg c g b e           (19.2)  
- the intercept coefficient is negative and depends on both the term  and the 
product of the probability intensity of a realignment () and the expected size of 
the realignment (g):  
Svensson and Bertola (1991) 
        2 2 2 2, ; , ,t t g f t g f t tg c g b e            ,  (19.3)  
- the time-varying intercept ct() may take positive and negative values 
- the slope coefficient where  2 2 ,g fb     is negative and increasing in term for 
low degrees of variability of expected devaluations (g
2relative to  f
2),  
- in the absence of fundamental drift (=0) the intercept c(gt,) should largely 
reflect devaluation risks.  
Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) 
        2 2 2 2, , ; , , , ,t t t g f t t t g f t tg c g b e                  (19.4)  
- the slope coefficient  2 2, , ;t t g fb g      is negative and decreasing in term for 
low realignment probabilities t and low degrees of variability of expected 
devaluation rates g
2  relative to  f
2), but positive and decreasing in term for high 
realignment probabilities t and high degrees of the variability of expected 
devaluationrates (g
2) relative to the fundamentals ( f
2) 
Key to symbols: it interest rate, i t
*
 foreign interest rate, t interest rate differential,et 
exchange rate, ft fundamentals, 

() instantaneous conditional standard 
deviation of t, 
2
 instantaneous variance of ft, (f) interest rate differential 
function, f (ff) first (second) derivative of  with respect to f, 
f
(f) density 
distribution of fundamentals, 

() density distribution of interest rate differential, 
fL and fU (L and U) upper and lower bound of fundamentals (interest rate 
differentials),  maturity,  parameter,  realignment probability (01), 
realignment size 2fU (c1=c0+2fU=f0+2fU). 
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 Bertola and Svensson (1991) introduce stochastic devaluation risk gt as a 
second source of time variation in exchange rates and interest rate differentials. The 
interesting point about the model of Bertola and Svensson (1991) is that the 
negatively sloped instantaneous interest rate differential in Graph 4 fluctuates 
vertically as the expected rate of devaluation gt changes over time, so that combined 
with the simultaneous fluctuations in the fundamentals ft almost any pattern of 
exchange rate and interest rate differential observations may result. More specifically, 
as the variability of gt relative to ft increases, the correlation between the 
instantaneous interest rate differential and the exchange rate will be less negative, and 
may vanish or even become positive. For positive and finite terms a similar result is 
obtained under certain assumptions about the time-series properties of the expected 
rate of devaluation gt.
7 The Bertola and Svensson (1991) model may be incorporated 
into the above linearized estimating equation by assuming a time-varying intercept 
ct(gt,) and a constant slope coefficient   ,22 fgb , which is negative and increasing 
in term only for low degrees of variability of expected devaluations (g
2) relative to 
the fundamentals ( f
2). As indicated in equation (19.3), the time-varying intercept 
c(gt,) should largely reflect devaluation risks in the absence of fundamental drift 
(=0).  
 Another approach to modelling devaluation risks is adopted in Bertola and 
Caballero (1991). In their model the imperfectly credible target zone is defended by 
the monetary authority only with probability 1- (01) by discrete marginal 
intervention, whilst with probability  a realignment is initiated.8 Extending the work 
of Bertola and Caballero (1991), Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) show that both the 
intercept and the sign of the slope coefficient now strongly depend on the realignment 
probability  as indicated in equation (19.4) of Box 19. The slope coefficient 
  ;,, 22 fgttgb  is negative and increasing in term for low realignment 
probabilities t and low degrees of variability of expected devaluation rates (g
2) 
relative to the fundamentals ( f
2), but positive and decreasing in term for high 
realignment probabilities t and high degrees of the variability of expected 
devaluation rates (g
2) relative to the fundamentals ( f
2). Variations in the intercept 
term c(gt,t;) should largely reflect variations of devaluation expectations gt and the 
likelihood of a realignment.  
 The empirical section below aims at quantifying the time-paths of expected 
devaluation rates implicit in EMS interest rate differentials by estimating the above 
augmented target zone models using time-varying parameter regression. As in the 
theoretical model of Bertola and Svensson (1991), this requires the specification of 
the future time-paths of the expected rate of devaluation gt, as reflected in interest rate 
differentials by movements of ct. According to Bertola and Svensson (1991) the 
expected devaluation rates are driven by a Brownian motion process, the continuous 
time equivalent of a random walk (with drift), whilst the simulations of Bertola and 
Svensson (1991) use some mean-reverting process9 in order to obtain stationary 
interest rate differentials. The empirical section below uses a flexible form, which 
allows expected devaluation rates and hence interest rate differentials to be a mixture 
of both stationary and non-stationary components, the composition of which may 
change over time. In particular, the expected devaluation rates ct implied by interest 
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rate differentials are modelled as a probability weighted average of a stationary 
(random) process and a non-stationary (random walk) process, as indicated by 
equations (20.1) and (20.2), respectively.  
 
 
Box 20 
Time Series Properties of Expected Devaluation Rates Implied by Interest Rate 
Differentials 
 
(a) stationary (random) process  
      21 1 1 1 1 1, 0, , 0 0,T Tt t t t t v t t jc c v E v E v v E v v j         (20.1)  
 
(b) non-stationary (random walk) process  
      21 1 1 1 1 1 1, 0, , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t u t t jc c u E u E u u E u u j         (20.2)  
 
(c) probability t  (0<t<1) weighted average of the 
   stationary process and non-stationary process 
     
 
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
.
t t t t t t t t
t t t t
c c c c v u
c c c c w
  

 
 
     
     
 (20.3) 
 
 
 
Box 20 shows that for a given probability t of the stationary process (and hence a 
given probability 1-t for the non-stationary process) this may be combined to obtain 
the coefficient process (20.3). This process has mean reverting properties as long as t 
takes intermediate values (0<t<1). The advantage of this set-up is that it allows the 
data to determine both the degree and the time-pattern of mean reversion of the 
expected devaluation rates implied by interest rate differentials.  
 To obtain a time-varying estimate of expected devaluation rates implied by 
interest rate differentials in a target zone, a learning algorithm, the so-called Bayesian 
multi-process Kalman filter of Harrison and Stevens (1971, 1976), is employed. The 
basic structure of this algorithm is the same as that described in section 3.1 above. 
However, in order to use the algorithm outlined in Box 17 the state space model of the 
target zone has to be adapted to the Kalman filter specification. For a formal 
description of this method and for references to other applications in economics the 
discussion in Weber (1988, 1992b) is referred to.  
 The working of the algorithm may best be explained by transforming the 
linearized approximation of the Bertola and Svensson (1991) target zone model 
(19.3), on which the estimates will be based, into its general state-space representation 
(21.1a) and (21.1b), where the specifications of (21.2) apply. For q1=0 and h1=1 this 
Kalman filter model implies at=at-1=...=a, which is equivalent to a model with 
constant expected devaluation rates, a variant of which is estimated in Svensson 
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(1991b). For h1=0 and q1=1, on the other hand, expected devaluation rates and hence 
interest rate differentials are non-stationary and driven by a random walk stochastic 
process.  
 The multi-process Kalman filter approach now requires these two alternative 
process models to be set-up as sub-models of a hybrid model. The sub-model M t
1
 
with constant devaluation expectations (h1=1, q1=0) may thereby be viewed as the 
reference model, against which the alternative model M t
2
 with time-varying 
devaluation expectations is to be judged in terms of explaining those component of 
interest rate differentials that the standard target zone model leaves unexplained. 
Given these two alternative specifications of the variance-covariance matrices Q
i
 and 
H
i
 (i=1,2), estimates of the unobservable state vectors a t
i
 and their variance-
covariance matrices 2Pt
i
 may then be extracted from the observable interest rate 
differentials t by using the Kalman filter. The possibility of stochastic process 
switching from stationary to non-stationary devaluation expectations, for example 
under speculative attacks, is thereby explicitly taken into account.  
 
 
Box 21 
State Space Representation of the Relationship Between Expected Devaluation 
Rates and Interest Rate Differentials 
 
(a) State Space Representation of Equation (19.3) 
          2, 0, , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t t t t t jz a S v E v E v v H E v v j          (21.1a) 
          21 , 0, , 0 0,T Tt t t t t t t t ja Ta Ru E u E u u Q E u u j         (21.1b) 
 
(b) Matrix and Vector Conventions 
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(21.2) 
 
 
 
 Given these specifications, the algorithm of Box 17 is then directly 
applicable. The multi-process Kalman filter regression model then allows an estimate 
of the unobservable expected devaluation rates implicit in interest rate differentials to 
be obtained from a linearized structural target zone model. The algorithm assumes 
that devaluation expectations vary over time and may switch between being stationary 
and non-stationary, say in periods of speculative attacks. The degree of time-
variability in expected devaluation rates is estimated recursively by searching for that 
process mix (or probability weighted average) of stationary and non-stationary 
parameter variation which best explains the observable interest rate differential data. 
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Under the reference model of purely constant expected devaluation rates the algorithm 
reduces to recursive least squares, whilst under the alternative model it is identical to 
the pure random walk parameter regression model. The intermediate case of mixed 
transitory and permanent parameter variation has mean reverting properties and is 
close in spirit to the time-varying regression model with return-to-normality 
coefficients.  
 Having described the various theoretical propositions and empirical 
procedures, I now turn to the empirical analysis of reputation and credibility. The 
focus of the empirical analysis thereby is on countries participating in the European 
Monetary System, but results for a control group of non-EMS countries are also 
reported.  
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Endnotes to Chapter 3 
                                                          
1 Vickers (1986) states that in such pooling equilibria the public has no basis for updating the 
reputation measure t. Such a constant t follows from equation (2.7) in Box 2 of the Backus 
and Driffill (1985a,b) model only if the inflationary policymaker is known to behave like the 
anti-inflationary type with probability one (t=1). See also Barro (1986) on this point. 
2 In the empirical reputation estimates such low initial inflation rates o are ensured by 
choosing the start of the sample period in the early 1960s. 
3 Clearly the latter type of shocks may not be very relevant to most OECD countries. The 
Bayesian learning of the MPKF then ensures that the probability weight attached to this process 
model will decline drastically and that it will be almost completely disregarded after some time. 
4 To be precise, the ARIMA(0,2,2) sub-version of the state space model (15.1a) to (15.1d) was 
used, with Pt being replaced by mt. This implies the restriction dt=dt-1=d0 in the more general 
ARIMA(0,3,3) model. In terms of the theoretical model from equations (18.1a) and (18.1b) in 
Box 18 this implies that some restrictive assumptions, such as <1 and absence of permanent 
shocks to money growth rates, were relaxed. The motivation behind this is that in Weber (1993) 
permanent shocks to money growth rates are found to play an important role in the post-war 
period. 
5 See Weber (1990a) for a detailed analysis of these issues. Some further discussion is also 
found in Weber (1991a). 
6 This may be justified by the fact that the relationship between finite term interest rate 
differentials and exchange rates is approximately linear , in particular for longer terms. 
7  In order to obtain stationary interest rate differentials, Bertola and Svensson (1991) assume 
some type of mean reverting properties (or re-setting at a realignment) of gt. 
8  Bertola and Caballero (1990) model central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets as 
discrete (large and infrequent) marginal intervention, as in the Flood and Garber (1989) model, 
instead of infinitesimal (small and frequent) marginal intervention, as in the Krugman (1991) 
and Svensson (1991b) models. 
9  To obtain a stationary interest rate differential, Bertola and Svensson (1991) choose an ad-
hoc mechanism which re-sets gt to g0 at each realignment. However, a (regulated) mean-
reverting process, such as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process used in Froot and Obstfeld (1989), 
may be preferable for modelling expected realignment risks implicit in stationary interest  rate 
differentials. 
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4 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON 
POLICY CREDIBILITY 
 
 
 
This section aims at providing empirical evidence on the various propositions 
discussed above. The main aim of the analysis is to quantify empirically the proposed 
credibility measures derived from the policy game and target zone literature. In the 
context of target zones for exchange rates this evidence is supplemented by reporting 
less formal indirect evidence on credibility found by looking at distributions and 
variability of exchange rates and interest rate differentials within explicit or implicit 
bands. 
 
 
4.1. Evidence about Counterinflation Reputation 
 
Before presenting any estimates, it is important to take a closer look at the data in 
order to get some intuition on the question of whether and how the European 
Monetary System (EMS) may have helped member countries to disinflate during the 
1980s. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1987) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) were the first 
to formulate the 'borrowing credibility' hypothesis. In their opinion the EMS 
represents an institutional arrangement which has enabled the non-German EMS 
member countries to borrow counterinflation reputation from the Bundesbank by 
pegging their bilateral exchange rates relative to the German mark. 
 
4.1.1. The Inflation Experience 
 
At a purely descriptive level, the 'borrowing reputation' hypothesis does not appear to 
be inconsistent with the time-paths of EMS inflation rates, as shown in panel (b) of 
Figure 4.1. For most of the EMS period Germany clearly has had the lowest inflation 
rates of all EMS countries. Throughout the EMS period Dutch inflation rates moved 
very closely in line with those in Germany, whilst the remaining EC countries 
experienced substantially higher inflation. Both Germany and the Netherlands did not 
accommodate the oil price shock of 1979 to any great extent, wheras the rest of the 
EC countries inflated substantially.  After this initial adverse impact of the oil price 
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Figure 4.1. 
Inflation Rates 
 
(a) ERM Participants During the Bretton Woods and Snake Period (% p.a.) 
 
 
(b) Non-ERM Participants During the Bretton Woods and Snake Period  
(% p.a.) 
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shock between 1979 and 1982, all EMS countries have had considerable success in 
reducing inflation between early 1982 and late 1986. This is precisely what the 
'borrowing reputation' view of the EMS, formulated in Giavazzi and Giovannini 
(1987) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), is all about. But the inflation data raise some 
additional questions: first, why did EMS countries in March 1979 enter the exchange 
rate mechanism (ERM) with such vast differences in inflation rates. Second, why did 
inflation rates initially diverge between 1979 and 1982? Third, why has inflation 
convergence to the low German levels been so slow and, for some countries, less than 
complete during 1982-87? Fouth, does the post-1987 EMS experience reject the 
'borrowing reputation' view, given that German reflation resulted in full convergence 
of EMS inflation rates by mid 1990 and continuing divergence thereafter? 
The pre-EMS history of inflation experience in the initial EMS member 
countries is displayed in panel (a) of Figure 4.1. Most countries experienced relatively 
low inflation rates during the Bretton Woods period. Throughout the 1960's inflation 
rates in EMS countries fluctuated roughly around their initial values, even though the 
size and relative smoothness of these inflation swings differed substantially between 
countries. On average, German inflation rates were both the lowest and least erratic, 
when compared with the remaining EMS countries. Towards the end of the Bretton 
Woods period inflation emerged in all countries. German inflation rates, for example, 
rose steadily from 2 percent in early 1970 to roughly 7 percent prior to the oil price 
shock in 1973. The remaining countries experienced somewhat higher inflation during 
this period, but in early 1973 all EMS inflation rates were within one percentage point 
of the German inflation rate. The oil price shock of 1973 then caused a drastic 
divergence of inflation rates due to the vastly different degrees of monetary 
accommodation. German monetary policy clearly did not accommodate the oil price 
shock at all, because already by the end of 1973 German inflation rates started 
declining steadily until 1979. On the other hand, inflation in Italy, and to a slightly 
lesser extent in France, Denmark and Belgium, rose drastically in response to the oil 
price shock. Inflation rates in these countries also became much more erratic and 
exhibited huge fluctuations during 1973 to 1979. Compared to Germany, the 
Netherlands initially also accommodated the oil price shock to a larger extent, but to 
substantially lesser degree than the remaining countries. However, after 1975 Dutch 
inflation rates fell sharply. A similar sharp disinflation was experienced by Belgium, 
where during 1975-79 inflation rates moved closely in line with those in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, inflation in the Benelux countries furthermore almost reached 
the low German levels by 1979. Italy and France, on the other hand entered the EMS 
with substantially higher inflation rates. 
Virtually at the same time as the EMS was started the European economies 
were hit by the second round of oil price shocks. Inflation rates rose steeply in Italy, 
France and Denmark, and, by comparison, modestly in Germany and the Benelux 
countries. As in 1973, differing degrees of monetary accommodation of the oil price 
hikes caused a massive divergence of inflation rates, which greatly destabilised EMS 
exchange rates and initiated several rounds of realignments during this early EMS 
period, as can be seen from Figure 4.18 below. For Belgium the drastic devaluation of 
the Belgian franc relative to all other EMS currencies had a strong inflationary 
impact, and ended the close co-movement of Belgian inflation rates with those in the 
Netherlands and Germany. 
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Disinflation in the EMS started in late 1981. This European disinflation 
period is studied empirically in Rogoff (1985b), Ungerer et al. (1983, 1986, 1990), 
Collins (1988), Artis (1987) and Weber (1990b). These studies find that, as far as 
disinflation is concerned, the EMS countries have not differed substantially from the 
other advanced economies. The same is true for the inflationary response of non-EMS 
countries to the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, as displayed in panels (a) and (b) 
of Figure 4.2. If anything, disinflation during the 1980's has been slower in the EMS. 
De Grauwe (1990) explains this by the fact that the exchange rate constraint has 
prevented EMS member countries from adopting a 'short sharp shock' treatment, 
which was resorted to in the U.K. under the Thatcher government. Panel (b) of Figure 
4.2 shows that most of the inflation reduction in the United Kingdom and the United 
States was achieved relatively quickly in the short period of mid-1980 to mid-1983. In 
contrast, the German and French disinflations only started in late 1981 and were not 
completed until late 1986. The importance of borrowing German counterinflation 
reputation in this process is not obvious. If the borrowing reputation hypothesis were 
true, it remains a puzzling fact that despite of joint disinflation the EMS countries did 
not experience a faster and more complete convergence of inflation to the low 
German levels. 
The German reflation period between 1987 and 1993 is also quite interesting 
to analyse in conjecture with the borrowing reputation hypothesis. In Weber (1991a) it 
is stated that whilst disinflation in the EMS has been slower, it also has been 
somewhat longer lasting, as exemplified by the strong reflation in the United 
Kingdom and the United States relative to Germany and the remaining EMS countries 
between 1987 and 1991. Interestingly, EMS inflation rates converge after 1987, whilst 
no such convergence is not observed outside the system. Wyplosz (1989) suggests 
that this may be attributed to the disciplinary effects arising from relatively fixed 
exchange rates. When looking at the data it is obvious that inflation convergence in 
the EMS continued for two reasons: on the one hand, the former inflationary EMS 
members, such as France and Denmark, have resisted reflation and belatedly 
embraced a more counterinflationary policy stance. On the other hand, Germany's 
anti-inflation policy stance appears to have mellowed slightly during 1987-90 and has 
decayed considerably in the aftermath of German unification. Full inflation 
convergence in the EMS was achieved by mid 1990, ironically as a result of German 
reflation to French inflation levels. During time, the rising German inflation rate 
dragged up with it inflation in Belgium and the Netherlands. The unification shock 
added to German reflation and divergence of EMS inflation rates started to emerge, 
with German inflation in 1991-92 exceeding inflation rates in all remaining ERM 
countries except Italy. The German mark thus no longer provided the hard-currency 
anchor of the system. More importantly, during 1990-1993 inflation was rising in 
Germany, whilst it was relatively stable or declining in the remaining EMS countries 
and other advanced economies. Even the Benelux countries appear to have recently 
moved away from following the German inflation lead. In my view these data clearly 
refute the 'borrowing reputation' hypothesis for recent years: given the differential 
behaviour of German inflation rates, the 'borrowing reputation' hypothesis implies that 
the other EMS member countries could only have borrowed a bad reputation. After 
German unification pegging to the mark became undesirable because it no longer 
implied a reputation bonus, given the Bundesbank's tolerance of inflation. 
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Figure 4.2. 
Inflation Rates 
 
(a) ERM Participants During the EMS Period (% p.a.) 
 
 
 
(b) Non-ERM Participants During the EMS Period (% p.a.) 
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Summarising the above, discussion it can be stated that Germany clearly was 
the country with the best and most consistent counterinflation record prior to and 
during the EMS. This should be reflected in a high counterinflation reputation 
estimate. On the other hand, most other EMS countries, in particular Italy and France, 
experienced two major inflation hikes when monetary policy strongly accommodated 
both rounds of oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979, and this should have greatly 
depressed counterinflation reputation. Finally, inflation rates in the Netherlands 
followed the German inflation pattern relatively closely, at least during the 1980's, 
whilst the inflation experience of the remaining EMS countries appears to have been 
less closely related to that of Germany. The implications of this for counterinflation 
reputation in these countries is not obvious, and the empirical analysis below aims at 
making some quantitative data-based statements on this issue by estimating and 
comparing the reputation measure derived in chapter 3. 
 
4.1.2. Estimates of Counterinflation Reputation 
 
The first empirical issue to be discussed here is whether or not the German 
Bundesbank was indeed the central bank with the highest anti-inflation reputation, as 
implied by the 'borrowing reputation' hypothesis. If so, have other EMS countries 
gained counterinflation reputation during the EMS period? Moreover, have such gains 
in reputation materialised due to purely domestic policy U-turns or due to the rules of 
the EMS? 
As noted above, counterinflation reputation is defined as the probability that 
policymakers consistently pursue low-inflation policies. This probability is estimated 
here by using the Bayesian Kalman filtering procedure described in chapter 3. This 
procedure consists of finding out how inflation may best be forecasted under various 
alternative assumptions about the degree to which inflation shocks are allowed by the 
central bank to be permanent, Clearly, monetary accommodation of permanent real 
shocks, such as the oil price hikes or the German unification shock, strongly 
undermines counterinflation reputation in this context. Econometrically such 
reputation losses are captured by the fact that the probability of forecasting inflation 
accurately with a model which only allows for transitory inflation shocks will 
deteriorate rapidly if inflation rises permanently. Since the model with exclusively 
transitory inflation shocks is used here to capture inflation outcomes under a 
counterinflationary policymaker, the probability updating procedure of the Bayesian 
multi-process Kalman filter yields the desired measure of counterinflation reputation. 
 
4.1.2.1. Period-Averages of Counterinflation Reputation 
 
The estimates of counterinflation reputation derived by applying the Bayesian multi-
process Kalman filter (MPKF) to consumer price indices
1
 from EMS and non-EMS 
countries are presented in Figure 4.3 for a pre-EMS period (72Q2-79Q1) on the 
horizontal axis and the EMS period (79Q2-93Q2) on the vertical axis. Panel (a) 
displays the period averages of reputation, panel (b) the end-of-period reputation 
estimates. The 45 line is added to make it easier to see how reputation has changed 
from one period to another. Three main findings emerge: first, on average Germany 
has the highest anti-inflation reputation prior to and during the EMS period. Second, 
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Figure 4.3. 
Counterinflation Reputation Measure:  
Prior Probability of Inflation Stationarity (in %) 
 
(a) Average of Period Estimates, Snake versus EMS Periods 
 
 
(b) End of Period Estimates, Snake versus EMS Periods 
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the small EMS economies Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland have 
gained some anti-inflation reputation during the EMS period. Finally, France and Italy 
have the lowest counterinflation reputation and have not increased their reputation 
during the EMS period. 
The estimates of counterinflation reputation are largely consistent with the 
actual inflation performances in Figure 4.1. Germany and the Netherlands entered the 
EMS with low inflation rates. The relatively low inflationary impact of the 1979 oil 
price shock, followed by a smooth disinflation (1982-1986) explains the preservation 
of counterinflation reputation in both countries. France and Italy, on the other hand, 
entered the EMS with high inflation, experienced double-digit inflation rates up to 
1983 and improved their inflation record only quite lately in the EMS period. The key 
point is that only the smaller EMS member countries have gained reputation under the 
EMS, while for the larger EMS countries there is no evidence of substantial reputation 
losses for Germany or reputation gains for France and Italy. In Weber (1992b) this is 
interpreted as evidence rejecting the 'borrowing credibility' hypothesis for the large 
EMS countries. The 'hard-currency' option provided by the EMS seems to have 
enabled the smaller inflation prone EMS countries, in particular Belgium and 
Denmark, to establish some anti-inflation reputation and to gain counterinflationary 
credibility by locking into German anti-inflation policies. From panel (a) a similar 
statement applies to Austria, which pursued a unilateral exchange rate pegging policy 
with respect to the German mark throughout the 1980's. Finally, the end-of-period 
results in panel (b) suggest that the United Kingdom, which joined the EMS in 
October 1990, has also managed to gain counterinflation reputation recently. In order 
to examine these issues in more depth, it is instructive to take a closer look at the 
time-paths of the various reputation measures. 
The evidence reported so far only supports the 'borrowing reputation' view of 
the EMS in two respects: as postulated by Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), Germany is 
found to be the low-inflation high-reputation centre of the EMS, and has largely 
managed to maintain this high reputation. Furthermore, the smaller EMS countries 
have gained counterinflation reputation, but such reputation gains are not found for 
the two large EMS countries, France and Italy. This is hardly surprising since for 
large economies 'tying the policymakers' hands on monetary policy', as is required by 
the 'borrowing reputation' hypothesis, is obviously a less attractive policy option. This 
view is also consistent with the fact that both France and Italy have continued to resort 
to precommitted monetary quantity targeting policies throughout the EMS period. 
 
4.1.2.2. Time-Paths of Counterinflation Reputation 
 
Given the apparent difference between the counterinflation reputation estimates for 
the large and small non-German EMS countries, it is interesting to compare how 
reputation has evolved over time. For this purpose the time-paths of the 
counterinflation reputation measures are displayed in Figures 4.4.  
 
Germany, France and Italy 
Panel (a) of Figure 4.4 compares the reputation estimates for Germany, France and 
Italy. Clearly, German counterinflation reputation is very high throughout the sample 
period,  but declines slightly after the end of the EMS deflation period after 1986, as 
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Figure 4.4. 
Counterinflation Reputation Measure: 
Prior Probability of Inflation Stationarity (in %) 
 
(a) Germany, France and Italy 
 
 
(b) Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark 
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Figure 4.4 continued 
(c) Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
 
 
German reflation emerged. The French reputation for counterinflation policies is 
considerably lower than German reputation. The French reputation measure fluctuates 
around its initial level prior to March 1973, but declines after the occurrence of the 
first oil price shock and the French withdrawal from the 'snake' in early 1974. It 
reaches its minimum in mid 1976, and remains relatively low thereafter. The Italian 
reputation measure is relatively high in the first half of the sample, declines strongly 
after the mid-1970s and largely resembles the behaviour of the French reputation 
measure during the EMS period. Both France and Italy lost counterinflation reputation 
primarily because of their high inflation rates in the 1960's and their monetary 
accommodation of the two oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979. The frequent switching 
between drastic inflation and steep disinflation furthermore is responsible for the fact 
that both countries failed to establish counterinflation reputation during disinflation 
episodes in the pre-EMS (1975-79) and EMS (1982-86) period. This feature of the 
reputation estimates is caused by the fact that a highly erratic policy environment with 
long runs of permanent positive inflation shocks and subsequent long runs of 
permanent disinflation shocks does not command the same counterinflation reputation 
as an environment where such huge swings in inflation rates do not occur. 
 
The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland 
The smaller EMS countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, 
traditionally place a higher weight on external stability and can therefore be expected 
to gain more than the larger countries from the provision of a 'hard currency' standard 
within the EMS. However, in Weber (1991a) it is argued that the EMS must be 
viewed as a bipolar system, which in addition to the 'hard currency' option of pegging 
to the DM also offered the 'soft currency' alternative of pegging to a 'weak currency', 
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such as the French Franc. Depending on this choice, the smaller EMS countries may 
have borrowed 'good' or 'bad' counterinflation reputation.  
The relevance of this proposition may best be illustrated by referring to panel 
(b) of Figure 4.4, which displays the reputation estimates for the former snake 
member countries, that is, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark relative to 
Germany. For the Bretton Woods period the Dutch counterinflation reputation 
estimate lies below the German estimate, but increases considerably after the 
European currency 'snake' arrangement is established between these countries in April 
1972 (see Box 22 for details). Throughout the snake period the Dutch reputation 
measure moves slightly below the German reputation measure. The onset of the EMS 
in March 1979 also has little impact on the apparent symmetry between the German 
and Dutch reputation measures. Finally, during the EMS disinflation period (1983-86) 
the Dutch reputation measure increases slightly and rises above the German reputation 
estimate after late 1986, when inflation rates in the Netherlands were lower than those 
in Germany. The Danish and Belgian reputation measures closely resemble the Dutch 
reputation measure prior to 1973, but decline strongly as inflation rises sharply in the 
aftermath of the oil price shock. Danish counterinflation reputation soon rises again 
and closely follows the Dutch measure for the remainder of the sample period. 
Belgian counterinflation reputation follows the French measure during the pre-EMS 
snake period, but there is a sharp increase in Belgian counterinflation reputation at the 
onset of the EMS, when Belgian inflation rates closely follow those in Germany and 
the Netherlands. Between 1983 and 1988 Belgian counterinflation declines somewhat, 
but rises again after 1991. 
 
 
Box 22 
From Bretton Woods to the European Monetary System 
The Smithonian agreement of the ‘Group of Ten’ of December 1971 widened the 
bilateral fluctuation margins against the U.S. dollar from 1% to 2.25%. In the Basle 
agreement of April 1972 the central banks of the EC countries Germany, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg agreed on narrower bilateral 
fluctuation margins of 1.125% ( 0.75% between the Netherlands and the Belgian-
Luxembourg Economic Union, BLUE) around their spot parities. In this ‘snake in the 
tunnel’ arrangement the narrow bilateral margins (the ‘snake’) were equal to half the 
size of the U.S. dollar margins (the ‘tunnel’). In May 1972 Denmark, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland joined the snake, but the latter two countries withdrew from 
both the snake and the tunnel in June 1972. Denmark withdrew from the snake in June 
1972, but rejoined in October 1972. Italy left the snake in February 1973 and in 
March 1973 the remaining snake countries decided to let their currencies float jointly 
against the U.S. dollar, which terminated the period of the ‘snake in the tunnel’. 
France withdrew from the system in January 1974 (French sample 72M4-73M12) 
rejoined in July 1975 but withdrew again in March 1976. The sample period 
considered here for the European currency snake system covers both the ‘snake’ and 
the ‘snake in the tunnel’ and runs from April 1972 to February 1979 with the 
exceptions indicated above. 
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The overall impression suggested by panel (b) of Figure 4.4 is that after 
maintaining an intermediate position throughout the Bretton Woods period the major 
gains in Dutch anti-inflation reputation were obtained by committing monetary policy 
to the 'hard currency' option of pegging the Dutch guilder to the German mark at the 
onset of the European currency 'snake' in 1972 and by continuing this commitment 
under the EMS arrangement after 1979. The Belgian reputation estimate, on the other 
hand, seems to switch from a similar intermediate position to closely following the 
French reputation estimates prior to the EMS, when both countries to a similar degree 
accommodated the oil price shock of 1973. Recently Belgian reputation appears again 
to follow a more intermediate path, with some reputation gains towards the sample 
end. For Denmark, as for the Netherlands, the main gains in counterinflation 
reputation materialised during the 'snake' period, when the Benelux countries and 
Denmark targeted the exchange rate vis-a-vis the German mark. Few additional 
reputation gains arose during the early EMS period. However, in a similar way to the 
Netherlands, the Danish reputation measure rises above the German measure towards 
the end of the EMS disinflation period, when the Danish government enforced legal 
upper-limits for wage increases in 1985. This belated EMS effect on Danish anti-
inflation reputation is consistent with the findings of Artis (1987), who suggests that 
Denmark appears to have used the EMS initially more as a crawling peg
2
 and only 
later moved to a more strongly counterinflationary stance by pursuing level pegging 
policies.  
The Irish reputation measure is displayed in Figure 4.4 together with the 
German and British reputation measures. During the Bretton Woods and the snake 
period the Irish pound was linked one-for-one to the British pound, but this link was 
dissolved when Ireland entered the ERM in 1979, whilst the United Kingdom chose to 
stay outside the system. On the whole, Irish and British inflation rates moved 
relatively closely together prior to 1979, with two major exceptions: whilst Ireland 
experienced higher inflation during the 1960's, the United Kingdom accommodated 
the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979 to a larger extent and consequently had higher 
inflation in the late 1970's and early 1980's. This is reflected in the reputation 
measures: after its initial increase, Irish counterinflation reputation declines 
continuously between 1964 and 1972. Following a transitory rise in 1973-74, the 
estimate displays a sharp permanent increase during 1975-76, which is largely due to 
the substantial cuts in selected VAT rates and subsidies,
3
 as well as strong external 
deflationary forces.
4
 Reputation then roughly fluctuates around 0.8 between 1977 and 
1982, and thereafter stabilises at a relatively high level. This post 1982 Irish 
consolidation, which is also reported in Dornbusch (1989), has been re-enforced 
towards the end of the EMS deflation period in 1986. Thus, as in the case of Denmark 
above, one may argue that the recent increase in Irish counterinflation reputation can 
be attributed to the Irish policy shift from an accommodating exchange rate policy to 
a determined effort to reduce inflation. The results reported here are thus not 
inconsistent with the view of Dornbusch (1989), who states that for Ireland the EMS 
clearly has become an instrument of deflation. 
 
The above evidence clearly points to counterinflation gains for all smaller 
EMS member countries, whilst no such evidence exists for France and Italy. But what 
about counterinflation reputation outside the system?  
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The United Kingdom 
In Figure 4.4 the British reputation is roughly as high as that for Germany prior to the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system. But with the oil price shock in 1973 and the 
election of the Labour government in February 1974 British inflation rates rise steeply 
to the highest level of all G7-countries. This is seen in the steep decline of the 
counterinflation reputation measure between 1973 and 1979. After the election of the 
Conservative government under Thatcher in May 1979 the counterinflation reputation 
measure rises sharply and thereafter fluctuates strongly between 1979 and 1985. After 
1985 these fluctuations become less erratic and there is a continuing upward trend in 
British counterinflation reputation throughout the second half of the Thatcher period. 
It is commonly believed that this gain in British counterinflation reputation has been 
materialised independently and without resort to foreign entanglements, as Minford 
(1988) and Currie (1988), amongst others, state. 
 
The United States and Canada 
The time path of the reputation measure for United States in Figure 4.5 is very similar 
to that of the United Kingdom, except for very recent years. American 
counterinflation reputation was relatively high during the Bretton Woods system until 
early 1973, but with the strong inflationary impact of the oil price shocks the 
reputation measure falls drastically. Counterinflation reputation then fluctuates 
strongly for some years, but remains roughly constant until the end of the sample 
period. The adoption of a strict monetarist policy stance in October 1979 and its 
abolition in October 1982 have little impact on the mean of the reputation measure, 
but its volatility is reduced considerably after 1983. A similar constancy of 
counterinflation reputation is displayed by the estimate for Canada throughout the 
entire sample period. 
 
Japan 
The counterinflation reputation measure in Figure 4.5 for Japan throughout the 
Bretton Woods period, but almost reaches its value in early 1971. As for the United 
Kingdom and the United States, Japan initially accommodates the oil price shock in 
1973 to a large extent, and inflation rises drastically. Consequently, Japan's 
counterinflation reputation declines sharply after the oil price shock in mid 1973. 
After major changes in monetary policy in early 1975, when Japan abandoned most of 
its activist policies and moved to a new counterinflationary policy regime, the 
reputation measure begins a steady and recently less erratic increase, and in 1989 
surpasses the German reputation measure. 
 
Austria 
The example of Austria in Figure 4.5 is interesting because during the 1980's Austria 
has unilaterally targeted the German mark exchange rate without a formal institutional 
arrangement such as the ERM. The success of this policy of 'shadow-targeting' the 
EMS in an effort to gain counterinflation reputation is obvious from Figure 4.5. After 
the oil price shock of 1973 Austrian counterinflation reputation was at an all-time 
low. During the late 1970's and throughout the 1980's Austria has continuously gained 
counterinflation reputation by pegging to the German Mark. During the peak of the 
German  post-unification  reflation  Austrian  counterinflation  reputation  even  has 
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Figure 4.5. 
Counterinflation Reputation Measure: 
Prior Probability of Inflation Stationarity (in %) 
 
(a) Germany, the United States, Japan and Canada 
 
 
(b) Germany and Austria 
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exceeded that of Germany due to lower Austrian inflation rates. The example of 
Austria, which will be dealt with in more detail below in the context of the credibility 
of exchange rate targeting, impressively demonstrates that gaining counterinflation 
reputation by pegging the exchange rate vis-a-vis a low inflation centre country does 
not require a formal institutional exchange rate arrangement, but true commitment and 
devotion. Without the latter, the former is meaningless and bound to fail. 
 
To summarise the above evidence from the ERM and non-ERM G7-
countries,
5
 it can be stated that for France, Italy, the United States and Canada no 
significant gains in counterinflation reputation were found, whilst the United 
Kingdom and Japan had some success in reputation building. With respect to 
Germany, counterinflation reputation was established in both countries entirely by 
domestic policy U-turns. In Japan and the United Kingdom, as well as in the smaller 
EMS countries, the timing of the gains in counterinflation reputation suggests that 
stabilisation policies in response to the inflationary impact of the 1973 oil price shock 
played a key role. Maintaining high or low counterinflation reputation during the 
EMS period appears to have been a matter of not repeating the mistakes of the years 
1973-75 in the event of the second oil price shock in 1979. Japan and the United 
Kingdom achieved this by domestic policy U-turns between the two rounds of oil 
price hikes. For the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, the high 
counterinflation reputation of Germany combined with the disciplinary effects of 
relatively fixed exchange rates within the ERM appear, at varying degrees, to have 
played a role in this process. The same applies for Austria, were a unilateral 
commitment instead of a formal institutional exchange rate arrangement, appears to 
have helped in containing inflation. All in all, the estimates suggest that rather than 
'borrowing credibility' for disinflation it appears to be the case that 'borrowing 
discipline' for resisting inflation may have been an equally important feature of the 
EMS. 
 
 
4.2. Evidence about Policy Credibility 
 
Having ascertained that some countries have gained counterinflation reputation during 
the EMS period, the next step is to establish whether there exists a link between the 
counterinflation reputation of the monetary authorities and the credibility of their 
policy announcements. To address this issue the credibility of money stock, exchange 
rate and interest rate targeting policies is evaluated empirically in the next three 
sections.  
 
4.2.1. The Credibility of Monetary Target Announcements 
 
The move to monetary growth targets may be viewed as an attempt by central banks 
to resolve their credibility problem. Has this form of signalling policy intentions 
helped EMS central banks to establish credibility? In answering this question it is 
important to note that money stock targeting, which was adopted by Germany, France 
and Italy in the mid-1970s before the advent of the EMS, has remained part of their 
practices. However, within the EMS, all monetary authorities cannot independently 
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target both the exchange rate and the money stock at the same time. This may render 
one of the two policy targets non-credible if both are set inconsistently to one another. 
Under what conditions can monetary target announcements be expected to 
command credibility? Andersen and Risager (1988) state that continuity is an 
important factor for the success of any stabilisation policy. In practice, however, 
different money and credit aggregates with differing degrees of controllability have 
been targeted. All countries occasionally switched from one monetary aggregate to 
another in order to improve monetary control, as will be discussed in detail below. 
 
4.2.1.1. The Experience with Monetary Targeting 
 
In late 1974, the German Bundesbank was the first central bank to announce a formal 
monetary target in terms of the growth of a monetary aggregate for a period as long as 
a year. This example was followed by the Federal Reserve of the United States in 
early 1975, where the initiative for the move to monetary growth announcements 
came from the legislature rather than from the central bank. Also in 1975, the Swiss 
and Canadian central banks announced formal monetary targets and in 1976 the 
monetary authorities of the United Kingdom and France followed suit. 
In addition to the above six countries with formally announced targets for 
monetary aggregate a number of borderline cases may also be observed: the Italian 
central bank chose a total domestic credit aggregate rather than a monetary aggregate 
as a formal intermediate target for monetary policy after 1974 but switched to 
monetary quantity targets in 1986. Since 1978 the Bank of Japan has made 
'projections' for a monetary aggregate. Finally, the Dutch Central Bank after early 
1977 focused on a national liquidity ratio, defined in terms of a monetary aggregate 
relative to national income. In the analysis below this second group will be considered 
in the same fashion as the first group in order to facilitate an international comparison. 
This may, of course, can be criticised on various grounds: with respect to the 
Netherlands, it is unclear whether the monetary authority actively seeks to control the 
monetary aggregate or national income to achieve the desired liquidity ratio in the 
long run. In the case of Japan it is uncertain whether or not the actual monetary policy 
is subsequently adjusted to try and validate the 'projections' for the monetary 
aggregates. 
A further drawback for a direct international comparison is given by the fact 
that the different countries under study focus on different monetary aggregates with 
different degrees of potential controllability. For example, the Swiss National Bank 
and more recently also the Bank of England focus on a monetary base target, over 
which central banks have almost perfect control. The majority of central banks, 
however, have attempted to target wider and less directly controllable monetary 
aggregates. M1 was targeted by both Canada and the United States. The United States 
also announced targets for M2, as did France, Italy and the Netherlands. Broadly 
defined monetary aggregates were targeted by Germany (M3), France (M3), Japan 
(M2 plus certificates of deposits), the United Kingdom (Sterling M3, M4) and the 
United States (M3). An intermediate case is the Bundesbank's targeting of the German 
central bank money stock (CBM), which comprises cash and reserve requirements on 
the components of M3 and hence is broadly defined but more directly controllable 
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than the broad monetary aggregates above. Finally, Italy initially targeted ceilings for 
total domestic credit (TDC), which is not a monetary but a credit aggregate. 
Another complication for an international comparative evaluation of the 
credibility of monetary target announcements is given by the previously mentioned 
discontinuities. Minor changes in the definition of the targeted monetary aggregate 
were observable in France (from M2 to M2R) and the United Kingdom (from £M3 to 
M3).
6
 Major shifts between different monetary aggregates took place in virtually all 
countries. The Swiss central bank focused on M1 targets at the beginning of its target 
announcements between 1975 and 1978, abolished target announcements altogether in 
1979 and announced targets for the monetary base (MB) for 1980 and for the adjusted 
monetary base (MBA) between 1981 and 1988, as well as M3 after 1987. The French 
central bank announced targets for M2 from 1977 until 1982, for M2R in 1984 and 
1985, for M3 in 1986 and for M2 again since 1987. The German Bundesbank 
switched from announcing targets for the central bank money stock (CBM) between 
1975 and 1987 to announcing targets for M3 since 1988. The monetary authority of 
the United Kingdom announced targets for M3 from 1976 until 1987, for M1 from 
1985 to 1987 and for M0 and M4 from 1987 onwards. The Italian central bank 
switched from announcing targets for total domestic credit (TDC) ceilings between 
1974 and 1990 to also announcing targets growth rates for M2 after 1984.  
Finally, the abolition of official monetary target announcements was decided 
upon by the central banks of Canada and the Netherlands. In the case of the 
Netherlands, the onset of the European Monetary System (EMS) with its Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) in March 1979 led to a policy stance where exchange rate 
considerations, especially with respect to the German Mark were given priority over 
independent monetary policy objectives. As a result, official announcements of M2 
targets were not made after December 1981. Increased orientation of monetary policy 
towards an exchange rate target vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar was also the reason behind 
the abolition of M1 target announcements in Canada in November 1982. Due to the 
very short sample spans, however, both Canada and the Netherlands will therefore not 
be considered in the quantitative evaluation below. 
After having highlighted some of the problems of the attempted comparative 
study on the credibility of monetary announcements, it is important to briefly discuss 
the experience of G7 countries with monetary targeting before turning to the estimates 
of the credibility measures. 
 
Germany  
Between December 1974 and 1987 the Bundesbank has announced an annual growth 
target for the adjusted central bank money stock (CBM), an aggregate consisting of 
currency in circulation and required reserves on domestic bank deposits at constant 
reserve ratios.
7
 As indicated in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6 central bank money growth 
mostly overshoot the fixed 8 percent target between 1975 to 1978. The Bundesbank 
attributed these target misses to both imperfect control as well as a deliberate reaction 
to external developments, mainly interventions to damp the appreciation of the D-
Mark.
8
 Furthermore, monetary targeting at that time was still considered to be at an 
experimental stage. After the 1975-1978 experience with constant fix-point targets, 
the Bundesbank adopted target ranges for CBM growth between 1979-1987 in order 
to allow for some flexibility to address unexpected economic developments,  such as  
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Table 4.1. 
German Announced Money Growth Targets and Realizations, Year on Year 
(y.o.y.) and Annual Average (avg.) of Monthly Growth Rates (in % p.a.). 
   
target range 
 
concretized 
 
outcome 
year target y.o.y. avg. target y.o.y. avg. 
1975 CBM
1
 8.0 - - 9.9
n
 (7.8) 
1976 CBM
2
 - 8.0 - - 9.3
n
 
1977 CBM
2
 - 8.0 - - 9.0
n
 
1978 CBM
2
 - 8.0 - - 8.5
n
 
1979 CBM
3
 6.0-9.0 -       lower limit 6.4
y
 (8.5)
†
 
1980 CBM
3
 5.0-8.0 -       lower limit 4.9
y
 (4.8)
†
 
1981 CBM
3
 4.0-7.0 -       lower half 3.6
y
 (4.4)
†
 
1982 CBM
3
 4.0-7.0 -       upper half 6.1
y
 (4.9)
†
 
1983 CBM
3
 4.0-7.0 -       upper half 7.0
y
 (7.3)
†
 
1984 CBM
3
 4.0-6.0 - - 4.6
y
 (4.8)
†
 
1985 CBM
3
 3.0-5.0 - - 4.5
y
 (4.6)
†
 
1986 CBM
3
 3.5-5.5 - - 7.7
n
 (6.4) 
1987 CBM
3
 3.0-6.0 - - 8.0
n
 (8.1) 
1988 M3 
3
 3.0-6.0 - - 6.5
n
 (6.2)
†
 
1989 M3 
3
 - 5.0 - 4.5
n
 (5.6) 
1990 M3 
3
 4.0-6.0 - - 5.2
y
 (4.4)
†
 
1991 M3 
3
 3.0-5.0 - - 18.2
n
 (18.2)  
1992 M3 
3
 3.5-5.5 - - 9.2
n
 (7.9) 
1993 M3 
3
 4.5-6.5 - - - (7.8) 
1994 M3 
3
 4.0-6.0 - - - - 
Sources: Deutsche  Bundesbank, Geschäftsbericht, various issues, OECD Country 
Surveys, Germany, various issues, Neumann (1988) and  own calculations using 
data of OECD Main Economic Indicators, various issues. 
Notes: CBM is the  central bank money stock, comprising  of currency in 
circulation and  required reserves  on  domestic liabilities, calculated at  constant 
reserve ratios (base January 1974). M3 comprises cash  holdings of non-banks, 
domestic non-bank sight deposits at banks, time  deposits (up to 4 years maturity) 
and saving deposits (at statutory notice). 
1
 December of preceding year to December of current year. 
2
 Annual average. 
3
 Fourth quarter of preceding year to fourth quarter of current year. 
y
 Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).  
n
 Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).  
†
 Annual average of target achieved (in terms of integer values).  
 
98 Chapter 4 
Figure 4.6. 
Money Stock Targeting in Germany 
 
(a) Central Bank Money Stock Targeting, 1975-1987 
 
 
 
(b) M3 Targeting, 1988-1983 
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exchange rate movements. Furthermore, the upper bound of the target range was 
lowered during 1979-85 from 9 to 5 percent as part of the Bundesbank's anti-inflation 
policy stance. In addition, to clearly indicate its policy intentions while adopting 
target ranges, the Bundesbank between 1979 and 1983 announced in mid-year where 
within the target range it would aim monetary growth. 
As indicated in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6 the Bundesbank was quite 
successful in achieving its monetary targets during the years 1979-85. To counteract 
the inflationary impact of the oil price shock the Bundesbank tightened monetary 
policy in 1979 and CBM growth came down within the target range in the second half 
of the year, and fluctuated around the lower bound of the target corridor in 1980 and 
1981. CBM growth then moved to the upper bound of the range in 1982, stayed there 
during 1983 and lay well within the target range during 1984 and 1985. After two 
years of massive target overshooting in 1986 and 1987 the Bundesbank finally 
terminated MCB targeting in January 1988 and switched to announcing target ranges 
for the monetary aggregate M3. Panel (b) of Figure 4.6 indicates that prior to German 
economic and monetary unification in 1990, the new policy stance of M3 targeting 
was relatively successful. However, the massive M3 target overshooting in the 
aftermath of the unification shock during 1992 and 1993 suggests there are serious 
problems with respect to the Bundesbank's ability to regain monetary control. 
 
France 
With the election of Raymond Barre as prime minister in March 1976 and the 
adoption of the so-called 'Barre Plan', an orthodox deflationary stabilisation policy 
package, in September 1976, the Banque de France began setting formal monetary 
targets. In December 1976 a growth rate target for M2 without bands was first 
publicly announced. Between 1977 and 1981 the target for M2 growth was 
successively reduced as monetary policy became more stringent and relied 
increasingly on selective credit controls and credit ceilings in order to achieve the 
monetary targets. With the election of President Mitterand in May 1981 economic 
policies were geared towards a reduction of unemployment by expansionary fiscal 
policies. Monetary policy was relaxed in June 1981, the M2 growth targets (set by the 
previous government) were revised upwards, and credit ceilings were eased. During 
most of this time M2 growth rates were rising, but remained within the specified 
corridor. Reflation, the October 1981 devaluation of the Franc and the speculative 
pressure on the Franc in early 1982 led to a tightening of policy, with the reduction of 
inflation being restored as the main policy objective after the second Franc 
devaluation in June 1982. In addition, prices and wages were frozen from June until 
the end of October 1982 and the freeze was gradually phased out during 1983. After 
the third devaluation of the Franc in March 1983 there was a turnaround in French 
macro policy with the austerity program introduced under Prime Minister Mouroy 
shortly afterwards. Fiscal and monetary policy were severely tightened and strict 
foreign exchange controls were adopted. The monetary contraction of 1983-84 was 
mainly achieved by keeping interest rates so high that credit ceilings were not 
binding. During 1985-86 the credit ceiling system was then replaced by a system of 
progressive reserve requirements and increased reliance on open market operations 
rather than direct credit controls. At the same time, French monetary policy was 
primarily directed  towards the exchange  rate.
9
  Throughout  the 1983-86 disinflation 
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Table 4.2. 
French Announced Money Growth Targets and Realisations, Year on Year 
(y.o.y.) and Annual Average (avg.) of Monthly Growth Rates (in % p.a.). 
    
outcome 
year target target range y.o.y. avg. 
1977 M2
1
 12.5 13.9
n†
 (12.3) 
1978 M2
1
 12.0 12.2
y
 (13.2) 
1979 M2
1
 11.0 14.4
n
 (13.4) 
1980 M2
1
 11.0 9.8
n†
 (11.6) 
1981 M2
1
 10.0-12.0 11.4
y†
 (12.6) 
1982 M2
1
 12.5-13.5 11.5
y†
 (12.3) 
1983 M2
2
 9.0-10.0 10.2
y†
 (10.2) 
1984 M2R
2
 5.5-6.5 7.6
n
 (9.9) 
1985 M2R
2
 3.0-5.0 6.9
n
 (8.7) 
1986 M3
2
 4.0-6.0 4.2
y†
 (5.3) 
1987 M2
2
 4.0-6.0 4.2
y
 (7.3) 
 M3
2
 3.0-5.0 9.9
n
 (9.0) 
1988 M2
2
 4.0-6.0 4.0
y
 (7.4) 
1989 M2
2
 4.0-6.0 4.1
y†
 (4.0) 
1990 M2
2
 3.5-5.5 -0.5
n
 (1.3) 
1991 M3
3
 5.0-7.0 3.7
n†
 (6.1) 
1992 M3
3
 4.0-6.0 5.4
n†
 (4.8) 
1993 M3
3
 4.0-6.5 - (3.9) 
1994 M3
3
      
Sources: OECD Country Surveys, France, various issues, Wyplosz (1988b), and 
own calculations using data of IMF International Financial Statistics, various 
issues.  
Notes: M2 is  currency, demand deposits, savings deposits and all time deposits, 
certificates of deposits plus short-term non-negotiable financial instruments. M2R 
is that part of M2 which is held by residents. M3 is total liquidity. 
1
 December of preceding year to December of current year. 
2
 Quarter centred around December of preceeding year to the same  quarter of the 
current year. 
3
 Fourth quarter of preceding year to fourth quarter of current year. 
y
 Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).  
n
 Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).  
†
 Annual average of target achieved (in terms of integer values).  
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Figure 4.7. 
Money Stock Targeting in France 
 
(a) M2 and M2R Targeting, 1977-1990 
 
 
 
(b) M3 Targeting, 1991-1993 
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period French money growth substantially overshot the announced target ranges. 
After 1987 the removal of capital controls and the introduction of proportional reserve 
requirements on bank deposits appears to have substantially stabilised M2 growth, 
which fluctuated around the lower bound of the target range between 1987 and 1990, 
and fell substantially thereafter. This recent instability of M2 led to the adoption of 
M3 targets in France. Figure 4.7 shows that with the exception of the recent 1993 
ERM crisis these M3 targets were implemented with relative success. 
 
Italy 
After having previously targeted the monetary base, the Banca d'Italia in 1974 
decided to set a monetary objective in terms of a total domestic credit (TDC) ceiling. 
This decision to target credit aggregates was supplemented by recourse to a 
progressively more sophisticated system of direct credit controls and bank credit 
ceilings. Following the onset of the EMS in 1979, a system of compulsory reserves on 
deposits and a limit on the increase of financing in foreign exchange for imports were 
introduced. During the entire pre-EMS period the ceiling for total credit growth was 
consistently overshot by substantial amounts. However, with a few exceptions total 
credit growth fell well below the ceilings during the EMS period, even though the 
Banca d'Italia until 1983 continued to frame its monetary policy mainly in the form of 
credit targets and interest rate objectives, and at the same time publicly rejecting a 
policy of strictly targeting some monetary aggregate. However, explicit monetary 
targets were adopted from 1984 onwards, when the Banca d'Italia started announcing 
growth targets for M2. Furthermore, the conduct of monetary policy was shifted more 
towards open market operations. Panel (b) of Figure 4.8 shows that the new policy of 
targeting M2 growth rates was implemented initially with some success, but after 
1991 massive target overshooting occurred. 
 
United Kingdom  
In the United Kingdom monetary targets were used internally by the Bank of England 
from 1973 onwards, but were first announced publicly for the monetary aggregate M3 
in the Budget of 1976 and for Sterling M3 (£M3) in the Budgets from 1977 onwards. 
For the 1974-1979 Labour Government these monetary targets were viewed as part of 
an anti-inflation programme which relied primarily on income policies. After the 
election of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher in May 1979, the new 
government gave priority to controlling the growth of monetary aggregates as the 
centrepiece of its new economic policy. The March 1980 Budget established the so-
called 'Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS)', an annually renewed five year 
forward-looking stabilisation plan aimed at gradually lowering inflation by limiting 
the growth of monetary aggregates and subordinating fiscal policy to the achievement 
of the monetary target. Under the Thatcher government financial markets were de-
regulated and foreign exchange as well as direct credit controls, the so-called 
"Corset", were abolished. Due to this deregulation £M3 growth consistently overshot 
its target ranges during 1979-83. As a reaction the March 1982 Budget introduced a 
multiplicity of monetary growth targets by setting growth corridors for Sterling M3, 
M1 and Private Sector Liquidity (PSL2). In addition the importance of the exchange 
rate was explicitly mentioned. Despite these indications of a move to a more 
discretionary  policy  stance,  £M3  grew  closer to the upper bound of the target range 
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Table 4.3. 
Italian Announced Money and Credit Growth Targets and Realisations, Year 
on Year (y.o.y.) and Annual Average (avg.) of Monthly Growth Rates  
(in % p.a.). 
   
target 
   
target 
 
year target level outcome target range outcome 
1975 TDC 17.9 13.6
n
 - - - 
1976 TDC 17.5 22.0
n
 - - - 
1977 TDC 15.1 16.8
n
 - - - 
1978 TDC 12.9  5.2
n
 - - - 
1979 TDC 18.4 17.1
y
 - - - 
1980 TDC 17.4 22.7
n
 - - - 
1981 TDC 16.0 17.2
n
 - - - 
1982 TDC 15.2  8.6
y
 - - - 
1983 TDC 18.3 15.5
y
 - - - 
1984 TDC 17.5 21.6
n
 M2 11.0 11.7
n
 
1985 TDC 16.2 14.1
y
 M2 10.0 13.1
n
 
1986 TDC 13.2  9.0
y
 M2 7.0-11.0 8.6
y
 
1987 TDC 11.1 12.6
n
 M2 6.0- 9.0 10.4
n
 
1988 TDC 9.4 12.2
n
 M2 6.0- 9.0 7.7
y
 
1989 - - - M2 6.0- 9.0 10.1
n
 
1990 - - - M2 6.0- 9.0 9.2
y
 
1991 - - - M2 5.0- 8.0 10.2
n
 
1992 - - - M2 5.0- 7.0 13.5
n
 
1993 - - - M2 5.0- 7.0 - 
1994 - - - M2 - - 
Sources: OECD Country Surveys, Italy, various issues, and own calculation using 
data of OECD Main Economic Indicators, and IMF International Financial 
Statistics, various issues. 
Notes: TDC is total domestic credit, announced in terms of a ceiling, and consists 
of bank and special  credit  institution loans plus bonds issued by local authorities, 
public and private companies (net of loans consolidating debt of local authorities) 
less state sector borrowing requirement. M2 is currency in circulation plus demand 
and time deposits. 
1
 Annual average of growth rate  
2
 Data taken from OECD Country Surveys, Italy, various issues. 
3
 Calculated as annual average of monthly growth rates from OECD Main 
Economic Indicators, various issues. 
y
 Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).  
n
 Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).  
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Figure 4.8. 
Money Stock and Credit Ceiling Targeting in Italy 
 
(a) Total Domestic Credit Targeting, 1975-1990 
 
 
 
(b) M2 Targeting, 1984-1993 
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Table 4.4. 
United Kingdom Announced Money Growth Target Projections and 
Realisations, Annual Average (avg.) of Monthly Growth Rates (in % p.a.). 
   
target 
 
year target range outcome 
1976 - - - 
1977 - - - 
1978 - - - 
1979 M2+CD's 11.8-12.3 - 
1980 M2+CD's 9.5-9.8 - 
1981 M2+CD's 8.0-8.8 10.9
n
 
1982 M2+CD's 9.5-9.5 10.1
y
 
1983 M2+CD's 7.0-7.5 8.6
n
 
1984 M2+CD's 7.8-7.8 9.3
n
 
1985 M2+CD's 8.0-8.0 9.2
n
 
1986 M2+CD's 8.5-8.5 8.8
y
 
1987 M2+CD's 9.5-9.5 10.1
y
 
1988 M2+CD's 11.0-11.5 11.6
y
 
1989 M2+CD's 10.0-11.0 11.2
y
 
1990 M2+CD's 11.0-11.0 13.4
n
 
1991 M2+CD's 4.3-4.3 3.1
n
 
1992 M2+CD's 1.3-1.3 -0.7
n
 
1993 M2+CD's   
1994 M2+CD's   
Sources: OECD Country Surveys, United Kingdom, various issues, Fischer (1988) 
and own calculations using data of OECD Main Economic Indicators, various 
issues, and IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
Notes: M3 is currency plus private sector demand and time deposits. M3 is 
currency plus private sector sterling demand and time deposits. M1 is currency 
plus private sector demand deposits. M0 is notes and coins in circulation and in 
banks, and bank's operational balances with the Bank of England. 
1
 Annual average of growth rate during the financial year, that April of preceeding 
year to March of the current year. 
2
 Calculated as average of monthly growth rates of the financial year using data of 
IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
y
 Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).  
n
 Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).  
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Figure 4.9. 
Money Stock Targeting in the United Kingdom 
 
(a) M3 and £M3 Targeting, 1976-1986 
 
 
 
(b) M0 Targeting, 1994-1993 
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than it had been at any time during the previous years of strict monetary targeting. 
After the March 1984 Budget, target ranges for both Sterling M3 and M0 were 
announced and the Sterling M3 target was finally abolished in March 1987 because of 
renewed massive target overshooting. After 1987 the Bank of England moved to 
announcing target ranges for M0 as the main monetary aggregate. On average, the M0 
target has been implemented with considerable success in recent years, as panel (b) of 
Figure 4.9 indicates. 
 
The United States. 
During 1975 to 1977 the growth rates of M1 were slightly below or within the target 
range, whilst M2 and M3 consistently overshot their respective targets. Subsequently 
the implementation of monetary policy underwent three changes. The first, albeit 
minor, change resulted from the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, which required the 
Fed to establish calendar year growth targets to prevent the phenomenon of infra-year 
'base drift'. Secondly, on October 6, 1979, the Fed announced its intention to adopt a 
more monetarist policy stance with strict adherence to M1 targets (and the 
abandonment of interest rate targets) in order to reduce the inflation rate. Three years 
later, on October 5, 1982, this strict monetarist policy was officially changed and the 
Fed decided to 'de-emphasis' M1 in favour of the broader aggregates, M2 and M3, but 
the commitment to low inflation was re-iterated. During the 1978-83 period M1 grew 
consistently above the announced target range, whilst M2 and M3 lay mostly within 
the announced corridors, as shown in Figure 4.10. After 1983 M1 growth remained 
erratic and until its abolition in 1987 mostly overshot its targets by substantial 
proportions. M2 and M3 growth rates, on the other side, lie mostly within their target 
ranges in recent years, indicating relatively successful monetary targeting. 
 
Japan 
In early 1975 the Bank of Japan abandoned most of its discretionary, activist policies 
adopted after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the oil price shock in 
1973, and moved to a new policy stance with monetary targeting. A broad money, 
(M2+CD's) was chosen as the intermediate target for monetary policy. Moreover, 
price stability was adopted as the first policy priority. In its management of the money 
supply, the Bank of Japan's main operating targets were the inter-bank interest rates 
(call and bill rates), and monetary control was implemented by manipulating the 
discount rate and reserve ratios. The Bank of Japan also used open market operations, 
occasionally supplemented by the use of 'window guidance', that is, direct controls of 
bank lending to the private non-bank sector. Even though the Bank of Japan has a 
monetary target, which is set for the period of a year, not the monetary target itself but 
'forecasts' of the targeted aggregate M2(+CD's) are announced to the public.
10
 The 
publication of these money growth projections is announced quarterly, and concerns 
the percentage increase of the average money stock over the same quarter of the 
previous year. In May 1979 banks were permitted to issue negotiable certificates of 
deposits (CDs) and secondary trading in these instruments started in April 1982. The 
CD component in Japan is under quantitative restrictions and relatively small. 
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Table 4.5. 
American Announced Money Growth Targets and Realisations, Average 
Annual Growth Rates for the Fourth Quarter of the Year (in % p.a.). 
 tar- target out- tar- target out- tar- target out- 
year get range come get range come get range come 
1975 M1 5.0-7.5 4.9
y
 M2 8.5-10.5 11.4
n
 M3 10.0-12.0 8.9
y
 
1976 M1  4.5-7.0 6.0
y
 M2 7.5-10.0 12.5
n
 M3 9.0-12.0 10.8
y
 
1977 M1  4.5-6.5 7.8
n
 M2 7.0-9.5 10.6
n
 M3 8.5-11.5 11.8
y
 
1978 M1  4.0-6.5 7.9
n
 M2 6.5-9.0 7.7
y
 M3 7.5-11.5 11.1
y
 
1979 M1  3.0-6.0 7.6
n
 M2 5.0-8.0 7.9
y
 M3 6.0-9.0 9.9
n
 
1980 M1  4.0-6.5 7.0
y
 M2 6.0-9.0 8.6
y
 M3 6.5-9.5 9.1 
1981 M1  6.0-8.5 5.0
n
 M2 6.0-9.0 8.8
y
 M3 6.5-9.5 11.6
n
 
1982 M1  2.5-5.5 8.3
n
 M2 6.0-9.0 8.7
y
 M3 6.5-9.5 9.4
y
 
1983 M1  4.0-8.0 9.7
n
 M2 7.0-10.0 11.4
n
 M3 6.5-9.5 9.3
y
 
1984 M1  4.0-8.0 5.2
y
 M2 6.0-9.0 7.6
y
 M3 6.0-9.0 10.2
n
 
1985 M1  4.0-7.0 11.4
n
 M2 6.0-9.0 8.4
y
 M3 6.0-9.5 7.4
y
 
1986 M1  3.0-8.00 14.2
n
 M2 6.0-9.0 8.6
y
 M3 6.0-9.0 8.5
y
 
1987   -    -  -  M2 5.5-8.5 4.5
n
 M3 5.5-8.5 5.7
y
 
1988   -    -  -   M2 4.0-8.0 5.5
y
 M3 4.0-8.0 6.3
y
 
1989   -    -  -   M2 3.0-7.0 4.7
y
 M3 3.5-7.5 3.6
y
 
1990   -    -  -   M2 3.0-7.0 3.7
y
 M3 2.5-6.5 1.7
y
 
1991   -    -  -   M2 2.5-6.6 2.7
y
 M3 1.0-5.0 1.0
y
 
1992   -    -  -   M2 2.5-6.5 1.7
y
 M3 1.0- 5.0 0.2
n
 
1993   -    -  -   M2 1.0-5.0 0.4
y
 M3 1.0- 5.0 -0.8
n
 
1994   -    -  -   M2   M3     
Sources: OECD Country Surveys, United States, various issues, Fischer (1988) and 
own calculations using data of IMF International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
Notes: M1 is currency plus private sector demand deposits, M2 is M1 plus time 
deposits. M3 is M2 plus savings demand. National money stock definitions were 
used.. 
1
 Calculated as average of monthly growth rates of the last quarter of each year 
relative to the same quarter of the previous year using data of IMF International 
Financial Statistics, various issues. 
y
 Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).  
n
 Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).  
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Table 4.6. 
Japanese Announced Money Growth Target Projections and Realisations, 
Annual Average (avg.) of Monthly Growth Rates (in % p.a.). 
   
target 
 
year target range outcome 
1976 - - - 
1977 - - - 
1978 - - - 
1979 M2+CD's 11.8-12.3 - 
1980 M2+CD's 9.5-9.8 - 
1981 M2+CD's 8.0-8.8 10.9
n
 
1982 M2+CD's 9.5-9.5 10.1
y
 
1983 M2+CD's 7.0-7.5 8.6
n
 
1984 M2+CD's 7.8-7.8 9.3
n
 
1985 M2+CD's 8.0-8.0 9.2
n
 
1986 M2+CD's 8.5-8.5 8.8
y
 
1987 M2+CD's 9.5-9.5 10.1
y
 
1988 M2+CD's 11.0-11.5 11.6
y
 
1989 M2+CD's 10.0-11.0 11.2
y
 
1990 M2+CD's 11.0-11.0 13.4
n
 
1991 M2+CD's 4.3-4.3 3.1
n
 
1992 M2+CD's 1.3-1.3 -0.7
n
 
1993 M2+CD's   
1994 M2+CD's   
Sources: OECD Country Surveys, Japan, various issues, Fischer (1988) and own 
calculations using data of IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
Notes: M2 is currency plus private sector demand and time deposits, CD's are 
certificates of deposit. 
1
 Calculated as annual average of monthly growth rates using data of IMF 
International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
y
 Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).  
n
 Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).  
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Figure 4.10. 
Money Stock Targeting in the United States 
 
(a) M1 Targeting, 1975-1986 
 
 
 
(b) M2 Targeting, 1975-1993 
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Figure 4.10 continued 
 
(c) M3 Targeting, 1975-1993 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11. 
Money Stock Targeting in Japan: 
M2+CD Targeting, 1978-1993 
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During 1978 Japanese monetary policy was eased as the yen appreciated relative to 
the U.S. dollar. As inflationary pressure re-emerged in the wake of the depreciation of 
the yen and the marked increase in oil and other international commodity prices 
during the first half of 1979, monetary policy was tightened. Money growth rates 
started falling after mid 1979 and declined drastically during 1980, leading to a 
quicker disinflation with much less extra unemployment in Japan relative to other 
OECD countries. Once inflation was under control, the Bank of Japan eased its 
restrictive course in early 1981 with severe cuts in the discount rate, a reduction of 
compulsory reserve requirements and an easing of 'window guidance' ceilings on bank 
lending. Money growth accelerated in 1981, but declined again during 1982 and 1983, 
when monetary policy was dominated by the authorities' objective not to weaken the 
yen. Between early 1984 and late 1986 M2+CD's growth rates fluctuated around 8 
percent and accelerated again during 1987-1990. During 1990 money growth rates 
dropped sharply from about 10 to only 3 percent, and recently have fluctuated around 
zero, During this recent period attempts to stabilise the strong yen together with the 
concern about inflation, have progressively influenced the conduct of Japanese 
monetary policy. Figure 4.11 shows that throughout the entire sample period, the 
Japanese quarterly announcements of the target range for M2+CD's growth rates have 
been pretty accurate, and have tracked actual growth rates much more closely than 
announcements in any of the other G7-countries. 
 
The above non-formal evidence about the credibility of monetary target 
announcements can easily be supplemented by some more structured evidence 
derived from the probability distributions of money growth rates relative to the 
average target ranges. This is depicted in Figure 4.12 for the three EMS countries, and 
in Figure 4.13 for the remaining three non-ERM countries. The evidence clearly 
indicated that money growth rates distributions are typically uni-modal, but the actual 
money growth rates frequently lie outside the announced target ranges, both with the 
midpoint and the peak of the distributions. This suggests that money growth target 
announcements have lacked credibility in most countries. 
 
4.2.1.2. Estimates of the Credibility of Monetary Target Announcements 
 
For any measure of the credibility of money growth announcements to make sense, 
the above general descriptive evidence should somehow be captured by the estimates. 
In the present study this a measure for the credibility of such monetary target 
announcements is derived by regressing the actual money growth rate mt on 
announced money growth rates 
a
tm  and on the optimal prediction of money growth 
rates based on past information 
*
, 1t tm  , as described in chapter 3. According to theory, 
the coefficients on 
a
tm  and 
*
, 1t tm   should add to unity. In Weber (1990a) the 
adequacy of this coefficient restriction is tested formally by likelihood ratio tests and 
not rejected at the 5 percent level for a single case. As in Weber (1990a), the updated 
estimates reported below are thus based on the restricted model by regressing mt-
*
, 1t tm   on a constant and the announcement bias 
a
tm -
*
, 1t tm  , which yields the desired 
marginal credibility estimate (MC) as the coefficient of the announcement bias in this 
regression. 
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Figure 4.12. 
Probability Distributions of Money Growth Rates Within and Outside 
Announced Target Ranges, ERM Countries 
 
   (a) German CBM Target, 1975-87   (b) German M3Target, 1988-93 
 
    
 
 
   (c) French M2/M2R Target, 1979-90   (d) French M3Target, 1991-93 
 
    
 
 
   (e) Italian TDC Target, 1975-88      (f) Italian M2Target, 1984-93 
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Figure 4.13. 
Probability Distributions of Money Growth Within and Outside  
Announced Target Ranges, Non-ERM Countries 
 
 
(a) British £M3 Target, 1976-87    (b) British M0Target, 1984-93 
 
    
 
(c) American M1Target, 1975-86   (d) American M2Target, 1975-93 
 
    
 
(e) American M3 Target, 1975-93   (f) Japanese M2CD Target, 1977-93 
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4.2.1.2.1. Period Averages of the Credibility Measures 
 
Table 4.7 presents the estimates for the G7 countries except Canada, which is not 
considered owing to its short sample period. Not surprising, the credibility of 
monetary announcements is highest for Japan in the overall period (0.49), and in the 
various EMS sub-periods (0.47, 0.51, 0.55), with all estimates being statistically 
significant at least at the 5 percent level. Japan is also the only country which has 
recently issued 'credible' money growth announcements in the sense of a MC 
credibility measure being above 50 percent, which implies that in forming money 
growth expectations a higher weight is placed on the current central bank 
announcement than on extrapolations of past money growth. The credibility of money 
growth target announcements in the remaining countries is by comparison relatively 
low. For most countries significant MC credibility estimates are found in the overall 
period and in the various sub-periods, but these estimates frequently lie below 10 
percent. Given the various target switches and the volatile history of monetary 
targeting described above, this is hardly surprising. 
It is instructive to analyse the credibility estimates in more detail. For 
Germany, CBM growth announcements were initially relatively credible (MC=0.33), 
but this credibility declined steadily during the EMS period. The switch to M3 target 
announcements is found so far to have failed to re-establish the credibility of the 
Bundesbank's monetary targeting. France, Italy and the United Kingdom, on the other 
hand, never really succeeded in commanding credibility for their monetary or credit 
targeting policies, even though the credibility of M0 targeting has recently risen 
considerably in the United Kingdom (to MC=0.21). Finally, the United States is found 
to have had severe problems in establishing credible monetary targets initially, but the 
move to strict monetary targeting during 1979-1982 succeeded in overcoming this 
credibility gap to some extent, as reflected by a rise of the MC estimates for M1 and 
M2 to 0.31 and 0.35 respectively. Interestingly, the credibility of M2 targeting during 
this period exceeded that for the M1 target, which was the prime policy objective. 
This finding is consistent with the fact that M1 was subsequently de-emphasised and 
the Federal Reserve switched to M2 as its prime monetary target. In the post-1982 
period the credibility of monetary targeting declines again, but not as strongly for M2 
as for M1 or M3. 
To summarise, the evidence reported in Table 4.7 is mostly in line with the 
descriptive evidence about the experience with monetary target announcements 
reported above. This suggests that the credibility measure proposed here is able to 
capture features of the data and thus to provide a tool for formally evaluating the 
credibility of monetary policy commitments. 
An important drawback of any econometric policy evaluation is that the 
structure of the econometric model may change as policies change over time, as 
pointed out by Lucas (1976) in his famous 'Lucas critique'. In order to check the 
relevance of this proposition in the present context, Table 4.8 reports the results of a 
search for structural breaks in the estimated equation by using the switching 
regression techniques developed in Goldfeld and Quandt (1973a,b, 1976). Switching 
regression estimation looks for the most likely point in time at which a break in the 
estimated relation occurs by estimating the relationship separately over the overall 
period and over any  two  sub-periods  determined  by  every  possible  break-point. A 
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Table 4.7. 
Regression Estimates for the Credibility of Money Growth Target Announce-
ments, MC Credibility Measure (maximum sample: Jan. 1975-July 1993) 
 
Country 
Mo-
ney 
Max. Sample 
Beginn/Ende 
Overall 
Period 
Snake 
Period 
EMS 
Period 
Early 
EMS 
Interm. 
EMS 
Late 
EMS 
Germany CBM Jan.  1975 0.112 0.329 0.069 0.147 0.036  
           Dec. 1987 (0.030) (0.085) (0.029) (0.067) (0.033)  
 M3 Jan.  1988 0.038  0.038   1.046 
           July 1993 (0.057)  (0.057)   (0.091) 
France M2 Jan.  1979 0.098  0.098 0.181 0.113  
           Dec. 1990 (0.032)  (0.032) (0.065) (0.041)  
 M3 Jan.  1991 0.073  0.073   0.073 
           July 1993 (0.012)  (0.012)   (0.012) 
Italy   TDC Jan.  1975 0.042 0.142 0.113 0.173 0.132  
           Dec. 1988 (0.023) (0.076) (0.044) (0.081) (0.055)  
          M2 Jan.  1984  0.061  0.061  0.094 0.064 
           July 1993  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.047) (0.053) 
U.K.    £M3 Apr. 1976  0.080 0.163 0.101 0.094 0.139  
           Mar. 1987  (0.024) (0.053) (0.031) (0.042) (0.064)  
          M0 Apr. 1984 0.118  0.118  0.094 0.205 
           Oct.  1992 (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048) (0.123) 
U.S.A. M1 Jan.  1975 0.114 0.095 0.135 0.311 0.056  
           Dec. 1986 (0.025) (0.040) (0.003) (0.061) (0.034)  
          M2 Jan.  1975 0.087 0.062 0.118 0.350 0.143 0.138 
           June 1987 (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.066) (0.026) (0.048) 
          M3 Jan.  1975  0.042 0.027 0.049 0.167 0.090 0.018 
           June 1993 (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.049) (0.021) (0.056) 
Japan M2 June 1980  0.493  0.049 0.466 0.510 0.550 
          CD's June 1993 (0.090)  (0.090) (0.156) (0.120) (0.222) 
Notes: The marginal credibility measures for the overall period and the four sub-
periods (start-Feb.1979, Mar.1979-Feb.1983, Mar.1983-Dec.1989, Jan.1990-end) 
are obtained as the coefficients estimates from the ordinary least-squares 
regression (mt-mt t,
*
1
) = c + (mt
a -mt t,
*
1
) + vt, vt  N(0,v
2 ) with mt and mt
a  as 
actual and announced money growth rates and mt t,
*
1
 as the optimal multi-process 
Kalman filter prediction of money growth based on a ARIMA(0,2,2) time series 
model. Refer to Chapter 3 for details of the estimates. The numbes in parenthesis 
below the credibility estimates are t-values (5 percent significance level). 
Estimates above 0.5 indicate credible announcements. For details of these tests see 
Weber (1990a, 1991a). 
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Table 4.8. 
Switching Regression Estimates of the Credibility of Money Growth Target 
Announcements (maximum sample: Jan. 1975-July 1993) 
 
Country 
Mo-
ney 
break-
point 
MCT 
t(MCT) 
MC1 
t(MC1) 
MC2 
t(MC2) 
Chow F 
-2ln 
CSF 
CSB 
Hn,m 
H1,t-k 
Germany CBM Nov.  0.112 0.323 0.046  8.637*** 0.663*** 4.745*** 
           1979  (3.716) (3.883) (2.177) 27.90*** 0.235*** 0.065    
France M2 Jan. 0.098 0.129 0.411  6.324*** 0.843    1.160    
           1990 (3.052) (3.794) (2.134)  5.966*   0.075    0.001    
Italy   TDC Aug.  0.042 0.070 0.123 4.086*** 0.674*   1.969***  
           1982 (1.788) (1.878) (2.891) 7.783*** 0.278*** 0.193    
          M2 Apr.  0.061 0.121 0.204 5.349*** 0.631*** 2.086**  
           1991  (2.151) (2.741) (2.227) 7.086**  0.275    21.36***  
U.K.    £M3 Jan.  0.080 0.185 0.113 6.391*** 0.245    1.401*    
           1980  (3.329) (3.680) (3.437) 6.463**  0.664    0.142    
          M0 July  10.11 0.513 0.168 3.598**  0.128    1.959*** 
           1986  (2.434) (3.119) (2.610) 5.828*   0.810    1.328    
U.S.A. M1 Jan.  0.114 0.087 0.133 1.156    0.194*** 2.933*** 
           1980 (4.565) (2.427) (3.833) 9.831*** 0.790*** 0.151    
          M2 Jan.  0.087 0.124 0.166 10.99*** 0.657    1.373*    
           1987 (5.785) (5.843) (5.087) 11.55*** 0.251    0.256    
          M3 Sep.  0.042 0.020 0.054 1.151    0.161    1.738*    
           1979 (3.706) (1.240) (3.661) 5.137*   0.829    0.220     
Japan M2 Sep.  0.493 0.427 0.754 1.073    0.615*** 2.300*** 
          CD's 1990 (5.463) (4.781) (2.754) 5.490*   0.371*** 0.101     
Notes: The marginal credibility measures for the overall period (MCT) and the two 
sub-periods (MC1, MC2) are obtained as the coefficients estimates from the 
ordinary least-squares regression (mt-mt t,
*
1
) = c + (mt
a -mt t,
*
1
) + vt, vt  N(0,v
2 ) 
with mt and mt
a  as actual and announced money growth rates and mt t,
*
1
 as the 
optimal multi-process Kalman filter prediction of money growth based on a 
ARIMA(0,2,2) time series model. Refer to Chapter 3 for details of the estimates. 
The numbes in parenthesis below the credibility estimates are t-values (5 percent 
significance level). Estimates above 0.5 indicate credible announcements. The 
timing of the most likely point of structural break is estimated by switching 
regression and judged on the basis of the likelihood-ratio test statistic (-2ln) of 
Quandt (1960). A significant structural break is assumed when the majority of six 
parametric stability tests point towards instability. These stability tests are given 
by the Chow (1960) F-test, the likelihood- ratio test -2ln of Quandt (1960), the 
forward and backward CUSUM-of-squares tests CSF and CSB of Brown, Durbin 
and Evans (1975), the test for heteroscedasticity Hn,m of Goldfeld and Quandt 
(1965) and a heteroscedasticity test Ht,t-k based on a regression of the squared 
residuals from the above equation on the squared fitted values. For details of these 
tests Weber (1990a). 
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likelihood ratio test procedure then identifies the point in time at which the three 
estimated money growth equations differ most from one another. These points in time 
are indicated in Table 4.8, together with the estimated MC credibility measures and a 
number of stability test statistics.
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The main result from Table 4.8 is that highly significant structural breaks, as 
indicated by the majority of stability tests, are found for Germany (CBM), Italy (TDC, 
M0), the United States (M1) and Japan (M2+CD's). It is therefore instructive to 
consider evidence for the G3 countries in more detail. 
 
4.2.1.2.2. Time Paths of the Credibility Measures 
 
The detailed analysis in this section will focus on the G3-countries, Germany, the 
United States and Japan. All three countries have experienced significant breaks in the 
credibility of their commitment to monetary targeting. Also, all three countries 
managed to command some degree of credibility for their monetary targets during the 
1980's and 1990's, but whilst Japan has managed to preserve and even increase the 
credibility of its monetary target announcements, credible target announcements are 
no longer part of the monetary policy stance in Germany or the United States. 
 
Germany  
Table 4.8 indicates that a change in the Bundesbank's commitment to monetary target 
announcements occurred in November 1979, when monetary policy was thightened 
considerably in order to counteract the inflationary impact of the oil price shock. This 
structural break is indicated by both the likelihood ratio test in panel (d) and the Chow 
test in panel (c) of Figure 4.14. In panels (e) and (f) of Figure 4.14 the two Cusum-of-
Squares tests also both cross the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance lines, indicating 
significant structural instability around the year 1979. The heteroscedasticity test 
Hn,m in Table 4.8 furthermore points towards a significant change in the residual 
variance of the equation. Thus, the majority of parametric stability tests identifies 
1979, the year of the onset of the EMS and the second round of oil price shocks, as 
the year in which the German monetary policy stance underwent major significant 
changes. 
What happened to the credibility of monetary targeting? Panel (a) reports the 
recursive estimates of the MC credibility measure (and its standard error band) when 
the sample size is increased period by period, holding fixed the start of the sample. 
For samples prior to 1979 the MC estimate increases and reaches its peak of MC=0.33 
in March 1979. The credibility of monetary target announcements then decline after 
the onset of the EMS, in particular from 1979 to 1981, when CBM growth fluctuated 
around the lower bound of the target corridor. During the EMS disinflation the MC 
credibility measure stabilised at a lower level, as CBM growth for most of the time 
stayed within the target range. The MC credibility estimate then declined again during 
1986 and 1987, when the Bundesbank, on account of two years of massive target 
overshooting, finally terminated CBM targeting. 
The low estimate of the credibility of the Bundesbank's CBM target 
announcements is consistent with Trehan's (1988) finding that the Bundesbank's 
concern over inflation has not bound it to strict adherence to monetary targets, since 
targets  have  been  missed  frequently,  and  that  the  Bundesbank  has thus retained a 
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Figure 4.14. 
Switching Regression Estimates of the Credibility of German Central Bank 
Money Stock Growth Target Announcements (Jan. 1975-Dec. 1987) 
 
(a) MC Forward Estimate   (b) MC Backward Estimate 
    
 
(c) Chow F-Test     (d) -2ln Likelihood Ratio Test 
    
 
(e) Cusum-Squared Forward Test  (f) Cusum-Squared Backward Test 
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considerable level of discretion in the implementation of monetary targeting. 
Furthermore, the credibility of monetary target announcements discussed here has to 
be distinguished from the credibility of the Bundesbank's anti-inflation policy stance. 
The credibility of this anti-inflation commitment is indisputable for most of the pre-
unification period, as has been demonstrated in Weber (1990a, 1991a) and in the 
section 4.1 above. Two possible explanations for the low credibility estimate found 
have been proposed in the literature: Fischer (1988) suggests that the lack of 
credibility could perhaps be due to the fact that the Bundesbank had tolerated too high 
an inflation in the late seventies. This argument is not supported by the above analysis 
of counterinflation reputation. Secondly, the fact that the periods of major target 
misses and subsequent credibility losses are connected to undesired exchange rate 
developments (1978, 1986-1987) is consistent with the view of Gleske (1987), who 
fears that increasingly exchange rate considerations have been given too much weight 
in the formulation and implementation of German monetary policy. The decline of the 
credibility during the entire EMS period strongly supports this view. 
 
The United States. 
For the United States Table 4.8 indicates that the period of the 'monetarist experiment' 
between October 1979 to October 1982 is of major importance with respect to the 
credibility of monetary targeting. Table 4.8 indicates December 1980 to be the most 
likely point of structural break. The likelihood ratio test in panel (d) of Figure 4.15 in 
addition to the policy U-turn in early 1980 also points towards a second, almost 
equally likely break-point in 1982-83. The 1982-83 policy U-turn is also indicated by 
the F-test of Chow (1960), whilst the two Cusum-of-Squares tests CSF and CSB 
definitely favour the 1979 break point. Whatever the exact timing, according to the 
stability tests the implementation of monetary policy underwent significant changes 
during the 1979-83 period. 
The recursive estimate of the credibility of M1 target announcements are 
displayed in panel (a) of Figure 4.15. The estimates are consistent with Axilrod's 
(1985) finding that initially credibility was being eroded by the consistency at which 
M1 growth overshot the target ranges. In October 1979 this downward trend of the 
credibility of M1 announcements is brought to a halt by the Fed's adoption of a more 
monetarist policy stance with strict adherence to M1 targets. At precisely the time of 
this policy U-turn the estimate of the credibility of M1 target announcements is found 
to have increased between early 1980 and late 1982. This supports Axilrod's (1985) 
assertion that the monetarist experiment of 1979-82 increased the Fed's credibility. 
Furthermore, the estimates show that these credibility effects are minor in the period 
between October 1979 to December 1980, but relatively large in the first half of 1981, 
when the new Reagan administration was elected. This in turn supports Blanchard 
(1984, 1987) view that while monetary disinflation was set in motion under President 
Carter, the role of President Reagan was to give it more credibility. The evidence is 
also in line with the results of Hardouvelis and Barnhart (1987), who find that the 
October 1979 announcement of a policy change did not provide the Federal Reserve 
with instant credibility, but that the Fed established credibility slowly over time, 
apparently after markets began verifying that the new Fed policy was successful. 
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Figure 4.15. 
Switching Regression Estimates of the Credibility of United States M1 Growth 
Target Announcements (Jan. 1975-Dec. 1986) 
 
(a) MC Forward Estimate    (b) MC Backward Estimate 
    
 
(c) Chow F-Test      (d) -2ln Likelihood Ratio Test 
    
 
(e) Cusum-Squared Forward Test   (f) Cusum-Squared Backward Test 
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Figure 4.16. 
Switching Regression Estimation Results for the Credibility of United States M2 
Growth Target Announcements (Jan. 1975-July 1993) 
 
(a) MC Forward Estimate  (b) MC Backward Estimate 
  
 
(c) Chow F-Test    (d) -2ln Likelihood Ratio Test 
  
 
(e) Cusum-Squared Forward Test (f) Cusum-Squared Backward Test 
  
Chapter 4 123 
In October 1982 the Fed announced its decision to abandon its monetarist 
policy stance, and to de-emphasise M1 in favour of the broader monetary aggregates, 
M2 and M3. The estimate of the credibility of M1 target announcements subsequently 
declined until M1, due to its apparent instability, was abolished as a formal monetary 
target in late 1986. The evidence reported here is thus consistent with Hardouvelis and 
Barnhart (1987), who suspected but found no evidence on credibility effects arising 
from the 1982 policy shift. 
Interestingly, the credibility of M2 target announcements, displayed in panel 
(a) of Figure 4.16, increased continuously throughout 1979-87. Table 4.8 and the 
Chow and likelihood ratio tests in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4.9 point towards a 
structural break in the commitment towards M2 targeting in January 1987, precisely 
when M1 targets were abolished. Thereafter the credibility of M2 target 
announcements declined. This provides some tentative support for the view of Loeys 
(1984), Friedman (1985), Goodfriend (1986) and Blanchard (1987) that possibly after 
1982, but definitely after 1987, the Fed did not replace M1 targets by M2 or M3 
targets, but shifted from monetary targeting to its pre-1979 practice of interest rate 
targeting instead. 
 
Japan 
The highest credibility estimates of all G7-countries have been found for Japanese 
M2+CD's targeting. In recent years credibility exceeded 50 percent, indicating that 
these announcements are an important factor in the public's assessment of the Bank of 
Japan's monetary policy stance.  
Table 4.8 indicates that the steep decline in money growth in September 
1990 presents a possible structural break. This is also indicated by the Chow test and 
the likelihood ratio test in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4.17. However, both test 
statistics in Table 4.8 are not significant at the 5 percent level, whilst the two Cusum-
of-squares tests CSF and CSB in panels (e) and (f) of Figure 4.17 are. These 
conflicting tests therefore provide no clear evidence of structural instability in the case 
of Japan. 
In panel (a) of Figure 4.17 the credibility estimate initially increases during 
1981-82 and remains relatively stable at a high level between 1982 and 1987. 
Credibility declines slightly between 1987 and 1991, bur rises again thereafter. All in 
all, the estimates obtained here are consistent with the finding of Fisher (1988) that 
the Bank of Japan clearly had achieved credibility during the 1980's. The Bank of 
Japan typically achieved rates of growth close to its projections,
12
 thereby enhancing 
credibility. Until 1985 this credibility was not undermined by the Bank of Japan's 
increasing concern over the exchange rate. However, after September 1985,
13
 as the 
Bank of Japan massively intervened in foreign exchange markets, there was some 
minor decline in the credibility. However, after the pre-announced steep decline in the 
growth rates of M2+CD's in 1991 the credibility of the Bank of Japan has recently 
started to rise again. 
To summarise, the Japanese monetary policy stance with fairly accurate and 
relatively frequent (quarterly instead of annual) monetary target announcements 
appears to have been successful in commanding credibility. The remaining G7-
countries, and in particular France, Italy and the United Kingdom, have largely failed 
to achieve a similar degree of credibility for their statements of monetary policy 
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Figure 4.17. 
Switching Regression Estimation Results for the Credibility of Japanese 
M2+CD's Growth Target Announcements (July 1980-July 1993) 
 
(a) MC Forward Estimate   (b) MC Backward Estimate 
  
 
(c) Chow F-Test     (d) -2ln Likelihood Ratio Test 
  
 
(e) Cusum-Squared Forward Test  (f) Cusum-Squared Backward Test 
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intentions. Monetary targeting in these countries has exhibited a large degree of 
discontinuity, which is a serious obstacle to establishing credibility. These European 
countries also had only limited success in achieving their monetary targets, but so also 
did the Germany and the United States. In view of the volatile history and limited 
success of monetary targeting in G7-countries, the low credibility estimates are hardly 
surprising. 
Why then did central banks so uniformly fail to establish credibility through 
monetary target announcements? One possible explanation is 'Goodhart's law', a 
modification of the 'Lucas critique'. It asserts that the attempt to control the supply of 
any monetary aggregate destabilises its demand. This argument has frequently been 
mentioned in connection with the target switches of the Bank of England, the Banque 
de France, the Bundesbank and the Fed. An alternative explanation is that central 
banks during the 1980's had practically given up monetary targeting, but preferred to 
keep monetary growth target announcements as some fix-points, even if they overshot 
them. De Boissieu (1988) explains this by stating that the loss of credibility would 
have been greater in the case of the abolition of monetary target announcements than 
it would be with overshooting. The logic of the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) 
model, as well as the estimates reported above, do not support this view: target 
overshooting reduces credibility, and massive target misses result in low and 
insignificant credibility estimates. Indeed, under these circumstances, monetary target 
announcements no longer provide the public with useful information, and might just 
as well be abolished. 
 
 
4.2.2. The Credibility of Exchange Rate Target Announcements 
 
If money targeting is not particularly credible, how could reputation be improved? 
The borrowing reputation hypothesis of Giavazzi and Giovannini (1987) or Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1988) suggests that credible exchange rate pegging may increase 
counterinflation reputation. For example, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989) argue that 
France and Italy joined the EMS on the belief that exchange rate targets are more 
credible than monetary targets, maybe because violations are more conspicuous. This 
clearly motivates the attempt of the following section to measure the credibility of 
official exchange rate target announcements. Before turning to the credibility 
estimates, however, it is instructive to again take a closer look at the data. 
 
4.2.2.1. Experiences with Exchange Rate Targeting 
 
Figure 4.18 displays the time-paths of the bilateral nominal exchange rate indices 
(March 1979 = 100) of EMS currencies relative to the German mark. With the 
exception of some wavering in late 1980, the German mark clearly was the 'hard 
currency' of the EMS since all currencies depreciated relative to it. Figure 4.18 also 
identifies three groups of EMS currencies: first comes the Dutch guilder, which has 
remained quite stable vis-a-vis the mark; second, the Italian lira exchange rate 
exhibited a sharp downward trend throughout the whole EMS period; finally, the 
French franc, Belgian franc, Danish krona and Irish pound switched, at various points 
in time between late 1982 and early 1987, from a trend of successive devaluations to 
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Figure 4.18. 
Nominal German Mark Exchange Rates 
 
(a) EMS Period, Initial ERM Participants, Index (1979 M3=100) 
 
 
(b) EMS Period, Remaining EC Countries, Index (1979 M3=100) 
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level pegging. Throughout this period, all the currencies in this last group, with the 
French Franc clearly being the weakest prior to 1993, experienced similar patterns of 
devaluation vis-a-vis the mark. 
Trend devaluations against the mark were not limited to the initial members 
of the ERM club. Panel (b) of Figure 4.18 shows that all remaining EC countries, in 
particular Greece, but also Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, which joined the 
ERM at later stages, also experienced very substantial declines in their German mark 
exchange rate. 
As shown in panel (a) of Figure 4.19 the Nordic EFTA countries, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, which adopted unilateral exchange rate target zones with 
respect to a basket of currencies, have shared a similar fate. In Switzerland and 
Austria, on the other hand, there has been a slight appreciation vis-a-vis the mark, and 
they have maintained relatively stable exchange rates. It is interesting to note that 
despite not having a formal exchange rate agreement with Germany, Austria has 
managed to stabilise its German mark exchange rate to a degree which outperforms 
even the Dutch ERM exchange rate stabilisation. The pattern of exchange rate 
developments with respect to the non-European G7 countries, displayed in panel (b) 
of Figure 4.19, is distinctly different. Amongst these countries the United States and 
Canada have experienced huge exchange rate swings vis-a-vis the German mark, 
whilst the Japanese yen underwent a substantial trend appreciation. 
The above mentioned similarity in the behaviour of the German mark 
exchange rates of European countries is not unique for the EMS system, it already 
existed under both the Bretton Woods system and the European currency snake 
arrangement, as shown in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4.20. In all three post-war 
exchange rate regimes the German mark provided a hard-currency stance, and the 
Dutch guilder remained most stable wirt respect to the mark. The remaining initial 
ERM member countries experienced devaluations of various degrees against the 
mark, with the French franc once more being the weakest currency amongst those 
participating in both pre-EMS exchange rate regimes. However, those countries 
adhering to the snake system (France, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands) 
managed to avoid the huge devaluations vis-a-vis the mark which were experienced 
by Italy, Ireland and the United Kingdom after the collapse of Bretton Woods. 
In Weber (1991a) the above pattern of exchange rate movements is 
interpreted as informal evidence for a bi-polar working of the EMS, as opposed to the 
'DM-zone' view held by Giavazzi and Giovannini (1987) or Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1988). The 'bi-polarity' hypothesis of the EMS states that after some short initial 
transition phase the EMS has functioned as a bipolar system with a 'hard currency' 
option offered by the German Bundesbank and a 'soft currency' option supplied by the 
Banque de France. Whilst the Netherlands almost from the onset of the EMS have 
been committed to the 'hard currency' option, the 'soft currency' alternative has played 
an important role for the remaining small EMS economies, Belgium, Denmark and 
Ireland, at least during most of the deflation period 1983-86. In Figure 4.21 this is 
exemplified by the relative stability of the French franc exchange rates of these 
countries during the disinflation period. However, Weber (1991a) shows that in the 
last few years prior to 1990 this 'soft currency' bloc of the EMS has disintegrated and 
some countries, in particular Ireland and to a lesser extent France, have shifted 
towards the 'hard currency' standard of the Bundesbank, which  itself  has mellowed 
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Figure 4.19. 
Nominal German Mark Exchange Rates 
 
(a) EMS Period, EFTA Countries, Index (1979 M3=100) 
 
 
(b) EMS Period, Non-ERM G7 Countries, Index (1979 M3=100) 
 
Chapter 4 129 
Figure 4.20. 
Nominal German Mark Exchange Rates 
 
(a) Bretton Woods Period, Index (1957 M1=100) 
 
 
(b) European Currency Snake Period, Index (1972 M4=100) 
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Figure 4.21. 
Nominal French Franc Exchange Rates 
 
(a) European Currency Snake Period, Index (1972 M4=100) 
 
 
 
(b) EMS Period, Index (1972 M4=100) 
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somewhat. The fact remains that by 1990 the EMS was far from being a system of 
credibly pegged DM exchange rates. The following section therefore aims at 
providing new evidence on whether and to what extent the most recent events have 
changed the credibility of exchange rate targeting. 
The problem with the post-1990 period is that, with the possible exception of 
Belgium, fostering exchange rate credibility was not the prime policy objective of 
ERM countries. Rather, the Delors plan for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
shifted the political agenda more towards the fiscal convergence criteria, largely 
ignoring the problems and implications of the nominal convergence and exchange rate 
stability criteria in the face of the emerging massive German unification shock: 
Germany's temporarily diverging inflation performance, which was discussed in detail 
in section 4.1, made further monetary and inflation convergence undesirable for most 
ERM member countries. The present study argues that, as a result, the bipolar 
working of the EMS was reinforced rather than eliminated, although now the 'soft 
currency' option was supplied by the Germans whilst the French provided the 'hard 
currency' stance. The popular press at the time frequently made references to this 
reversed bipolarity by using the terms "Franc forte" one the one side and 
"Bundesbanque" on the other. This play on words simply reflects the fact that in the 
late EMS period pegging to the German mark no longer necessarily provided a 
disinflationary bias, at least not in the short run. On the contrary, borrowing 
Bundesbank credibility has involved the serious risk of an imported temporary 
inflationary bias. This has seriously undermined the commitment of ERM central 
banks towards exclusively targeting their respective DM exchange rates, due to 
German post-unification reflation. As German monetary policy turned extremely 
restrictive during 1992 and deflation was brought on its way, the commitment of 
ERM countries to follow this restrictive move amid emerging recessions came again 
under question. Massive speculative attacks on the Italian lira and the British pound 
during the ERM crisis in September 1992 and repeated attacks on many of the 
remaining ERM currencies during the following nine month finally resulted in the fall 
of the system in August 1993. 
 
4.2.2.2. Estimates of the Credibility of Exchange Rate Target Announcements 
 
The implication of the above interpretation of the history of exchange rate movements 
in the EMS is that the 'DM-zone' or 'borrowing credibility' view is unwarranted. 
Rather, owing to the co-existence of a 'hard currency' and a 'soft currency' option, 
which allowed for a crawling peg vis-a-vis the German mark, the EMS did not 
automatically imply a counterinflation bias. In principle the smaller EMS countries, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, were free to choose between the two 
options: credibly pegging to the German mark allowed countries to share German 
counterinflation reputation, but not credibly pegging to the German mark created 
some room for monetary autonomy and less steeper disinflations. The credibility of 
exchange rate pegging policies, to be confirmed below by harder evidence, is a key 
issue in understanding why disinflations in the EMS have been slower and less than 
complete for so many years. It also explains why divergence has occurred. The 
following section also argues that for the smaller EMS countries the credibility of 
exchange rate pegging policies and the existence of an external anchor may also play 
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a vital role in understanding why inflation emerged to such vastly differing degrees 
after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 
 
4.2.2.2.1. Exchange Rate Credibility Across Exchange Rate Regimes. 
 
Panel (a) of Figure 4.22 presents the average credibility (AC) estimates for a 
comparison of Bretton Woods with the European snake system and the EMS. The AC 
measure reflects the average deviation (in percentage points) of exchange rate 
projections from official parity announcements. The smaller this projected bias in the 
parity announcement, the higher is average exchange rate credibility. One result 
stands out: only the Dutch guilder exchange rate with respect to the mark is higher 
under the EMS than under either the Bretton Woods or the snake system. All 
remaining exchange rate pegs command less credibility when compared with Bretton 
Woods, and in the case of the 'wide band' participants of the ERM, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, the loss in exchange rate credibility is substantial. 
Panel (b) of Figure 4.22 presents the marginal credibility (MC) estimates. As 
indicated above, the MC measure is best viewed as the proportion (in percentage 
points) by which exchange rate projections are influenced by official parity 
announcements.
14
 A natural benchmark for judging credibility is MC equal to 50 
percent: below that level announcements are dominated by other factors. Two main 
results emerge. First, if exchange rate fixity was mostly credible under both the 
Bretton Woods system (23 out of 27 MCs exceed 50%) and within the European 
currency snake system (8 cases out of 10), that is not the case under the EMS 
arrangement (only 7 out of 21 MCs are above 50%) Second, the MC measure reveals 
that the credibility of the exchange rate commitment has generally declined, in many 
cases significantly, in the EMS relative to the Bretton Woods or the European snake 
system. 
Both results may be explained by the higher degree of exchange rate 
flexibility in the EMS, as reflected by the wider fluctuation margins of 2.25 percent 
as compared to 1 percent under the Bretton Woods system or 1.125 percent under 
the European currency snake system. The results also may be partly attributed to the 
fact that the EMS exhibited both a much higher frequency and size of parity 
realignments than the Bretton Woods system. In any case, the results indicate that 
amongst the historical post-war systems of fixed but adjustable exchange rates the 
EMS was the least credible system. 
 
4.2.2.2.2. Hard and Soft Currency Options 
 
Does this imply that the EMS did not provide a bonus for disinflation 'credibility '? To 
answer this question the overall EMS period (Mar. 1979-July 1993) has been split into 
three sub-periods (Mar.1979-Feb.1983, Mar.1983-Dec.1989, Jan.1990-July 1993). 
The resulting estimates of the MC and AC credibility measures are presented in 
panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4.23. The key result from Figure 4.23 is that the EMS has 
not functioned as a 'DM-zone'. Instead, the EMS is found to have operated as a 
bipolar system in which the French franc offered a 'soft currency' alternative to the 
'hard currency' option of the German mark. With the exception of the Netherlands, 
which was almost from the onset of the EMS committed to the 'hard currency' option, 
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Figure 4.22. 
Exchange Rate Credibility Across Regimes.  
Bretton Woods Period versus Snake/EMS Period  
 
(a) AC Credibility Estimates (in %) 
 
 
(b) MC Credibility Estimates (in %) 
 
Key to symbols: g = Germany, f = France, i = Italy, n = Netherlands, b = Belgium, 
d = Denmark, e = Ireland, u = United Kingdom,  
bilateral rates are indicated by the combination of these symbols 
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the 'soft currency' option appears to have played an important role for the remaining 
smaller EMS economies (Belgium, Denmark and Ireland), at least in the early stages 
of the EMS. Panel (a) of Figure 4.23 clearly indicates the existence of a 'soft currency' 
bloc with France at its centre. Exchange rates in this 'soft currency' bloc of the EMS 
were credibly pegged, as is reflected by the high credibility estimates in both pre-1990 
periods for the French franc exchange rates of Belgium (fb), Ireland (fe), Denmark 
(fd) and for the bilateral rates between these economies (be, de). Weber (1990) shows 
that these close French franc linkages of Denmark (fd) and Ireland (fe) and to a lesser 
extent of Belgium (fb), dissolve after 1987. For the post-1990 sample the process is in 
part reversed. Belgium now clearly drifts away from the former 'soft currency' bloc 
and strongly increases the credibility of its commitment to pegging to the German 
mark and the Dutch guilder, as can be seen on the left-hand side of Figure 4.23. The 
German-Dutch exchange rate link has an outstanding and almost perfect credibility in 
the post-1990 period. It is therefore not surprising that this exchange rate link is the 
only bilateral link which survived the ERM crisis of 1992-93 without having to 
abolish the narrow band of 2.25 percent. The remaining smaller EMS countries have 
also managed to gain credibility in their commitment to targeting the German mark, 
whilst similar gains are not to be found for France and Italy. Note that this result 
strikingly resembles the result obtained in section 4.1 with respect to gaining 
counterinflation reputation. Given the German reflation in excess of French inflation 
rates in the post-unification period, it is furthermore not surprising that France has not 
increased its commitment to pegging to the German mark. The same situation may 
also explain why Denmark and Ireland have re-iterated their commitment to the 
French franc in the post-1990 period. 
Additional evidence on the existence of a 'soft currency' bloc during the EMS 
disinflation period is provided on the right-hand side of Figure 4.23 by the steep 
decline of the credibility of exchange rates targeting between the members of former 
'snake' bloc: the initially relatively credible exchange rate pegs of Belgium and 
Denmark vis-a-vis Germany (gb,gd) and the Netherlands (nb,nd) become extremely 
non-credible as Belgium and Denmark switch to the 'soft currency' option of the EMS. 
The terms 'soft currency' option and 'French franc' zone are, however, not to be 
interpreted too literally. These labels do not mean to imply that EMS countries 
explicitly targeted their French franc exchange rate. Rather, the overriding objective 
of countries in this 'soft currency' bloc, like France, has been to implement 
disinflations which were less drastic than they would have been with level-pegging to 
the German mark, which in turn implies that their currencies shared the common fate 
of occasional devaluation and thus mimicked the French franc.
15
  
The growing importance of the 'hard currency' option of the EMS may also 
be illustrated by referring to Figure 4.23: it is signalled by the increasingly credible 
commitments of all smaller EMS countries towards the German mark (gn, ge, gd, gb), 
in particular in the post-1990 period of the EMS. The outstanding credibility of the 
Dutch-German (gn) exchange rate peg is equally obvious, irrespective of whether it is 
evaluated on the basis of the AC or the MC credibility measure. In both cases the 
Dutch-German exchange rate link is close to being perfect in the late EMS period. 
This result suggests that both countries are already relatively close to a de facto 
monetary union, which also explains why this exchange rate link survived the 1992-
93 ERM crisis without problems.  The step toward Economic and Monetary Union 
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Figure 4.23. 
Exchange Rate Credibility Across EMS Periods  
 
(a) AC Credibility Estimates (in %) 
 
 
 
(b) MC Credibility Estimates (in %) 
 
Key to symbols: g = Germany, f = France, i = Italy, n = Netherlands, b = Belgium, 
d = Denmark, e = Ireland, u = United Kingdom,  
bilateral rates are indicated by the combination of these symbols 
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with irrevocably fixed exchange rates and hence perfectly credible pegs, as envisaged 
in stage 3 of the Delors plan, may further involve only minor credibility gains for the 
Netherlands. 
Finally, panel (b) of Figure 4.23 reveals that the exchange rate commitment 
of the Banca d'Italia is not credible (in the sense of MC 0.5) for any of the cases 
reported. The post-1990 narrow bands of 2.25 percent for the lira have failed to 
command more credibility than the formerly wide bands of 6 percent. This low 
credibility is in general also confirmed by the AC credibility measures in panel (a) of 
Figure 4.23, but here some evidence of increasingly credible pegs relative to all EMS 
countries are found owing to the narrower bands. 
 
4.2.2.2.3. Time-paths of the Credibility Estimates 
 
So far it has been established that the EMS initially worked as a bipolar system with a 
'hard' and a 'soft' currency option and that policy switches between these options 
appear to have occurred. In trying to understand the importance of exchange rate 
credibility for the EMS disinflations, it is necessary to analyse the timing of the policy 
shifts in the commitment of central banks to targeting their exchange rates. 
According to the 'Lucas-critique' the structural parameters of a model change 
whenever the policy is changed. Thus, U-turns in exchange rate policies should show 
up in the credibility measures. The estimates reported below search for the most likely 
point in time at which such a policy shift may have occurred. Econometrically this is 
done by applying 'switching regression' analysis, which has been discussed in detail in 
the context of monetary target announcements above. Table 4.9 reports the evidence 
from this exercise for the EMS period, whilst Table 4.10 produces similar evidence 
from a longer sample for those countries which participated in both the snake and 
EMS arrangement. 
Summarising this evidence, it can be stated that two major periods of change 
in the EMS are identified. The early period of change is between the realignments of 
June 1982 and March 1983, when the initially relatively credible pegs between the 
former 'snake' participants Germany and the Netherlands on the one side and Belgium 
and Denmark on the other side dissolve. At this time the 'soft currency' bloc with 
France at its centre and the 'hard currency' bloc linked to Germany are established. 
The second major period of change in the EMS lies between the realignment of April 
1986 and the Basle-Nyborg Agreement of September 1987. 
The timing of the first round of policy switches, which established the 
bipolar operating characteristics of the EMS, is also indicated in the Table 4.9 for a 
longer sample period, which includes data from the European currency snake period 
and the EMS period. A striking feature of these estimates is that all policy shifts 
occurred between the two realignments of June 1982 (gd,gn,nb) and March 1983 
(gb,nd,bd). The formerly credible commitments to relatively fixed exchange rates 
between the three smaller 'snake' participants, in particular the tight Benelux linkages, 
declines drastically. Furthermore, whilst the Belgian and Danish monetary authorities 
dissolved their DM pegs, the Dutch central bank after October 1982 moved towards 
credibly pegging the guilder to the German mark. This fact is also obvious from panel 
(b) of Figure 4.24. This evidence is consistent with the fact that towards the end of 
1981  De  Nederlandsche  Bank  abolished  target  announcements  for  the  national 
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Table 4.9. 
Switching Regression Estimation Results for the Credibility of Official 
Exchange Rate Announcements 
(Mar. 1979-July 1993) 
 
Country 
 
Rate 
break-
point 
MCT 
t(MCT) 
MC1 
t(MC1) 
MC2 
t(MC2) 
Chow F 
-2ln 
CSF 
CSB 
Hn,m 
H1,t-k 
Germany-France Sep.     0.448 0.556 0.504 14.901*** 0.722* 3.863***  
          1987    (11.58) (11.09) (5.104) 32.470*** 0.128*** 39.654***  
Germany-Italy July    0.204 0.252 0.095 1.877 0.832*** 6.449***  
          1985    (5.468) (4.223) (2.222) 35.454*** 0.145*** 24.498***  
Germany-Netherl. Oct.    0.414 0.226 0.766 13.564*** 0.444*** 3.247***  
          1982    (7.126) (2.254) (10.71) 27.293*** 0.417*** 19.034***  
Germany-Belgium Mar.    0.446 0.575 0.102 30.159*** 0.500*** 5.510***  
          1983    (11.47) (9.242) (2.457) 51.333*** 0.237*** 473.03***  
Germany-Denmark Mar.    0.299 0.491 0.132 10.735*** 0.398*** 3.136***  
          1982    (7.530) (5.683) (3.023) 20.073*** 0.489*** 55.266***  
Germany-Ireland June    0.516 0.363 0.795 20.598*** 0.600 2.872***  
          1986    (11.71) (5.943) (17.02) 30.164*** 0.204*** 80.654***  
France-Italy Jan.    0.221 0.257 0.096 1.589 0.847*** 4.523***  
          1987    (5.279) (4.508) (1.850) 23.446*** 0.133*** 22.932***  
France-Netherl. Apr.    0.466 0.655 0.347 15.909*** 0.232*** 2.560***  
          1986    (11.57) (17.04) (4.200) 24.895*** 0.609 12.473***  
France-Belgium Nov.    0.390 0.796 0.109 81.316*** 0.315*** 1.404*    
          1986    (8.955) (16.53) (1.811) 54.242*** 0.195*** 243.68***  
France-Denmark May    0.579 0.810 0.390 12.148*** 0.292 1.235  
          1983    (12.85) (11.94) (7.069) 11.297*** 0.583* 18.031***  
France-Ireland Sep.    0.598 0.734 0.637 19.050*** 0.597 1.860***  
          1987    (15.15) (13.71) (11.15) 21.566*** 0.219*** 46.533***  
Italy-Netherl. Apr.    0.182 0.166 0.659 4.744*** 0.882 1.493     
          1991    (5.026) (4.555) (4.120) 7.852** 0.062 6.021**   
Italy-Belgium Oct.     0.222 0.307 0.199 8.146*** 0.703** 2.641***  
          1986    (5.698) (5.656) (3.444) 16.092*** 0.204*** 188.23***  
Italy-Denmark July    0.172 0.208 0.122 0.849 0.730*** 2.333***  
          1986    (4.490) (3.618) (2.654) 6.798** 0.259*** 11.872***  
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                 Table 4.9 continued 
 
Country 
 
Rate 
break
-point 
MCT 
t(MCT) 
MC1 
t(MC1) 
MC2 
t(MC2) 
Chow F 
-2ln 
CSF 
CSB 
Hn,m 
H1,t-k 
Italy-Ireland Sep.    0.236 0.354 0.088 5.591*** 0.801*** 4.738***  
       1986    (5.266) (5.06) (2.072) 25.143*** 0.133*** 30.503***  
Netherl.-Belgium May    0.458 0.725 0.164 56.908*** 0.170* 1.426     
       1982    (11.29) (14.91) (3.623) 42.897*** 0.428*** 327.54***  
Netherl.-Denmark Feb.    0.355 0.566 0.135 17.400*** 0.192 1.234     
       1983    (9.109) (11.73) (2.537) 16.349*** 0.638 43.160***  
Netherl.-Ireland June    0.538 0.326 0.806 25.062*** 0.471 1.531**   
          1986    (12.82) (6.032) (16.13) 24.967*** 0.300*** 129.85***  
Belgium-Denmark Dec.    0.271 0.682 0.171 47.823*** 0.310** 1.060     
          1985   (6.280) (11.78) (3.022) 37.209*** 0.329*** 219.50***  
Belgium-Ireland Feb.    0.643 0.770 0.663 50.196*** 0.456*** 1.223  
          1990    (15.16) (19.69) (8.240) 40.543*** 0.172 115.90***  
Denmark-Ireland Feb.    0.624 0.661 0.689 7.529*** 0.598 1.128     
         1988   (16.88) (14.83) (9.837) 13.268*** 0.320 49.185***  
Notes: The marginal credibility measures for the overall period (MCT) and the two 
sub-periods (MC1, MC2) are obtained as the coefficients estimates from the 
ordinary least-squares regression (t- t t,
*
1
) = c + ( t
a - t t,
*
1
) + vt, vt  N(0, v
2 ) with 
t and  t
a
 as actual and announced exchange rates and  t t,
*
1 as the optimal multi-
process Kalman filter prediction of thel excahnge rate based on a ARIMA(0,2,2) 
time series model. Refer to Chapter 3 for details of the estimates. The numbes in 
parenthesis below the credibility estimates are t-values (5 percent significance 
level). Estimates above 0.5 indicate credible announcements. The timing of the 
most likely point of structural break is estimated by switching regression and 
judged on the basis of the likelihood-ratio test statistic (-2ln) of Quandt (1960). A 
significant structural break is assumed when the majority of six parametric stability 
tests point towards instability. These stability tests are given by the Chow (1960) F-
test, the likelihood- ratio test -2ln of Quandt (1960), the forward and backward 
CUSUM-of-squares tests CSF and CSB of Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975), the 
test for heteroscedasticity Hn,m of Goldfeld and Quandt (1965) and a 
heteroscedasticity test Ht,t-k based on a regression of the squared residuals from the 
above equation on the squared fitted values. For details of these tests Weber 
(1990a). 
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Table 4.10. 
Switching Regression Estimation Results for the Credibility of Official 
Exchange Rate Announcements (Apr. 1972-July 1993) 
 
Exchange Rate 
break
-point 
MCT 
t(MCT) 
MC1 
t(MC1) 
MC2 
t(MC2) 
Chow F 
-2ln 
CSF 
CSB 
Hn,m 
H1,t-k 
Germany-Netherl. Oct.    0.268 0.201 0.766 14.517*** 0.636*** 3.583***  
          1982   (6.886) (3.881) (10.71) 36.320*** 0.247*** 8.754***  
Germany-Belgium Mar.    0.332 0.376 0.102 8.646*** 0.763*** 5.913***  
          1983    (9.977) (7.656) (2.457) 46.457*** 0.164*** 775.73***  
Germany-Denmark Nov.    0.300 0.339 0.205 2.707* 0.626*** 5.120***  
          1979    (8.689) (4.688) (5.249) 32.853*** 0.350*** 19.759***  
Netherl.-Belgium Sep.    0.450 0.598 0.135 31.197*** 0.439 1.835***  
          1982   (12.70) (13.24) (2.894) 32.071*** 0.339*** 435.47***  
Netherl.-Denmark Mar.    0.425 0.555 0.144 13.703*** 0.596** 2.578***  
          1983    (11.60) (10.29) (2.862) 23.756*** 0.293*** 24.58***  
Belgium-Denmark Mar     0.337 0.572 0.087 25.180*** 0.509 2.125***  
          1983    (8.859) (10.06) (1.961) 30.133*** 0.304*** 158.67***  
Notes: The marginal credibility measures for the overall period (MCT) and the two 
sub-periods (MC1, MC2) are obtained as the coefficients estimates from the 
ordinary least-squares regression (t- t t,
*
1
) = c + ( t
a - t t,
*
1
) + vt, vt  N(0,) with t 
and  t
a  as actual and announced exchange rates and  t t,
*
1
 as the optimal multi-
process Kalman filter prediction of thel excahnge rate based on a ARIMA(0,2,2) 
time series model. Refer to Chapter 3 for details of the estimates. The numbes in 
parenthesis below the credibility estimates are t-values (5 percent significance 
level). Estimates above 0.5 indicate credible announcements. The timing of the 
most likely point of structural break is estimated by switching regression and 
judged on the basis of the likelihood-ratio test statistic (-2ln) of Quandt (1960). A 
significant structural break is assumed when the majority of six parametric 
stability tests point towards instability. These stability tests are given by the Chow 
(1960) F-test, the likelihood- ratio test -2ln of Quandt (1960), the forward and 
backward CUSUM-of-squares tests CSF and CSB of Brown, Durbin and Evans 
(1975), the test for heteroscedasticity Hn,m of Goldfeld and Quandt (1965) and a 
heteroscedasticity test Ht,t-k based on a regression of the squared residuals from 
the above equation on the squared fitted values. For details of these tests Weber 
(1990a). 
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liquidity ratio (M2 / net national product) in favour of gearing monetary policy 
towards a stable German mark exchange rate target. 
Evidence on more recent policy shifts and the new tendency of the EMS to 
converge to a 'hard currency' option is provided in Table 4.9: significant policy shifts 
towards credible German mark exchange rate policies occurred for Ireland in June 
1986, two months prior to the large unilateral devaluation (-8%) of the Irish pound in 
the EMS. For the French franc a break is detected in September 1987, the month of 
the Basle-Nyborg Agreement of the EMS.  
The Irish policy shift occurred during a period of policy consolidation, as 
Dornbusch (1989) notes. It was initiated by the weakness of the Irish pound in the 
EMS, which was largely due to the Irish loss in competitiveness as a result of the 
sharp depreciation of the British pound, the currency of a major Irish trading partner. 
The fact that the credibility estimates of the Irish Pound exchange rate relative to both 
the German mark and the Dutch guilder increased significantly after the policy shift 
supports the view of Dornbusch (1989) that the Irish pound recently has become one 
of the hard EMS currencies. 
France is also found to have increased its commitment to credibly pegging 
the exchange rate relative to the German mark. However, this effect is not obvious 
from Table 4.9 for the most likely break-point, which is highly significant according 
to all stability tests A closer look at the switching regression results for France in 
Figure 4.25, however, clearly reveals the French credibility gains. Panel (b) reports 
the MC credibility estimate for the French-German exchange rate link when holding 
fixed the sample endpoint and successively deleting observations from the beginning 
of the sample. The MC measure initially declines until March 1983, and then remains 
relatively stable over the disinflation period. During 1987 the French franc exchange 
rate target vis-a-vis the German mark increases, and stabilises at a higher level. 
Additional credibility gains arise in mid-1990 and in late-1991. The fact that most 
credibility gains materialise in the aftermath of the Basle-Nyborg Agreement of 
September 1987, which expanded the role of inframarginal interventions and allowed 
for a wider use of the fluctuation bands, suggests that the enhanced credibility may 
partly be attributed to the existence of better control procedures.  
Finally, the credibility of the Italian central bank's commitment to fixed 
exchange rates vis-a-vis Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland is found to 
have decreased significantly after the large unilateral devaluation of the Lira in July 
1985 and during mid-1986. As noted above, the move to narrower bands in January 
1990 did not establish credibility. This suggests that Italy in fact never played by the 
rules of the EMS. 
To summarise, the credibility of the commitment of central banks to 
targeting the exchange rate varies considerably between EMS countries. Almost 
perfect exchange rate credibility is found only for the Dutch-German exchange rate 
link, which is the only exchange rate that survived the recent EMS crisis within the 
old narrow bands of 2.25 percent. In August 1993 all other EMS countries moved to 
targeting their bilateral exchange rates within much wider bands of 15 percent, and 
Italy suspended its EMS membership in September 1992. The credibility estimates 
indicate a substantial lack of exchange rate credibility already prior to these events: 
Italy is found to have possessed almost no credibility, and for many of the remaining 
EMS countries exchange rate credibility in early 1992 lagged considerably behind that  
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Figure 4.24. 
Switching Regression Estimation Results for the Credibility of Dutch DM 
Exchange Rate Targeting Policies Across Exchange Rate Regimes  
(Feb. 1957-Aug. 1993) 
 
(a) MC Forward Estimate    (b) MC Backward Estimate 
      
 
(c) Chow F-Test      (d) -2ln Likelihood Ratio Test 
    
 
(e) Cusum-Squared Forward Test   (f) Cusum-Squared Backward Test 
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Figure 4.25. 
Switching Regression Estimation Results for the Credibility of French DM 
Exchange Rate Targeting Policies During the EMS Period  
(Mar. 1979-July 1993) 
 
(a) MC Forward Estimate   (b) MC Backward Estimate 
     
 
(c) Chow F-Test     (d) -2ln Likelihood Ratio Test 
     
 
(e) Cusum-Squared Forward Test  (f) Cusum-Squared Backward Test 
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of the Dutch-German rate. This fact may explain why speculative attacks occurred. In 
order to analyse this point, it is instructive to study the behaviour of interest rates, in 
particular their differential movements between EMS countries, which will be 
discussed in the section below. 
 
 
4.2.3. The Credibility of Interest Rate Target Announcements 
 
Given that for many countries both monetary quantity targeting and exchange rate 
targeting appears to have faced serious credibility problems, the other major candidate 
for implementing credible monetary policies is interest rate targeting. A closer look at 
monetary policy actions in EMS economies
16
 reveals that the central banks of the 
smaller EMS member states, in particular of the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland, 
have predominantly resorted to such interest rate targeting policies, as reflected, for 
example, by official discount rate changes. It has been argued above that such interest 
rate targeting policies may have been adopted as an operational procedure to control 
the exchange rate. This view, formalised in chapter 2, assumes that foreign interest 
rates combined with projections of potential exchange rate movements within the 
band can be translated into a target for the domestic interest rate. This type of policy 
may have taken two forms. First, countries may have targeted domestic market 
interest rates indirectly by setting official interest rates, such as discount rates or 
lombard rates, in accordance with official interest rates in the country with which 
exchange rate stabilisation is desired. Second, central banks may have targeted 
domestic market interest rates more directly in accordance with market interest rates 
in the centre-country by open market operations rather than through discount rate 
policies. Finally, market interest rates may have been targeted by setting official 
interest rates to be consistent with purely domestic policy objectives. The credibility 
estimates will not allow us to differentiate between these three forms of interest rate 
targeting policies, but a closer look at the data will yield some insights with respect to 
this point. 
 
4.2.3.1. The Experience with Interest Rate Targeting 
 
Long-term interest rates in EMS countries have initially risen and diverged 
considerably in the aftermath of the oil price shock in 1979. Panel (a) of Figure 4.26 
further shows that EMS interest rates declined and converged during the disinflation 
period 1981-86. During 1987-90 almost complete convergence of long-run interest 
rates occurs due to a substantial increase of German and Dutch rates to the French 
levels. In the wake of the unification shock German long-term rates decline again 
after late 1990, along with the rates of all remaining EMS countries. Long-term rates 
do not show any great response to the EMS crisis of 1992-1993. 
In panel (b) of Figure 4.26 the behaviour of long-term interest rates in the 
G7-countries outside the EMS shows a similar time-pattern. However, non-EMS 
long-term rates do not converge to a significant extent, and the sizeable interest rate 
differentials provide room for major exchange rate movements. An interesting feature 
is the apparent similarity in long-term rates between Germany and Japan, which have 
both experienced low inflation. 
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Figure 4.26. 
Long-term Government Bond Interest Rates 
 
(a) ERM Participants During EMS Period (% p.a.) 
 
 
 
(b) Non-ERM Participants During EMS Period (% p.a.) 
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Figure 4.27. 
Short-term Interest Rates 
 
(a) ERM Participants During EMS Period (% p.a.) 
 
 
 
(b) Non-ERM Participants During EMS Period (% p.a.) 
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Short-term money market interest rates in panel (a) of Figure 4.27 highlight 
an additional important aspect of the EMS: four EMS sub-periods can be clearly 
identified. During the early EMS (1979-83) highly volatile movements at relatively 
high average levels of interest rates in France, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland reflect 
speculative attacks, which resulted in frequent unilateral realignments. Disinflation, 
capital controls and policy adjustments in the following period (1983-87) reduce this 
volatility drastically and put a downward trend on the average levels of interest rates. 
The third EMS period (1987-92) is initially characterised by relatively parallel 
movements of interest rates and a marked increase of all rates between 1988-1990. 
During 1990-1992 a substantial and almost complete convergence of short-term 
interest rates occurs. The final EMS period is again characterised by highly volatile 
interest rate movements in response to the austerity measures pursued by central 
banks following speculative attacks on their currencies. Belgium and the Netherlands 
were largely immune to these attacks, but Ireland, Denmark and, to a lesser extent 
France, came under heavy pressure. This visual impression of an increasing 
harmonisation of interest rate movements prior to 1990 is also reflected in the average 
correlation between EMS short-term money market interest rates, which initially rose 
only slightly from 0.36 (Mar.1979-Feb.1983) to 0.41 (Mar.1983-Dec.1986), but then 
jumped to 0.63 (Jan.1987-Dec.1989). A similar harmonisation between the non-EMS 
countries in panel (b) of Figure 4.17 cannot be recognised. 
Panel (a) of Figure 4.28 displays EMS discount rates, which exhibit several 
interesting empirical regularities. First, the Netherlands, and more recently Belgium, 
have managed to bring their discount rates closely in to line with German rates. In 
1991, when the Belgian government publicly announced the exchange rate vis-a-vis 
Germany as the prime objective of its new monetary policy stance, it steeply reduced 
the discount rate, which thereafter almost exactly followed the German rate. A similar 
policy shift had been implemented by the Dutch government in late 1981, when it 
gave up the national liquidity ratio as its monetary target in favour of an exchange rate 
target relative to the German mark . Throughout the post-1981 period Dutch discount 
rates very closely kept track of the German rate, and on many occasions both rates 
were changed at the same date. The small and relatively constant interest rate 
differential thereby did not vanish until mid-1992, when both Dutch and Belgian 
discount rates fell below the German discount rate. A second fact from Figure 4.28 is 
that official discount rate differentials did not converge to a significant extent during 
the EMS. Finally, and most importantly, Figure 4.18 indicates a parallel evolution of 
discount rates in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland after mid-1987, 
joined by Denmark in late 1989. The average correlation between EMS and German 
discount rates thereby increases by about 35% (from 0.53 to 0.72) between the 
disinflation and the new inflation period (April 1983 to Dec. 1986 and Jan. 1987 to 
Dec. 1989). These 'Euro-rounds' of discount rate changes, which signal the growing 
attention paid to the German mark target in the late 1980's, support the hypothesis of a 
convergence of the EMS to a 'hard currency' standard. In the post-unification period 
discount rate changes again appear less co-ordinated, signalling some decay in the 
Danish and Irish commitment to the German mark target. 
To summarise, the interest rate data lend some support to the view that the 
bipolarity view of the EMS: the striking similarity in the movement of German and 
Dutch interest rates points towards the existence of a 'small DM-zone', which recently 
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Figure 4.28. 
Official Discount Rates 
 
(a) ERM Participants During EMS Period (% p.a.) 
 
 
 
(b) Non-ERM Participants During EMS Period (% p.a.) 
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has been joined by Belgium. The currencies of these 'hard currency' club did not come 
under huge speculative attacks during 1992-93. Danish and Irish interest rates, and 
Belgian interest rates during the disinflation period (1983-87), more closely followed 
French rather than German interest rates. This 'soft currency' club typically 
experienced higher short-term and long-term interest rates and its exchange rates 
therefore had a tendency to weaken against the German mark. For Italy this is 
particularly true. With respect to the recent EMS crisis, an interesting fact can be 
observed: despite of higher German inflation, German long-term interest rates 
throughout the post-unification period were below long-term rates in the remaining 
EMS countries. This suggests that financial markets expected the German inflation 
surge to be transitory. Indeed, after the German inflation peak in early 1992 German, 
Dutch and Belgian long-term rates fell by more than the corresponding rates in the 
remaining EMS countries, re-opening long-term interest rate differentials. At the same 
time short-term interest rates in Ireland, Italy and Denmark rose steeply in response to 
speculative attacks. The Netherlands managed to avoid such speculative attacks by 
more or less completely surrendering monetary sovereignty and pegging to the 
German mark, for better or for worse. 
 
 
4.2.3.2. Estimates of the Credibility of Interest Rate Target Announcements 
 
Having described some stylised facts about interest rates behaviour in the EMS, the 
results from the empirical evaluation of the credibility of interest rate targeting 
policies may now be discussed. Within the context of a modified Cukierman and 
Meltzer (1986b) model it is important that these interest rate targets are public 
knowledge. For simplicity, the analysis below assumes that officially announced 
discount rates reflect the interest rate targets of the central bank. It is not necessary for 
discount rates to be unbiased measures of the central bank's interest rate target, since 
the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model explicitly allows for an announcements 
bias. All that is required is that the discount rate and the interest rate target move 
together over time.
17
 
The announcement bias of discount rates with respect to market interest rates 
is visualised in Figure 4.29. For Germany, shown in panel (a), discount rates on 
average lie below market interest rates. This negative announcement bias is due to the 
fact that the Bundesbank targets short-term money market rates between the discount 
and the lombard rate, which typically is between 1 and 2 percentage points above the 
discount rate. Most of the probability distribution therefore falls into this interval. In 
Figure 4.29 a similar negative announcement bias exists in France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, the United States and Canada. A positive announcement bias, with 
discount rates typically above market rates, is found for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. The result for Ireland indicates a serious problem: both the 
official discount rate and the interbank rate are administered interest rates, which are 
changed only occasionally and frequently at the same time. A high credibility estimate 
for Ireland should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
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Figure 4.29. 
Probability Distributions of Short-term Interest Rates Around  
Discount Rate Targets (in %) 
 
(a) Germany,.Jan. 1960- Aug. 1993     (b) France, Jan. 1960- Aug. 1993 
 
    
 
(c) Italy, Jan. 1971- Aug. 1993         (d) Netherlands, Jan. 1960-Aug. 1993 
 
      
 
(e) Belgium, Jan. 1960- Aug. 1993      (f) Denmark, Jan. 1960- Aug. 1993 
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Figure 4.29 continued 
 
 
(g) Ireland, Jan. 1971 - Aug. 1993       (h) U.K., Jan.1972-Sep.1992 
 
    
 
(i) U.S.A., Jan. 1960-Aug.1993    (j) Canada, Jan. 1960- Aug. 1993 
 
    
 
(k) Japan, Jan 1960- Aug. 1993         (l) Switzerland, Jan. 1972- Aug. 1993 
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4.2.3.2.1. The Credibility of Interest Rate Target Announcements Across 
  Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Panel (a) of Figure 4.30 displays the MC credibility estimate for both short-term 
money market rates and long-term government bond rates of EMS countries when 
compared between the Bretton Woods, the European snake and the EMS countries. 
Panel (b) displays the corresponding results for non-EMS countries. The results may 
be summarised as follows: First, interest rate targeting policies of both EMS and non-
EMS countries possessed some short-term credibility, but lacked long-term 
credibility. The remainder of this section will therefore focus on the short-term rates. 
Second, amongst the initial EMS member countries only Belgium and the Netherlands 
made relatively credible interest rates announcements, whilst for France, Italy and 
Denmark low MC estimates are found. The high estimate for Ireland is a statistical 
artefact, as indicated above, and will be ignored throughout this section. A third 
finding from Figure 4.30 is that the German credibility estimate falls sharply in the 
EMS period relative to the Bretton Woods or snake period. This may be explained by 
the move to monetary quantity targeting in the late 1970's, as described in section 
4.2.1 above. For the Netherlands, on the other hand, the MC credibility estimate 
increases continuously. 
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4.30 further reveal that for the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Canada interest rate target announcements have gained 
credibility during the EMS period. This result is not surprising, given the limited 
success of these countries in establishing credibility with monetary target 
announcements. 
Figure 4.31 presents similar evidence for the various EMS sub-periods. The 
key point from panel (a) of Figure 4.31 is that in the most recent EMS period (Jan. 
1990-July 1993) all EMS countries except Germany and Denmark have been able to 
rely on credible interest rate target announcements in the sense that discount rates 
could effectively be used by the public to forecast movements in short-term money 
market rates. But, as above, these signals had little relevance for predicting the 
behaviour of long-term government bond rates. This result may be interpreted as 
evidence of a lack of credibility of anti-inflation policies in the long-run, since under 
zero expected inflation short-term and long-term rates should move closely together 
and hence be equally responsive to the policy signal. For Germany the credibility of 
discount rate announcements fall to almost zero during the EMS. This finding is 
consistent with the view expressed in Neumann (1988) that the Bundesbank during 
the 1980s has targeted money market interest rates not through discount operations 
but rather more directly by influencing interest rates on short-term treasury bills. The 
evidence from panel (b) of Figure 4.31 suggests that credible interest rate target 
announcements have been the exception rather than the rule in countries outside the 
EMS. Interestingly, the only countries with credible interest rate announcements (in 
the sense MC>0.5) are Canada, Sweden and Norway. In all three countries exchange 
rate targeting has officially played an important role in the implementation of 
monetary policy. The potential link between exchange rate targeting and interest rate 
targeting is explored in some more depth below. 
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Figure 4.30. 
Credibility Estimates for Interest Rates Targeting Across Regimes 
 
(a) MC Credibility Estimates for ERM Countries (in %) 
 
 
 
(b) MC Credibility Estimates for non-ERM Countries (in %) 
 
 
Key to symbols:         ,  = short-term call money rates, 
     , = long-term government bond rates 
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Figure 4.31. 
Credibility Estimates for Interest Rates Targeting Across EMS Periods 
 
(a) MC Credibility Estimates for ERM Countries (in %) 
 
 
 
(b) MC Credibility Estimates for non-ERM Countries (in %) 
 
 
Key to symbols:        ,  = short-term call money rate differentials, 
                      , = long-term government bond rate differentials 
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In the theoretical model of chapter 2 it was mentioned that instead of 
targeting interest rates under purely domestic policy considerations, central banks of 
smaller countries may target interest rates as a short-run operational procedure for 
targeting the exchange rate. In order to control exchange rate movements central 
banks aim at controlling interest rate differentials. They do this by setting domestic 
interest rate targets to be consistent with those of the foreign country. The credibility 
of targeting interest rate differentials (and ultimately exchange rates) may then be 
analysed by estimating the signalling effect of discount rate differentials. Figure 4.32 
reports the estimates, which correspond to those in Figure 4.31 except that interest 
rates and discount rates have been replaced by interest rate differentials and discount 
rate differentials vis-a-vis Germany. The key result from panel (a) of Figure 4.32 is as 
follows: those countries which issued credible interest rate announcements in a purely 
domestic context during 1990-93 have not been able to achieve similar credibility 
with respect to interest rate differentials vis-a-vis Germany. This is so because the 
credibility of German interest rate targeting declined substantially in the aftermath of 
German unification, as indicated in Figure 4.31. German unification thus made it 
more difficult for EMS countries to control exchange rates by targeting interest rate 
differentials vis-a-vis Germany. 
 
4.2.3.2.2. Time-paths of the Credibility Estimates 
 
As in the case of exchange rate targeting above, the relevance of the 'Lucas-critique' is 
evaluated by searching for potential structural breaks in central banks' commitment to 
interest rate targeting. The results are reported in Table 4.11 for the post-1975 period. 
The main findings are as follows: First, the majority of stability test statistics indicate 
significant structural breaks in the estimated relationship for each country. For 
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom significant instability 
occurred during the 1981-83 period. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have 
shifted to more credible interest rate announcements, whilst the Danish targets lost 
credibility. A second very interesting result of Table 4.11 is that for Ireland and 
France significant structural breaks are detected in August 1992, the month prior to 
the EMS crisis which drove Italy and the United Kingdom out of the system. 
The apparent instability of interest rate targeting policies in EMS countries is 
somewhat surprising in view of the various policy U-turns, which have been 
described above in the context of monetary and exchange rate targeting. In particular, 
central banks quite frequently seem to shift between these objectives. The clearest 
example of such a policy switch in the context of interest rate targeting policies is 
given by the Dutch-German link. The Dutch central bank clearly established credible 
interest rate targeting as a means for stabilising the exchange rate with Germany. This 
becomes obvious when considering the timing of the Dutch policy U-turn. Figure 4.33 
reports the switching regression results for the post-1960 period. The likelihood ratio 
test in panel (d), as well as the two Cusum-of-squares tests in panels (e) and (f) 
indicate that a significant break occurred in March 1982. The data discussed above 
pointed out that only after 1982 did all Dutch interest rates moved closely in line with 
the corresponding German rates, and exchange rates were largely stabilised within a 
much narrower target zone inside. Panel (a) of Figure 4.33 displays the time-path of 
the derived credibility measure.  The credibility of discount rate announcements falls 
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Figure 4.32. 
Credibility Estimates for Interest Rates Differentials Targeting  
Across ERM Periods 
 
(a) MC Credibility Estimates for ERM Countries (in %) 
 
Late EMS Period (90M1-93M7)                      Early EMS Period (79M3-83M2) 
 
 
(b) MC Credibility Estimates for non-ERM Countries (in %) 
 
Late EMS Period (90M1-93M7)                          Early EMS Period (79M3-83M2) 
 
Key to symbols:         ,  = short-term call money rate differentials, 
                      , = long-term government bond rate differentials 
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Table 4.11. 
Switching Regression Estimation Results for the Credibility of  Official 
Interest Rate Announcements for Call Money Rates (Jan. 1975-July 1993) 
 
Country 
 
Rate 
break-
point 
MCT 
t(MCT) 
MC1 
t(MC1) 
MC2 
t(MC2) 
Chow F 
-2ln 
CSF 
CSB 
Hn,m 
H1,t-k 
Germany call Sep. 0.171 0.143 0.168 1.943 0.828*** 9.600*** 
          money 1981 (4.113) (1.781) (4.673) 60.342*** 0.155*** 0.348  
France call Aug. 0.101 0.077 0.602 19.559*** 0.664*** 5.311***  
          money 1992 (5.274) (4.686) (3.314) 26.302*** 0.185 66.506***  
Italy   call Oct. 0.279 0.510 0.336 43.322*** 0.186 3.515***  
          money 1976 (11.06) (7.350) (11.16) 41.289*** 0.532*** 7.349***  
Nether- call Mar. 0.578 0.574 0.661 0.260 0.955*** 36.123*** 
lands  money 1982 (15.59) (9.600) (13.74) 126.39*** 0.042*** 1.719***  
Belgium call Jan. 0.429 0.633 0.123 16.289*** 0.780** 4.676***  
          money 1987 (9.077) (9.461) (3.150) 35.638*** 0.091*** 49.931***  
 Denmark call Apr. 0.074 0.134 0.006 4.607*** 0.854*** 10.094***  
          money 1983 (3.618) (3.355) (0.317) 62.437*** 0.106*** 0.012  
Ireland call Aug. 1.138 0.995 1.405 29.492*** 0.080*** 169.20***  
          money 1992 (15.02) (14.26) (4.028) 211.79*** 0.709*** 0.016***  
U.K. call Mar. 0.701 0.890 0.796 25.504*** 0.619*** 4.989***  
          money 1982 (14.04) (9.566) (17.47) 49.886*** 0.187*** 1.818  
Notes: The marginal credibility measures for the overall period (MCT) and the two 
sub-periods (MC1, MC2) are obtained as the coefficients estimates from the 
ordinary least-squares regression (it-i t t,
*
1
) = c + (i t
a
-i t t,
*
1
) + vt, vt  N(0,v
2 ) with it 
and i t
a
 as actual and announced interest rates and i t t,
*
1
 as the optimal multi-process 
Kalman filter prediction of call money interest rates based on a ARIMA(0,2,2) 
time series model. Refer to Chapter 3 for details of the estimates. The numbes in 
parenthesis below the credibility estimates are t-values (5 percent significance 
level). Estimates above 0.5 indicate credible announcements. The timing of the 
most likely point of structural break is estimated by switching regression and 
judged on the basis of the likelihood-ratio test statistic (-2ln) of Quandt (1960). A 
significant structural break is assumed when the majority of six parametric 
stability tests point towards instability. These stability tests are given by the Chow 
(1960) F-test, the likelihood- ratio test -2ln of Quandt (1960), the forward and 
backward CUSUM-of-squares tests CSF and CSB of Brown, Durbin and Evans 
(1975), the test for heteroscedasticity Hn,m of Goldfeld and Quandt (1965) and a 
heteroscedasticity test Ht,t-k based on a regression of the squared residuals from 
the above equation on the squared fitted values. For details of these tests Weber 
(1990a). 
Chapter 4 157 
Figure 4.33. 
Switching Regression Estimation Results for the Credibility of Dutch Interest 
Rate Targeting Policies Across Exchange Rate Regimes (Feb. 1960-July 1993) 
 
(a) MC Forward Estimate   (b) MC Backward Estimate 
     
 
(c) Chow F-Test     (d) -2ln Likelihood Ratio Test 
     
 
(e) Cusum-Squared Forward Test  (f) Cusum-Squared Backward Test 
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substantially towards the end of the Bretton Woods period, and stabilises at a lower 
level during 1970-72. The MC measure increases again after the onset of the 
European snake arrangement, which pinned the Dutch-German exchange rate down to 
a fluctuation band of 1.5 percent. In the post-1982 period the credibility measure is 
fairly high, as is indicated in panel (b). 
 
4.2.4. Country by Country Summary 
 
In the previous sections an extensive discussion of policy credibility, both within the 
policy game and the target zone context, has been presented. The main results are 
summarised briefly below for the various EMS countries. 
In general the results reported in this study raise some doubt about the 
hypothesis that the EMS may be viewed as a disinflation devise for all non-German 
EMS members. In particular the early bipolar nature of the EMS - the joint existence 
of a hard and a soft currency option, seriously undermines the borrowing reputation 
hypothesis since the EMS can no longer automatically be taken as exhibiting a 
disinflationary bias. Depending on whether they pegged to a hard or a soft centre 
country, policymakers in EMS economies may have borrowed a good or a bad 
counterinflation reputation. The bipolarity hypothesis, furthermore, pretty well 
accounts for the fact that disinflation in the EMS has been slower and less than 
complete initially. But after 1986, and in particular in the period after German 
unification an increased commitment of EMS member countries to targeting the 
German mark have been found in the data. It has been argued that this was due to the 
fact that the German hard stance has mellowed in the aftermath of German 
unification, which has rendered the fixed parities more credible. 
Germany was found to have established and maintained a high 
counterinflation reputation through a consistent low inflation performances prior to 
1987. In particular, the inflationary impact of the 1979 oil price shock in Germany 
was relatively small. Disinflation therefore was not a major problem. Recently 
German unification has pushed up inflation to about 5 percent and counterinflation 
reputation has eroded somewhat. The German success in controlling and containing 
inflation in the early 1990's could thereby not be attributed to the use of any 
particularly credible monetary policy instrument. This may be due to the publicly 
acknowledged policy stance of the German Bundesbank of not strictly adhering to any 
particular policy rule, but to adopt whatever policy measures appear adequate at the 
time in order to achieve the prime policy target of a low inflation rates. Low inflation 
still is the prime policy objective in post-unification Germany, but the strong wage-
push component of inflation, as well as the inflationary consequences of the growing 
budget deficits, have recently made inflation more difficult to contain. 
French anti-inflation reputation is found to have been low and remained 
relatively low throughout the EMS due to higher French inflation. Double-digit 
inflation rates persisted throughout 1979 to early 1983, and the stringent austerity 
programme adopted after the March 1983 realignment succeeded in bringing inflation 
down to 3% in late 1987. Since then inflation roughly stayed at that level. The 
widespread adoption of foreign exchange controls thereby allowed France to 
circumvent many of the disciplinary effects of fixed exchange rates and enabled 
policymakers to effectively pursue an independent monetary policy. Deflation in 
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France was therefore largely home-made. After 1987 the convergence of inflation 
rates between Germany and France has been achieved by constant French inflation 
and a rise of German inflation. This suggests that the recent convergence of the EMS 
has involved two elements: France has belatedly embraced the hard option, whilst 
Germany has slightly mellowed its hard stance. Initially this resulted in a more stable 
system, but since the complete abolition of foreign exchange controls the tensions 
within the system grew again as countries contemplated the transition to economic 
and monetary union (EMU). Disputes over these issues have greatly destabilised the 
system despite a substantial degree of economic convergence. 
Given the reputation of both major EMS countries for initially being hard or 
soft about inflation, the smaller EMS members were in principle free to choose 
amongst these alternative deflation scenarios offered by EMS membership.  
The Netherlands entered the EMS with inflation rates only slightly above the 
levels of Germany. By late 1982 the Dutch central bank increases the credibility of its 
commitment to the German mark exchange rate and the positive inflation differential 
had disappeared. Throughout the remaining EMS period Dutch inflation closely 
follows that of Germany and counterinflation reputation in both countries was found 
to have been equally high. The Dutch disinflation process during the EMS period may 
therefore be explained by the hypothesis of borrowing reputation from the German 
Bundesbank via credible exchange rate policies. This is indicated by the credibility 
estimates from both the policy game and the target zone literature. In fact the 
closeness of discount rate announcements by the Nederlandsche Bank and the 
Bundesbank largely enhances the credibility of the Dutch exchange rate commitment. 
Belgium, which maintained a very close bilateral exchange rate linkage with 
the Netherlands during the European currency snake system, also entered the EMS 
with inflation rates only slightly above those of Germany. However, in June 1982 the 
Belgian policy shift from credibly pegging to the Dutch guilder (and hence indirectly 
to the German mark) to adopting the soft currency option of credibly pegging to the 
French franc results in a rise of inflation to French levels. Thereafter Belgium and 
France experienced similar inflation performances and macroeconomic policies, 
which were dominated by direct price and wage controls and attempts to reduce the 
inflationary impacts of automatic wage indexation schemes. However, despite the 
decline in Belgium inflation during 1983-86, there was almost no convergence to the 
also declining German and Dutch inflation rates. The soft currency option of credibly 
pegging to the French franc in connection with the higher French inflation rates 
explains why Belgium despite its gain in counterinflation reputation could not 
disinflate more quickly. The more recent commitment to level pegging the German 
mark exchange rate, confirmed by Belgian participation in the so-called 'Euro-rounds' 
of discount rate changes, is associated with a gradual convergence of its inflation rate 
to German levels in the post-1987 period. Whilst some degree of exchange rate 
credibility has materialised, it is still far from being as credible as the Dutch-German 
link, as the speculative attacks during 1992-92 point out. 
Denmark also entered the EMS with inflation rates lower than those in 
France. Inflation then jumped to French levels as a result of the second oil price shock 
just after the onset of the EMS and remained there for some time. During the deflation 
period 1982-1986 the inflation performances of Denmark and Belgium are almost 
identical, with an emphasis on wage de-indexation. Thus, the slow Danish disinflation 
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is in accord with its embracing of the soft currency option. There is less evidence of 
any possible recent shift towards the hard option. Denmark has only recently taken 
part in co-ordinated discount rate changes, and no particularly credible policy 
instrument was found. 
The Irish disinflation experience was different from that of Belgium and 
Denmark. First the inflationary impact of the oil price increase in Ireland was 
massive. After a slight decline in 1980-81 Irish disinflation started in 1982 with the 
adoption of an austerity and fiscal consolidation programme. Tight fiscal policies and 
not taking advantage of the two EMS realignments in 1982 helped Ireland to reduce 
inflation from substantially by mid 1983. Between 1983 and early 1986 fiscal 
consolidation largely eliminated budget deficits and Irish inflation declined slowly 
along with the French rate. Throughout this time, credibly pegged exchange rates 
relative to the soft currency bloc in the EMS were maintained. After a period of 
weakness in mid-1986 and a drastic devaluation (-8%) in August 1986, the Irish 
pound switch to the hard currency bloc. Despite the reflationary impact of this drastic 
devaluation, inflation had declined to the low levels of Germany and the Netherlands 
by late 1989. The recent Irish participation in the co-ordinated discount rate changes 
has provided support for the new policy stance of containing inflation. 
No credible form of intermediate monetary targeting has been detected for 
Italy. Whilst the Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989) hypothesis that exchange rate targets 
are more credible than monetary targets is verified, it does not follow that exchange 
rate targets have been credible. In fact, all Italian EMS exchange rate commitments 
have been non-credible, a finding is consistent with the trend movements of most 
Italian bilateral exchange rates throughout the EMS period. The most credible form of 
intermediate monetary targeting in Italy is interest rate targeting. Yet, even this 
strategy has not been implemented in a way consistent with fixed exchange rates, as 
indicated by the still prevailing interest rate and inflation differentials with the 
remaining EMS countries. In view of these findings it is not surprising that amongst 
all EMS countries Italy faced most problems during the 1992 EMS crisis, and was 
forced to leave the system. 
 
 
4.3. Evidence about Target Zone Credibility 
 
The various propositions about the distributions, variability and correlation between 
exchange rates and interest rate differentials in systems of fixed but adjustable 
exchange rate bands have been at the heart of a vastly growing empirical literature, 
which is briefly summarised below.  
Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between interest rate 
differentials and exchange rates in the unilateral Swedish exchange rate target zone is 
provided in Svensson (1991b) for monthly data and in Lindberg and Söderlind (1991) 
for daily data. Svensson (1991b) estimates a linearized version of his model by 
regressing interest rate differentials of various maturity on the parity deviation of the 
exchange rate. The estimated slope coefficients exhibit the expected pattern of being 
negative and smaller for longer maturities. However, the fit between theory and data 
is far from perfect, and a strongly serially correlated component is left unexplained., 
as Bertola and Svensson (1991) note. Serious doubts about the empirical validity of 
Chapter 4 161 
the standard target zone model for the Swedish data are raised in Lindberg and 
Söderlind (1991), who apply calibration methods to daily data and show that their 
results in most cases refute the standard target zone model. 
For the EMS empirical evidence on the relationship between interest rate 
differentials and exchange rates is provided in Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1990), 
albeit without Svensson's theoretical framework. Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1990) 
find no compelling evidence of the type of non-linearities implied by standard target 
zone models.  
Recent research has focused on second generation target zone models which 
incorporate realignment risks and devaluation expectations. Some empirical evidence 
based on this type of augmented target zone model is provided in Rose and Svensson 
(1991) and Svensson (1991d) for EMS exchange rates and interest rate differentials 
relative to Germany. Rose and Svensson (1991) show that adding fluctuating 
devaluation risk can reconcile some of the problems associated with early target zone 
models, which have only a single forcing variable, the fundamentals process. For 
more recent applications see Lindberg, Svensson and Söderlind (1991), Koen (1991), 
Weber (1991b, 1992a), Chen and Giovannini (1993) and Caramazza (1993). Svensson 
and Rose (1993) use the target zone framework to analyse the exchange rate crisis of 
September 1992. Before turning to the empirical evidence on the credibility of real 
world exchange rate target zone arrangements, it is instructive to take a closer look at 
the data. 
 
4.3.1. Experiences with Target Zones 
 
This present study will deal exclusively with the European Monetary System. Section 
4.2.2.1 above already discussed the evolution of exchange rates of EMS and non-
EMS countries between the Bretton Woods, the snake and the EMS period. The 
fluctuation bands played no role here. However, in the target zone framework the 
existence of currency bands has an important effect on the movements of exchange 
rates between these boundaries. Bands also have far-reaching implications for the 
relationship between interest rate differentials and the exchange rate's band position, 
and this should be reflected in the data. 
The data used in this section are daily exchange rate and interest rate data for 
the period 13 March 1979 to 28 August 1990. The choice of the sample period 
deliberately excludes the more recent post-unification period, in order to avoid a 
sample selection bias. Such a bias would be implied if credibility effects were tested 
for in a sample containing the collapse of the exchange rate system. For a recent target 
zone study of the period prior to October 1992 see Rose and Svensson (1993).  
Figure 4.34 displays the German mark exchange rates of the initial EMS 
member countries. Several aspects about EMS realignment strategies can be seen 
from these six panels. The Dutch guilder exchange rate underwent only two 
realignments and is extremely stable by comparison with the remaining EMS 
currencies, in particular in the post-1983 period. At each realignment the guilder rate 
was set more or less at the centre of the band. The remaining EMS exchange rates 
were typically re-set to a position at the upper boundary of the band. This is a clear 
indication of the fact that policymakers  did  not  expect  these  exchange rates to turn 
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Figure 4.34. 
EMS Exchange Rates and Official Exchange Rate Bands  
during the EMS Period 
(a) FF/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (b) Lit/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
(c) Hfl/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (d) Bfr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
 (e) Dkr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (f) IrL/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
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more stable after the realignment, as no room was allowed for these currencies to 
appreciate against the mark. This may signal a serious lack of target zone credibility. 
Figure 4.35 displays the exchange rate's band position against one-month 
Euro interest rate differentials. These off-shore interest rates are much more volatile 
than the domestic interest rates analysed above, because in the early EMS period 
central banks heavily relied on foreign exchange controls in order to insulate domestic 
rates from speculative attacks. However, these speculative runs clearly show up in the 
off-shore interest rate differentials. The French and Italian Euro rate differentials with 
respect to Germany were frequently above ten percent, and in some cases rose as high 
as 35 percent per year. With the exception of the Netherlands, interest rate 
differentials thereby typically were one-sided, with German rates being lower. The 
same pattern has been established above for the interest rate differentials between 
domestic short-term and long-term rates. 
At a purely descriptive level, the postulated deterministic inverse relationship 
between interest rate differentials and the exchange rate's band position appears not to 
be supported by the data. Rather, the first visual impression is that interest rate 
differentials and exchange rates are positively correlated. This again points towards a 
lack of target zone credibility. 
Another obvious fact from Figure 4.35 is that EMS realignments, that is, 
changes of the central parity, typically coincide with over proportional jumps in the 
relative band position of the exchange rate. But these jumps in exchange rates are only 
occasionally mirrored by corresponding jumps in the interest rate differentials, 
indicating that some realignments came as a surprise. Furthermore, most of the large 
interest rate differentials occur in the first half of the EMS period. Typically 
currencies were then weak against the mark and high interest rate differentials signal 
high devaluation expectations. This fact is in sharp contrast to the assumptions of the 
simple, fully credible target zone model, which predicts an inherent stabilisation 
effect. 
 
4.3.2. Estimates of the Credibility of Exchange Rate Target Zones 
 
First generation standard target zone model assume perfect credibility, whilst 
augmented target zone models allow for imperfect credibility and devaluation risks. 
Second generation target zone models explicitly introduce devaluation expectations as 
a second state variable. Before turning to these more recent models, the issue of target 
zone credibility is discussed by confronting the predictions of the more simple fully 
credible target zone model with those models which assume imperfect credibility. 
These models only allow indirect inference about target zone credibility by evaluating 
the relevance of propositions 3.1 to 3.7 (4.1 to 4.7) for the model with perfect 
(imperfect) target zone credibility. 
 
4.3.2.1. Indirect Evidence on Target Zone Credibility 
 
This section presents a number of non-parametric test statistics on the probability 
distributions, the variability and the correlation between the exchange rate's band 
position and interest rate differentials.  I  view  this  analysis  as  a  systematic  way  of 
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Figure 4.35. 
EMS Parity Deviations of DM Exchange Rates and Corresponding  
One Month Interest Rate Differentials 
  (a) France-Germany     (b) Italy-Germany 
    
  (c) Netherlands-Germany    (d) Belgium-Germany 
    
  (e) Denmark-Germany     (f) Ireland-Germany 
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comparing the characteristics of the exchange rate and interest rate data across EMS 
countries, and not as some formal test. 
Figure 4.36 displays the probability density distributions of exchange rates 
within the band. The fully credible target zone model predicts a U-shaped distribution 
with exchange rates being more frequently at the edges of the band (proposition 3.2). 
All six panels of Figure 4.36 reject this proposition. EMS exchange rates tended to be 
more frequently in the middle of the band. The Dutch guilder exchange rate is an 
extreme example for this. On the other hand, the Danish krona exchange rate was 
quite uniformly distributed over the band. 
Figure 4.37 describes the variability of exchange rates within the band. 
Perfectly credible target zone models predict a inherent stabilisation effect, with most 
variability in the middle of the band and low variability at the boundaries (proposition 
3.3). All six panels of Figure 4.37 reject this conjecture. As suggested in the model of 
imperfect target zone credibility exchange rate variability is typically high at the 
edges of the band. This is particularly obvious for France, Italy and Belgium. Except 
for the extreme variability at the edges, exchange rate variability otherwise is 
relatively uniform across the band, as predicted by the random walk hypothesis of 
exchange rates under a free float. EMS exchange rate bands thus do not seem to have 
any great stabilising effects. Rather, the extreme variability at the edges of the bands 
points towards some degree of destabilising speculation as exchange rates approach 
the boundaries of the bands. 
Figure 4.38 displays the probability distributions of 12-month Euro interest 
rate differentials between EMS countries and Germany. The fully credible target zone 
model predicts bimodal U-shaped distributions (proposition 3.6). All six panels of 
Figure 4.38 point more towards unimodal distributions, with more mass concentration 
around intermediate levels of interest rate differentials. The only minor exception is 
the Netherlands were some weak indication of bimodality can be found. In most 
cases, however, the data appear to reject the predictions of the fully credible target 
zone model. 
Figure 4.39 shows the variability of interest rate differentials in EMS 
countries. The fully credible target zone model predicts that most variability should 
occur for intermediate levels of interest rate differentials (proposition 3.7). Such a 
unimodal relationship with high variability at intermediate levels of interest rate 
differentials is clearly rejected by all six panels of Figure 4.39. For the Netherlands 
the relationship is obviously U shaped, with high variability occurring at both high 
and low levels of interest rate differentials. For the remaining EMS countries high 
variability coincided with high levels of interest rate differentials. The data therefore 
largely refute the fully credible target zone model. 
Figure 4.40 indicated the relationship between interest rate differentials and 
the exchange rate's band position. Fully credible target zone models derive a negative 
relationship (proposition 3.5). The six panels of Figure 4.40 display no clear pattern. 
For France, Denmark and Ireland no obvious relationship exists. For Italy and 
Belgium these is some weak indication of a negative correlation on average, whilst for 
the Netherlands a slightly positive relationship is suggested. The pattern in the data is, 
however, not very systematic, and it is difficult to say anything about the relevance of 
the standard target zone model based on this diffuse evidence. 
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Figure 4.36. 
Probability Distributions of EMS Exchange Rates within the  
Fluctuation Band (in %) 
 
(a) France, Jan. 1979- Aug. 1990    (b) Italy, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(c) Netherlands, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990   (d) Belgium, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(e) Denmark, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990   (f) Ireland, Jan. 1982- Aug. 1990 
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Figure 4.37. 
Variability of EMS Exchange Rates within the Fluctuation Band  
(Standard Deviation) 
 
(a) France, Jan. 1979- Aug. 1990    (b) Italy, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(c) Netherlands, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990    (d) Belgium, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(e) Denmark, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990   (f) Ireland, Jan. 1982- Aug. 1990 
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Figure 4.38. 
Probability Density Distribution of 12-Month  
Interest Rate Differentials (in %) 
 
(a) France, Jan. 1979- Aug. 1990  (b) Italy, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(c) Netherlands, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990  (d) Belgium, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(e) Denmark, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 (f) Ireland, Jan. 1982- Aug. 1990 
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Figure 4.39. 
Variability of 12-Month Interest Rate Differentials  
(Standard Deviation) 
 
(a) France, Jan. 1979- Aug. 1990  (b) Italy, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(c) Netherlands, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990  (d) Belgium, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(e) Denmark, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 (f) Ireland, Jan. 1982- Aug. 1990 
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Figure 4.40 
Relationship Between 12-Month Interest Rate Differentials  
and the Exchange Rate's Position in the Band 
 
(a) France, Jan. 1979- Aug. 1990  (b) Italy, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(c) Netherlands, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990  (d) Belgium, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 
   
 
(e) Denmark, Mar. 1979- Aug. 1990 (f) Ireland, Jan. 1982- Aug. 1990 
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To summarise, the informal evidence discussed above raises serious doubts 
about the ability of the standard target zone model to resemble the stylised facts of the 
evolution of exchange rates and interest rate differentials in the EMS. 
 
4.3.2.2. Direct Evidence on Target Zone Credibility 
 
Augmented target zone models focus on time-varying expected devaluation rates as 
the major factor in explaining the time-varying wedge between interest rate 
differentials and the exchange rate's band position in Figure 4.35. Svensson (1991a) 
proposes a 'simple test' of target zone credibility by assuming that expected 
devaluation rates are identical to interest rate differentials. In this case a 'simple 
credibility test' can be constructed by calculating the expected exchange rate implied 
by interest rate differentials of a given maturity, and plotting that rate against the 
prevailing exchange rate bands. The problem with this test is that it makes no 
distinction between expected parity changes and expected exchange rate changes. 
Svensson (1991d), Svensson and Rose (1991, 1993) and Lindberg, Svensson and 
Söderlind (1991), amongst others, apply the so-called 'drift adjustment' method for 
obtaining estimates of expected parity changes and devaluation rates. In Weber 
(1991a,c) an alternative approach to estimating devaluation expectations based on 
time-varying parameter regression is explored. As in the 'drift adjustment' method, the 
derivation of devaluation expectations in Weber (1992a) accounts for the possibility 
of infra-band exchange rate movements. Since both methods yield very similar 
results, the analysis below will focus on Svensson's (1991a) 'simple' test and on the 
time varying parameter approach proposed in Weber (1992b). 
 
4.3.2.2.1. Svensson's 'Simple' Credibility Test 
 
Before turning to the details of these devaluation expectation estimates, some less 
formal evidence on target zone credibility will be provided by computing Svensson's 
(1991a) 'simple test'. Figures 4.41 and 4.42 display the 'simple test' for twelve-month 
and one-month interest rate differentials respectively. These tests, which are reported 
in Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1990) clearly indicate that, with the exception of the 
Dutch guilder rate, EMS exchange rate target zones have completely lacked 
credibility at the twelve months horizon, as almost none of the expected exchange 
rates one year ahead lies within the boundaries of the exchange rate bands. Only as 
late as 1990 is an increase in target zone credibility noticeable. The analysis of policy 
credibility in the sections above strongly suggests that this is due to rising German 
inflation and interest rates in the aftermath of unification. The Dutch guilder exchange 
rate target zone, on the other hand, possesses credibility well beyond the one year 
horizon. This finding again strongly suggests that only Germany and the Netherlands 
may be viewed as members of a credible DM-zone in the EMS. 
In Figure 4.42 the credibility of the expected exchange rates at the one month 
horizon point towards another interesting EMS phenomenon. Many of the early EMS 
realignments were preceded by short periods of sizeable devaluation expectations 
which indicate substantial speculation over a realignment within the next month. This 
feature of the data vanishes in the more recent EMS realignment periods, indicating 
an increase in short-term target zone credibility. 
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Figure 4.41 
Expected Twelve Month Ahead EMS Exchange Rates  
and Official Exchange Rate Bands during the EMS Period 
(a) FF/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (b) Lit/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
(c) Hfl/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (d) Bfr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
 (e) Dkr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (f) IrL/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
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Figure 4.42. 
Expected One Month Ahead EMS Exchange Rates  
and Official Exchange Rate Bands during the EMS Period 
(a) FF/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (b) Lit/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
 (c) Hfl/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (d) Bfr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
 (e) Dkr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (f) IrL/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
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The problem with the 'simple test' of Svensson (1991a) is that it implicitly 
assumes that the band position of the exchange rate will not change over the maturity 
horizon for which exchange rate expectations are calculated. In Weber (1992c) I have 
proposed an alternative test, which accounts for the possibility of favourable within-
band exchange rate changes. This produces a more conservative test. The 'modified 
simple test' consists of plotting the expected boundaries of the exchange rate band 
against the officially prevailing ones and then judging credibility by the percentage 
area of overlap. Figures 4.43 and 4.44 display the official and expected bands implied 
by twelve-month and one-month interest rate differentials respectively. Figure 4.45 
displays the corresponding credibility estimates in terms of the percentage overlap of 
both bands for the two-day, one-month and twelve-month time horizon. Several 
interesting aspects should be mentioned. First, credibility no longer must be viewed as 
a (0,1)-variable. For example, Figure 4.43 indicates that the EMS exchange rate target 
zone no longer have completely lacked credibility at the twelve month horizon. 
Rather, a limited degree of credibility has been present during the period of weakness 
of the German mark in 1981 and during the post 1986 German reflation period. After 
German unification EMS target zone credibility is relatively high in all EMS 
countries, and almost perfect in the case of the Netherlands. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Rose and Svensson (1993). Figure 4.43 also indicates that the 
credibility of the Dutch-German exchange rate target zone has been high but until 
recently far from being perfect. This was impossible to detect by using the 'simple 
test' of Svensson (1991a). Another advantage of the modified test proposed here is 
obvious from Figure 4.44, as it is now relatively easy to see that most of the early 
EMS realignments, in particular with respect to the French franc, did not come 
unexpectedly. Finally, Figure 4.45 provides a convenient normalisation of the 
modified tests for target zone credibility by calculating the percentage overlap of 
expected and actual fluctuation bands. A clear rating of target zone credibility with 
respect to the one-year time horizon emerges: German mark exchange rate target 
zones were predominantly credible for the Netherlands, followed by Belgium. Much 
less credibility is found for Denmark and France, and Ireland and Italy almost 
completely lacked credibility until recently. This informal evidence about the 
credibility of the DM target zones suggest that whilst recently some gains in 
credibility have been materialised, the EMS by mid-1990 was still far from being a 
system of credible exchange rate target zones. 
 
4.3.2.2.2. Target Zone Credibility and Estimates of Devaluation Expectations 
 
Having described the less formal evidence provided by a variety of 'simple' credibility 
tests, I now turn to the more formal evidence about expected devaluation rates. The 
procedure used in the present study is based on the time-varying parameter regression 
approach outlined in section 3. Time-varying parameter regression extracts a measure 
of the unobservable expected devaluation rates from data on interest rate differentials 
and exchange rate parity deviations in the EMS. This measure corresponds to the 
intercept estimate in a regression of interest rate differentials on a constant and the 
exchange rate's band position. The important point here is that the coefficient of the 
intercept term is allowed to be time-varying, rather than being constant. Postulating 
that the evolution of the intercept coefficient and hence devaluation expectations are 
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Figure 4.43. 
Actual and Expected Twelve Month Ahead EMS Exchange Rate Bands  
during the EMS Period 
(a) FF/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (b) Lit/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
(c) Hfl/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (d) Bfr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
(e) Dkr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (f) IrL/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
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Figure 4.44. 
Actual and Expected One Month Ahead EMS Exchange Bands  
during the EMS Period 
(a) FF/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (b) Lit/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
(c) Hfl/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (d) Bfr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
    
(e) Dkr/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90   (f) IrL/DM Rate, 13/03/79-16/05/90 
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Figure 4.45 
'Simple Estimates' of EMS Target Zone Credibility  
for Various Time-Horizons 
 
  (a) France-Germany      (b) Italy-Germany 
   
 
  (c) Netherlands-Germany     (d) Belgium-Germany 
   
 
  (e) Denmark-Germany      (f) Ireland-Germany 
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driven by a mixture of transitory and permanent shocks then results in a time-varying 
estimate of expected devaluation rates, which corresponds to that part of interest rate 
differentials not explained by infra-band movements of exchange rates. 
The evidence obtained from this analysis, to be discussed in detail below, 
shows that whilst no apparent relationship exists between actual interest rate 
differentials and the exchange rate's band position, as is commonly found in the 
literature, a clear and relatively noise-free empirical relationship can be derived after 
adjusting interest rate differentials for time-varying expected devaluation rates. In the 
fully credible target zone model these expected devaluations are assumed to be zero. 
The finding that devaluation expectations have declined significantly over the EMS 
period may thus be interpreted as evidence of an increase in the credibility of EMS 
exchange rate target zones. This increase in credibility does not, however, imply that 
target zone credibility have achieved sufficient credibility for the predictions of the 
fully credible target zone model to be true, as will be discussed below. 
The estimates of expected devaluation rates are displayed in Figures 4.46 to 
4.48, together with the estimates of the slope estimate of the correlation between 
interest rate differentials and parity deviations, the probability of transitory parameter 
variation and the standardised prediction errors, both for forward and backward 
regressions.
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As in the paper by Rose and Svensson (1991), the expected rate of 
devaluation implied by the French-German one month interest rate differentials is 
displayed in Figure 4.46. The forward estimates in the upper left panel of Figures 4.46 
are highly correlated with the interest rate differential, especially when the interest 
rate differential takes extreme values in the first half of the EMS period. The estimates 
of expected devaluation rates are almost indistinguishable from the corresponding 
estimates in Rose and Svensson (1991), despite being derived by using a completely 
different approach: as in the Rose and Svensson (1991) paper, zero or even negative 
expected rates of devaluation are found for the second half of the EMS period, and 
towards the end of the sample the expected devaluation rates are generally more 
variable than the relatively stable interest rate differentials. The backward estimates, 
on the other hand, are consistently positive and much less variable in the late EMS 
period, and track interest rate differentials quite closely. In both cases the estimates of 
expected devaluation rates decline substantially after 1983, indicating a move to more 
credible target zones. The coefficients of the exchange rate's parity deviations, shown 
in the second panel of Figure 4.46, have positive signs throughout the sample period 
and are significantly different from zero for the post-1982 period, as indicated by the 
confidence intervals. These positive coefficients point towards a non-credible target 
zone. The evolution of these coefficients further appears to be correlated with the 
exchange rate, since permanent jumps occur at each of the devaluation dates. The 
increasing positive correlation between the interest rate differential (for a given 
maturity) and the band position of the exchange rate may thereby be taken as an 
indication of a stepwise erosion of credibility, which diminishesg with each 
realignment. Justification for this interpretation may be found by referring to the 
simulation results of Bertola and Svensson (1991), who show that increased 
devaluation risk ceteris paribus implies steeper slope coefficients. Another finding is 
that the probability of transitory parameter variation, as shown in the third panel of 
Figures 4.46, has frequently taken non-zero values in the pre-1983 EMS period, and 
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Figure 4.46. 
Forward (Left) and Backward (Right) Estimation Results for  
French-German Interest Rate Differentials 
(a) Estimates of Expected Devaluation Rate 
    
(b) Estimates of Parity Deviation Response Coefficient 
    
(c) Probability of Transitory Parameter Variation 
    
(d) Standardized Regression Residuals 
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Figure 4.47. 
Forward (Left) and Backward (Right) Estimation Results  
for Italian-German Interest Rate Differentials 
(a) Estimates of Expected Devaluation Rate 
    
(b) Estimates of Parity Deviation Response Coefficient 
    
(c) Probability of Transitory Parameter Variation 
    
(d) Standardized Regression Residuals 
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Figure 4.48. 
Forward (Left) and Backward (Right) Estimation Results  
for Dutch-German Interest Rate Differentials 
(a) Estimates of Expected Devaluation Rate 
    
(b) Estimates of Parity Deviation Response Coefficient 
    
(c) Probability of Transitory Parameter Variation 
    
(d) Standardized Regression Residuals 
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that this feature has vanished recently. This points towards less speculative attacks 
and increased target zone credibility. For the post-1990 sample period Svensson and 
Rose (1993) show that few changes in these conclusions occur until immediately 
before the ERM crisis of September 1992. They interpret this as evidence that the 
credibility crisis in the EMS appears to have been largely unexpected. 
The results for Italy and the Netherlands in Figures 4.47 and 4.48 are close in 
spirit to those of France. In each case significant positive slope estimates are obtained 
in the forward regressions for the post-1983 EMS period, whilst in the backward 
regressions the slope estimates typically decline towards the late EMS period and are 
frequently not significantly different from zero towards the end of the sample. This 
finding is in keeping with the view that the DM exchange rate target zones in the 
EMS have recently become more credible, and that the speculative attacks on the non-
credible target zones from the early EMS period have mostly vanished. This is largely 
consistent with the results from the 'simple' target zone credibility tests above and the 
evidence reported in Svensson and Rose (1993). 
The Dutch-German exchange rate represents the only exception from the 
above pattern, as is pointed out in Figure 4.48. In both forward and backward 
regressions a significantly negative estimate of the slope coefficient is obtained for 
most of the sample period, pointing towards a credible target zone. At the same time 
the estimates of expected devaluation rates are the lowest of all countries considered, 
which conforms with the existence of a relatively credible target zone. The striking 
difference between the Dutch-German and the remaining DM exchange rate target 
zones within the EMS strongly supports the evidence reported above in the policy 
game context. Weber (1991a) points out that owing to the bipolar functioning of the 
EMS, only Germany and the Netherlands appear to have formed a credibly pegged 
hard currency bloc or small DM exchange rate target zone. 
The final point to be considered here regards the "value added" of augmented 
as compared to standard target zone models. The above empirical estimates, and the 
results derived in Rose and Svensson (1991, 1993), Svensson (1991d), and Lindberg, 
Svensson and Söderlind (1991) suggest that allowing for time-varying devaluation 
risk in target zone models is an essential and non-trivial extension. This extension is 
vital if the predictions of the target zone theory are to be confronted with real world 
data. The advantage of the Bertola and Svensson (1991) model over standard target 
zone models may be demonstrated by referring to Figure 4.49, which compares 
scatterplots of the standard (left hand side) and the devaluation expectations 
augmented relationships between the exchange rate's band position and one-month 
Euro interest rate differentials. Scatterplots similar to those on the left hand side of 
Figures 4.49 are examined in Bertola and Caballero (1990), Flood, Rose and 
Mathieson (1990) and Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) for the EMS in search of a stable 
downward sloping, non-linear (s-shaped) relationship. Needless to say, most authors 
find no clear patterns in the data. 
Augmented target zone models of the Bertola and Svensson (1991) type, 
displayed on the right hand side of Figure 4.49, predict a negatively sloped non-linear 
relationship only between exchange rates and devaluation expectations adjusted 
interest rate differentials, that is the actual differentials minus the expected rates of 
devaluation. However, with the exception of the Dutch-German case these scatterplots 
strongly refute the hypothesis that devaluation expectation adjusted EMS exchange  
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Figure 4.49 
Relationship Between Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rates in 
Standard and Augmented Target Zone Models 
(a) French-German One Month Interest Rate Differentials 
    
(b) Italian-German One Month Interest Rate Differentials 
    
(c) Dutch-German One Month Interest Rate Differentials 
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rate target zones were credible in the sense of displaying a negative correlation 
between adjusted interest rate differentials and the exchange rate's band positions.. 
Rather, the low-noise correlations found between devaluation expectations adjusted 
interest rate differentials and exchange rates appear to be positively sloped, as is 
suggested by models of non-credible target zones. 
The underlying relationship to the credibility of the target zone estimates 
becomes even more transparent when adjusting interest rate differentials for expected 
realignment risks. Figure 4.50 displays such realignment risk adjusted interest rate 
differentials versus the exchange rate’s band positions for the estimated non-linear 
specification. Only the Dutch estimates are consistent with a credible exchange rate 
target zone, whilst the French and Italian estimates suggest a lack of credibility of the 
target zone arrangements.  
To summarise, the evidence about the credibility of EMS exchange rate 
target zones reported above indicates that by mid-1990 decline of expected 
devaluation rates has to be viewed as being insufficient to ensure that the EMS may 
be viewed as system of credibly target zones. Almost perfect credibility was only 
achieved by the Dutch-German exchange rate link. On the other hand, the lack of 
exchange rate target zone credibility is found to be particularly pronounced in the case 
of Italy. In view of these estimates, which are derived on the basis of daily data for the 
period of March 1979 to August 1990, the events of September 1992, when the Italian 
Lira was forced to leave the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS and float its 
currencies, come as little surprise. 
 
 
4.4. Country by Country Summary of the Main Results 
 
In the previous sections an extensive discussion of policy credibility, both within the 
policy game and the target zone context, has been presented. In each section the main 
results were already summarised. The discussion here provides some reflections on 
these results by considering each of the EMS countries in turn. 
In general the results reported in this study raise some doubt about the 
hypothesis that the EMS may be viewed as a disinflation devise for all non-German 
EMS members. In particular the early bipolar nature of the EMS - the joint existence 
of a hard and a soft currency option, seriously undermines the borrowing reputation 
hypothesis since the EMS can no longer automatically be taken as exhibiting a 
disinflationary bias. Depending on whether they pegged to a hard or a soft centre 
country, policymakers in EMS economies may have borrowed a good or a bad 
counterinflation reputation. The bipolarity hypothesis, furthermore, accounts fairly 
well for the fact that disinflation in the EMS has been slower and less than complete 
initially. But after 1986, and in particular in the period after German unification an 
increased commitment of EMS member countries to targeting the German mark has 
been found in the data. It has been argued that this was due to the fact that the German 
hard stance has mellowed in the aftermath of German unification and this has 
rendered the fixed parities more credible. 
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Figure 4.50. 
Realignment Risk Adjusted Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rate and 
Positions, Non-Linear Specification, Daily Data, 21/03/1983 to 5/10/1992 
 
(a) France versus Germany 
 
 
(b) Italy versus Germany 
 
 
(c) The Netherlands versus Germany 
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Germany is found to have established and maintained a high counterinflation 
reputation via consistently low inflation performances prior to 1987. In particular, the 
inflationary impact of the 1979 oil price shock in Germany was relatively small. 
Disinflation therefore was not a major problem. Recently German unification has 
pushed up inflation to about 5 percent and counterinflation reputation has eroded 
somewhat. The German success in controlling and containing inflation in the early 
1990's could not be attributed to the use of any particularly credible monetary policy 
instrument. This may be on account of the publicly acknowledged policy stance of the 
German Bundesbank of not strictly adhering to any particular policy rule, but 
adopting whatever policy measures appear adequate at the time in order to achieve the 
prime policy target of a low inflation rate. Low inflation still is the Bundesbank's 
prime policy objective in post-unification Germany, but the strong wage-push 
component of inflation, as well as the inflationary consequences of the growing 
budget deficits, have recently made inflation more difficult to contain. 
French anti-inflation reputation is found to have been low and remained 
relatively low throughout the EMS due to higher French inflation. Double-digit 
inflation rates persisted throughout 1979 to early 1983, and the stringent austerity 
programme adopted after the March 1983 realignment succeeded in bringing inflation 
down to 3% in late 1987. Since then inflation has roughly stayed at that level. The 
widespread adoption of foreign exchange controls has allowed France to circumvent 
many of the disciplinary effects of fixed exchange rates and enabled policymakers to 
effectively pursue an independent monetary policy. Deflation in France has therefore 
been largely home-made. After 1987 the convergence of inflation rates between 
Germany and France was achieved by constant French inflation and a rise of German 
inflation. This suggests that the recent convergence of the EMS has involved two 
elements: France has belatedly embraced the hard option, whilst Germany has slightly 
mellowed its hard stance. Initially this resulted in a more stable system, but since the 
complete abolition of foreign exchange controls the tensions within the system has 
grown again as countries contemplate the transition to economic and monetary union 
(EMU). Disputes over these issues have greatly destabilised the system despite a 
substantial degree of economic convergence. 
Given the reputation of both major EMS countries for initially being hard or 
soft about inflation, the smaller EMS members were in principle free to choose 
amongst these alternative deflation scenarios offered by EMS membership.  
The Netherlands entered the EMS with inflation rates only slightly above the 
levels of Germany. By late 1982 the Dutch central bank increased the credibility of its 
commitment to the German mark exchange rate and the positive inflation differential 
had disappeared. Throughout the remaining EMS period Dutch inflation closely 
followd that of Germany and counterinflation reputation in both countries was found 
to have been equally high. The Dutch disinflation process during the EMS period may 
therefore be explained by the hypothesis of borrowing reputation from the German 
Bundesbank via credible exchange rate policies. This is indicated by the credibility 
estimates from both the policy game and the target zone literature. In fact the 
closeness of discount rate announcements by the Nederlandsche Bank and the 
Bundesbank largely enhances the credibility of the Dutch exchange rate commitment. 
Belgium, which maintained a very close bilateral exchange rate linkage with 
the Netherlands during the European currency snake system, also entered the EMS 
Chapter 4 187 
with inflation rates only slightly above those of Germany. However, in June 1982 the 
Belgian policy shift from credibly pegging to the Dutch guilder (and hence indirectly 
to the German mark) to adopting the soft currency option of credibly pegging to the 
French franc resulted in a rise in inflation to French levels. Thereafter Belgium and 
France experienced similar inflation performances and macroeconomic policies, 
which were dominated by direct price and wage controls and attempts to reduce the 
inflationary impacts of automatic wage indexation schemes. However, despite the 
decline in Belgium inflation during 1983-86, there was almost no convergence to the 
also declining German and Dutch inflation rates. The soft currency option of credibly 
pegging to the French franc in connection with the higher French inflation rates 
explains why Belgium despite its gain in counterinflation reputation could not 
disinflate more quickly. The more recent commitment to level pegging the German 
mark exchange rate, confirmed by Belgian participation in the so-called 'Euro-rounds' 
of discount rate changes, has been associated with a gradual convergence of its 
inflation rate to German levels in the post-1987 period. Whilst some degree of 
exchange rate credibility has materialised, it is still far from being as credible as the 
Dutch-German link, as the speculative attacks during 1992-92 point out. 
Denmark also entered the EMS with inflation rates lower than those in 
France. Inflation then jumped to French levels as a result of the second oil price shock 
just after the onset of the EMS and remained there for some time. During the deflation 
period 1982-1986 the inflation performances of Denmark and Belgium were almost 
identical, with an emphasis on wage de-indexation. Thus, the slow Danish disinflation 
has been in keeping with its embracing of the soft currency option. There is less 
evidence of any possible recent shift towards the hard option. Denmark has only 
recently taken part in co-ordinated discount rate changes, and no particularly credible 
policy instrument was found. 
The Irish disinflation experience was different from that of Belgium and 
Denmark. First the inflationary impact of the oil price increase in Ireland was 
massive. After a slight decline in 1980-81 Irish disinflation started in 1982 with the 
adoption of an austerity and fiscal consolidation programme. Tight fiscal policies and 
not taking advantage of the two EMS realignments in 1982 helped Ireland to reduce 
inflation substantially by mid 1983. Between 1983 and early 1986 fiscal consolidation 
largely eliminated budget deficits and Irish inflation declined slowly along with the 
French rate. Throughout this time, credibly pegged exchange rates relative to the soft 
currency bloc in the EMS were maintained. After a period of weakness in mid-1986 
and a drastic devaluation (of -8%) in August 1986, the Irish pound switched to the 
hard currency bloc. Despite the initial reflationary impact of this drastic devaluation, 
inflation had declined to the low levels of Germany and the Netherlands by late 1989. 
The recent Irish participation in the co-ordinated discount rate changes has provided 
support for the new policy stance of containing inflation. 
No credible form of intermediate monetary targeting has been detected for 
Italy. Whilst the Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989) hypothesis that exchange rate targets 
are more credible than monetary targets is verified, it does not follow that exchange 
rate targets have been credible. In fact, all Italian EMS exchange rate commitments 
have been non-credible, a finding which is consistent with the trend movements of 
most Italian bilateral exchange rates throughout the EMS period. The most credible 
form of intermediate monetary targeting in Italy has been is interest rate targeting. 
188 Chapter 4 
Yet, even this strategy has not been implemented in a way consistent with fixed 
exchange rates, as indicated by the still prevailing interest rate and inflation 
differentials with the remaining EMS countries. In view of these findings it is not 
surprising that amongst all EMS countries Italy faced the most problems during the 
1992 EMS crisis, and was forced to leave the system. 
The fact that all the remaining countries except the Netherlands in mid-1993 
ran into similar problems as Italy leaves little hope for the future of the system, which 
de facto has been suspended by the adoption of extremely wide bands  
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1  The empirical estimates below are based on applying the MPKF to the logarithms of the 
quarterly consumer price indices for the period 60Q1 to 90Q4. The filter is initialized in 60Q3 
by using the actual price level Pt-1 and inflation rate (Pt-1-Pt-2) prior to the estimation period 
as an estimate of the initial state vector at-1 for all four individual process models. Furthermore, 
the initial prior and posterior probabilities were chosen as t-1=0.25 for all four models, which 
implies an initial reputation estimate of t-1=0.5. 
2 Artis (1987) defines a "crawling peg" as an  exchange rate arrangement in which inflation  
differentials are not fully accommodated, and realignments are underindexed adjustments. 
3  These cuts together were roughly equivalent to a 4 percent creduction in the consumer price 
index. For details see OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland, 1975, p. 6. 
4 See OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland, 1975, p. 6. 
5 The United Kingdom was subsumed in this group because it only participated in the ERM for 
the short period of October 1990 to September 1992. 
6 These minor changes were accounted for in this study by trying to use announcements for one 
monetary aggregate consistently throughout the sample where possible. For the United 
Kingdom target growth rates for M3 were used throughout, while for France no adjustment was 
made. Hence, some reservations with respect to the estimates for France between 1984 and 
1986 are in order. 
7 Before March 1978 currency held by banks was included in the currency position and 
afterwards was accepted as part of required reserves. The series used here is adjusted for this 
change in reserve requirements. 
8  See Deutsche Bundesbank (1985), page 25, or Schlesinger (1983) who reports that in 1977-
1978 the Bundesbank accepted substantial 'overshooting' of monetary growth in order to 
counteract an excessive 'real' appreciation of the D-Mark. 
9 See Wyplosz (1988b) for this interpretation of French post 1983 monetary policy. 
10 See Suzuki (1985). For details of monetary targeting in Japan see also Shimamoto (1983), 
and for comparitive studies see Dotsey (1986), Wagner (1989), and the recent contribution by 
McCallum (1993). 
11  The identification of the most likely point of structural break is based on the likelihood ratio 
test (-2ln) of Quandt (1958, 1960) and Goldfeld and Quandt (1973a,b 1976). The Quandt 
(1960) test statistic does not follow a 2 -distribution, but Lehner and Möller (1981) 
demonstrate that a modified 2 -distribution can be used to construct a conservative test for s 
structural break points. This modified " distribution is used here to evaluate the significance of -
2ln. In addition, the test Fk,t-2k of Chow (1960) for the constancy of the regression 
coefficients with k and t-2k degrees of freedom is considered. A problem with the Chow (1960) 
F-test is, as has been demonstrated by Toyoda (1974), that it is biased in the presence of 
heteroscedastisity. See also Jaytissa (1977) and Schmidt and Sickles (1977) on this point. For 
problems of the Chow test under misspecification see Thursby (1982). Furthermore, two 
versions of the CUSUM-of-Squares test of Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975), a forward test 
CSF and a backward test CFB, are reported. These tests are based on a plot of the cumulated 
sum or recursive least squares residuals from the Kalman filter run against certain upper and 
lower significance bounds for different significance levels, which were taken from Harvey 
(1981a), pp 364. Finally, two F-tests for heteroscedastisity, Hn,m and Hs,n-k are reported, 
Hn,m is the Goldfeld & Quandt (1965) heteroscedastisity test based on a division of the sample 
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of t observations into two sub-samples of m and n (n=t-m) observations and tests the hypothesis 
that the variance of residuals increases over time. This test corresponds to the test of Harvey 
and Phillips (1974) if no central observations are ommitted. Hs,n-k tests the hypothesis that the 
variance of the residuals is heteroscedastic because it is proportional to the fitted values. This 
test is by a a regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values.  
12 Suzuki (1985) explains that the use of projections rather than targets is giving the central 
bank flexibility and freeing it from political preasure. See also Fischer (1988). 
13 Meltzer (1986b, 1987a) reports this policy switch to a system of less freely fluctating 
exchange rates in Japan after the September 1985 Plaza agreement of the G5 countries. 
14 Expectations are seen as being influenced by official target announcements or by chartist 
(backward looking) behaviour. See Chapter 3, in particular Equation (18.3) in Bob 18, for this 
feature of the MC estimate. 
15 This important point has been raised by Malinvaud in the General Discussion of the Weber 
(1991a) paper. For details, see Weber (1991a), p. 95. 
16 Consult, for example, the calendars of main economic events in the OECD Country Studies 
for these countries. 
17 The MC credibility measure refers to the slope rather than the intercept estimate. The latter 
captures the announcement bias. 
18  The forward regressions start with a minimum of k+2 observations at the start of the sample 
and recursively update via the Kalman filter the state estimates by incorporating the information 
content revealed by subsequent observations. The backward regressions are initialised at the 
end of the sample and update the state estimates by going back in time. If EMS target zones 
were non-credible in the early EMS period and have become more credible in the late EMS 
period, then the state estimates of these backward recursions should towards the sample end be 
more consistent with the credible target zone model. 
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5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on empirical estimates of pre-specified counterinflation reputation and policy 
credibility measures, the present study shows that 'borrowing counterinflation 
reputation' from the Bundesbank in order to disinflate was not a feature of the 
European Monetary System. Such a 'DM-zone' view of the EMS had been postulated 
by Giavazzi and Pagano (1988). The present study shows that France and Italy have 
not managed to use the EMS as a disinflation device by locking into German 
monetary policy. However, the estimates indicate that 'borrowing reputation' has, to 
various degrees, worked for the smaller EMS countries. The role of the EMS in this 
process is unclear: similar counterinflation reputation gains have also been obtained 
by Austria, which did not formally participate in the EMS, but has targeted the 
German mark exchange rate. 
       The present study explains the differences in the extent to which countries have 
profited from German counterinflation reputation during the EMS period by differing 
degrees of exchange rate credibility. It is demonstrated that not all EMS countries 
have shown the same commitment to targeting the German mark exchange rate. An 
important finding of the present study is that credible commitments to fixed exchange 
rates, which were the rule under the Bretton Woods system, have been the exception 
under the EMS. In particular, the present study shows that after some short initial 
transition phase the EMS has functioned as a bipolar system with a 'hard currency' 
option supplied by the German Bundesbank and a 'soft currency' option offered by the 
Banque de France: whilst the Netherlands, almost from the onset of the EMS, has 
been committed to the 'hard currency' option, the 'soft currency' alternative has played 
an important role for the remaining small EMS economies, Belgium, Denmark and 
Ireland, at least in the early stages of the EMS. At a later stage of the EMS this 'soft 
currency' bloc disintegrated and some countries, most noticeably Ireland and to a 
lesser extent also France, shifted towards the 'hard currency' standard. In the wake of 
German unification the 'hard currency' stance of the Bundesbank has eroded 
somewhat. Initially this increased convergence. When German inflation exceeded 
inflation rates in the remaining EMS countries the potential gains from credible 
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exchange rate pegging policies disappeared. This destabilised the system and 
contributed to its collapse in August 1993. 
       The potential benefits and drawbacks of systems of exchange rate target zones 
such as the EMS are at the heart of the recent target zone literature. This literature has 
been reviewed in the present study, and its empirical implications have been 
confronted with the data from the EMS. It has thereby been shown that the EMS did 
not appear to function as a system of credible exchange rate bands. Rather, for much 
of the initial EMS period, realignment expectations were high and credibility was low. 
The present study finds no compelling evidence of the type of non-linearities implied 
by fully credible target zone models, and the probability distributions of exchange 
rates within the band are not as they ought to be if exchange rate credibility were 
present. Thus, in keeping with the credibility measures derived from the policy game 
literature, the target zone framework points towards a serious lack of central bank 
commitment to targeting fixed exchange rates. However, the tests also indicate that 
recently exchange rate credibility has increased for all EMS countries. Except for the 
Netherlands, the decline of devaluation expectations must, nonetheless, still be viewed 
as insufficient to ensure that the EMS may be viewed as a system of credible target 
zones: rather, the estimated positive correlations between interest rate differentials and 
exchange rates point towards the presence of destabilising speculation when exchange 
rates approach the boundaries of the band. This presents no problem as long as 
exchange rates stay well within the middle of the band. But when they move towards 
the boundaries, financial markets will test whether or not the current parities are 
immutable. Devaluation expectations raise interest rate differentials, and this in turn 
fuels the speculative attack. The present study finds that in particular for the Italian 
lira the lack of exchange rate credibility appears to have been very pronounced. In 
view of these estimates it is hardly surprising that speculative attacks have forced the 
Italian Lira (and the British Pound) to leave the exchange rate mechanism in 
September 1992. For the remaining EMS countries, which abandoned their narrow 
bands in August 1993, target zone credibility was far from being perfect, but it was 
probably higher than during most of the previous EMS period. In addition, economic 
fundamentals were not vastly diverging. It is therefore difficult to find a consistent 
explanation for the collapse of the EMS system without further research into the 
intrinsic dynamics of exchange rates within bands under speculative attacks.  
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Appendix A  
Analytical Solution of Parabolic Partial Differential Equations 
Expected Exchange Rates in a Target Zone 
Svensson (1991b) shows that in a fully credible target zone the expected maturity 
exchange rate h(f,c,) is the solution for the partial differential equation: 
    (A1a) 
with initial condition:
 
 
 h(f,c,0)=x(f,c), f f fL U  ,  (A1b) 
and derivative boundary conditions: 
 hf(fL,c,)=0 and hf(fU,c,)=0 for   0 . (A1c) 
An analytical Fourier-series solution of this parabolic partial differential equation can 
be obtained by drawing on methods developed for boundary value problems in 
thermal diffusion processes in physics, as described for instance in Churchill and 
Brown (1987).  
Defining a=(fU-fL)/ and =2/

, the analytical Fourier series solution for equations 
(A1a,b,c) is derived by Svennson (1991b) as: 
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  (A3) 
with 
 y0(f,c)=0, (A4) 
  (A5) 
  (A6) 
  (A7) 
  (A8) 
 0 0  (A9) 
  (A10) 
Clearly, the series h(f,c,) in equation (A3) involves a summation of infinitely many 
terms, and in practice this analytical solution has to be comuted numerically as a 
summation of a truncated series. In the present application (Graphs 3.4 to 3.6) a 
truncation at n=9 was found to be sufficiently accurate in calculating the expected 
maturity exchange rate h(f,c,) such that the analytical Fourier-series solution 
produced the same results as the direct numerical solution discussed in Appendix B 
below. 
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Appendix B  
The Numerical Solution of Parabolic Partial Differential Equations 
 
B1. Expected Exchange Rates in a Target Zone 
The numerical solution of parabolic partial differential equations will be discussed 
below in two steps. At first a solution is derived for fundamentals which lie strictly in 
the interior of the fundamentals band, fL<f<fU. This solution is identical for both fully 
credible and imperfectly credible exchange rate target zones. In a second step a 
solution for the boundaries (f=fL, f=fU) of the target zone is obtained, which is 
distictly different for fully credible and imperfectly credible target zones due to 
differences in the boundary conditions (smooth pasting versus jumps). 
     Svensson (1991b) shows that strictly inside the target zone the expected maturity 
exchange rate h(f,c,) is the solution to the parabolic partial difference equation: 
                                        fL<f<fU,   0 , (B1a) 
with initial condition: 
 h(f,c,0)=x(f,c), fL<f<fU, (B1b) 
     A numerical solution may be obtained by employing the so-called direct method 
from Gerald and Weatley (1989). Thereby a second order Taylor expansion forward 
and backward of the twice differentiable function h(.) in equation (B1a) is taken. For 
this purpose a I*J grid for (f,) is defined, where for a given positive integer I a state 
space for fundamentals is defined: 
     (B2) 
whilst for a positive integer J and a given positive real time-step t : 
  j j for j   , , . . . ,1 1J  (B3) 
is postulated. Approximating the derivatives hf and hff by central differences: 
     (B4a) 
     (B4b) 
196 Appendix 
and the derivative h by a forward difference: 
     (B4c) 
a forward solution in  of the original partial differential equation can be obtained as: 
                                                                  2 i I-1, (B5) 
with                      , and                , whereby r0.5 is required for convergence. 
     This difference equation approximates the original differential equation in the 
interior of the band. Following Svensson (1991b) and Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) the 
boundary conditions now have to be incorporated into the solution, as will be 
discussed below. 
B2. Expected Exchange Rates at the Boundaries of a Fully Credible Target Zone 
     Svensson (1991b) shows that the above difference equation (B5) holds only in the 
interior of the band, that is for 2 i I-1. In order to incorporate the derivative 
boundary conditions: 
 hf(fL,c,)=0 and hf(fU,c,)=0  (B6) 
into the solution, one extra grid points is added above and below the previous grid fi 
(i=1,2,...I): 
 f0=fL-f and fI+1=fU+f  (B7) 
And the derivative boundary conditions may then be expressed as:  
                 (B8a) 
                 (B8b) 
which implies: 
 h h and h hj j I
j
I
j
0 2 1 1   . (B9) 
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Substituting (B9) back into (B5) then results in the difference equations for the 
boundaries: 
  (B10a) 
  (B10b) 
Combined with the solution for the interior of the band from equations (B4a,b,c) and 
(B5) this may be written in matrix form as:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or in more compact notation as:  
 h hj j 1  . (B11) 
Combined with the initial condition that the zero-term expected forward exchange 
rate is equal to the current spot exchange rate,               , this results in the linear 
forward iteration: 
 . (B12) 
The initial vector of exchange rates x(f,c) may be obtained by mapping the 
fundamentals into exchange rate space using equations (3.20e-m) from Box 3.1 of 
Chapter 3. Based on this, a vector of forward exchange rates for any maturity may 
then be obtained by recursively iterating the above linear transformation , whereby 
f and t must be chosen such that r=s2t/(2(x)2)0.5 is satisfied in order to ensure 
the stability of the system. 
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B3. Expected Exchange Rates at the Boundaries of an 
Imperfectly Credible Target Zone 
     Bartolini and Bodnar (1991) show that that the boundary conditions describing the 
jumps of the exchange rate at the edges of a number of N bands in fundamental space 
with I steps in each band are given by: 
  (B13a) 
  (B13b) 
whereby it is assumed that the top of the highest band (i=1) and the bottom of the 
lowest band (i=NI) are defended by infinitesimal intervention with probability one: 
  (B14) 
Combined with the solution for the interior of the band from equations (B4a,b,c) and 
(B5) this may be written in matrix form as: 
  
  
with B= 
0 1 2 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
  r s r r s  L
N
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
O
Q
PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
a f a f a f
,   D= 
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 0  r s r r s  
L
N
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
O
Q
PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPa f a f a f
, 
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Written in matrix notation, one again obtains a linear difference equation: 
 h hj j 1  , (B15) 
which, combined with the initial condition that the zero-term expected forward 
exchange rate has to be equal to the current spot exchange rate,                    , results in 
the linear forward iteration: 
 . (B16) 
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The initial (NI) vector of exchange rates can, in analogy to the case of a fully credible 
target zone above, be obtained by mapping the (NI) vector of fundamentals into 
exchange rate space using equations (3.20e-m) from Box 3.1 of chapter 3. Based on 
this, a vector of forward exchange rates may then be obtained for any maturity by 
recursively iterating the above linear transformation . As above, f and t must be 
chosen such that r=s
2t/(2(x)2)0.5 is satisfied in order to ensure the stability of the 
system. 
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DATA SOURCES 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Quarterly Data 
Consumer Price Indices 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
 
7.2. Monthly Data 
Nominal Exchange Rates 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
Government Bond 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
Call Money 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
Interest Rates 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
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Consumer Price Indices 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
Monetary Aggregates 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
 
7.3. Daily Data 
Nominal Exchange Rates 
Data from Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1991), Bank for International 
Settlements Databank. 
Nominal Interest Rates 
2 Day, 1 Month and 12 Month Euro Rates Data from Flood, Rose and 
Mathieson (1991), Bank for International Settlements Databank. 
I should like to thank Andy Rose for kindly providing these BIS daily 
data. 
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